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PEACE IQC – PROGRAM EVALUATIONS

TASK ONE - FINAL BASELINE REPORT

OCTOBER 2016

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ASPIRE	Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement
AFPC	Association of Women Communications Professionals
B4P	Buddhist Network for Peace
BIRP	Bouar Inter-Religious Platform
CAR	Central African Republic
CPC	Community Peace Committee
CPM	Committee for Peace & Mediation
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DCHA/CMM	Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation
DDR	Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
HOPE Yala	Healing, Opportunity, Peace and Engagement of Youth in Yala
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IP	Implementing Partner
IRP	Inter-Religious Platform
ISTF	Islamic Sri Taksin Foundation
KIA	Kenan Institute Asia
KII	Key Informant Interview
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MAC	Muslim Attorney Centre
DNH	Do No Harm
PAW	Women's Agenda for Peace
P2P	People-to-People
PPST	Promoting Peace in South Thailand
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
SPAN	Southern Paralegal Advocacy Network
TAF	The Asia Foundation
TOC	Theory of Change
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAID/RDMA	United States Agency for International Development/Regional Development Mission for Asia
USG	United States Government

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And finally, the evaluation team is especially grateful to the hundreds of men, women and young people from Thailand and CAR who generously shared their time, knowledge and experiences. Their transparent, candid and courageous commentary provides the substance on which this report is based.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM) has undertaken a thematic evaluation of four people-to-people peacebuilding projects that engage conflicting groups whose differences include religious identity in order to contribute to the limited body of knowledge on the nexus of religion, conflict and peacebuilding relevant to development programming. The four peacebuilding projects that provide the basis of this study are funded through USAID's Global Reconciliation Fund. These projects include:

- **Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand (PPST):** implemented by The Asia Foundation (TAF) and its seven local partners in the three provinces and border districts of the Deep South of Thailand over a three-year period.
- **Healing, Opportunity, Peace and Engagement of Youth in Yala (HOPE Yala):** implemented in Yala province in the Deep South of Thailand by the Kenan Institute Asia (KIA) and its two local university partners over a three-year period.
- **Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement (ASPIRE):** Implemented by Mercy Corps and its local partner the Bouar Inter-Religious Platform in the Central African Republic (CAR) over a two-year period.
- **Zo Kwe Zo:** Implemented by Search for Common Ground (SFCG) and its local partner Association of Women Communications Professionals (AFPC) in Bossangoa, Bangassou and Bangui in CAR over a two-year period.

In the start-up period for each of the four projects, the evaluation team conducted field work at project sites in South Thailand and CAR over a combined total of six weeks. The following key findings in this baseline report are organized according to the three main thematic evaluation questions related to how factors relevant to religion and peacebuilding influences projects' (1) implementation, (2) effectiveness and (3) sustainability:

(1) IMPLEMENTATION: *What are the critical implementation activities and strategies needed to respond effectively to conflict where parties are mobilized around religious identities?*

Roles played by religious actors affiliated with at least one of the participating projects are grouped into the following six categories: Spiritual Leadership, Identity-Group Representation, Role Modeling, Community Mobilization, Dispute Resolution, and Conflict Transformation.

- Respondents described the dual nature of these six roles by illustrating examples of religious actors who served to reinforce conditions for peace or conditions for conflict. For example, one religious actor serving in the role of spiritual leader may support a reconciliation path inspired by religious values while another spiritual leader may draw upon sacred texts to outline when violence is

justified or defined as a duty. One actor in the role of conflict transformer may find common ground that builds bridges and promotes healing while another transformer successfully derails a peace process as a spoiler.

- The fluid nature of these roles is exemplified by actors who change their positive or negative posture toward peace due to changing circumstances, the amount and quality of available information on the conflict, local and external support, or dissuasive mechanisms.
- Although, non-religious and secular actors can take on many of the same roles as religious actors, respondents consider some roles as primarily within the religious or the secular domains. For example, the role of spiritual leader is exclusive to religious actors. Roles attributed primarily to secular actors relate to governance, security, and basic service delivery. Additionally, respondents preferred a secular actor play a primary peacebuilding role when religious identity was seen as leading to preferential treatment or bias.
- Women are able to perform in the same roles as men but are usually subordinate to men when operating within formal religious institutions. Women more commonly serve as religious actors through faith-based organizations and are believed to be more effective than men in inter-religious trust-building.

Project-specific opportunities for leveraging religion to facilitate implementation is evidenced to varying degrees in all four projects:

- High regard and status of formal religious leaders in CAR, and to a lesser extent in South Thailand, present these actors as potentially influential project partners, especially those religious leaders who are grounded in the local community and provide tangible supports and service.
- Although religious institutions—such as churches, mosques, temples and leadership hierarchies—potentially offer permanency, penetration, and inter-connectivity that secular institutions often lack, ASPIRE is the only one of the four projects at baseline that has explicit plans to engage with formal religious structures. ASPIRE intends to strengthen the organizational capacity of its local partner Bouar Inter-Religious Platform (BIRP) and build a lasting relationship between BIRP and the network of other inter-religious platforms in Bangui and other parts of the county.
- The formal and informal power, authority, and influence that religious leaders and institutions wield provides greater access to population groups for delivering messages of peace (or conflict) than civil authorities may have; the extent to which projects tap into this potential will be measured at endline.
- In the case of HOPE Yala, the project staff and advisors see Muslims' and Buddhists' limited understanding of each other's beliefs and practices (something that could be seen as a challenge) as a productive opportunity for cross-community learning. Through demystifying religious practices and beliefs, the project intends to break down stereotypes and to build meaningful and trusted relationships.

Significant implementation challenges related to religion fall into three main categories:

- All four projects describe challenges related to intra- and inter-religious divisions with varying levels of distrust, rumors, and isolation arising from historical grievances and current cycles of aggression, victimhood and revenge.
- In both South Thailand and CAR, state actors have attempted to instrumentalize religion by mobilizing constituencies through identity-based fears, grievances and prejudice to achieve self-interested political aims.
- Given that religious-identity representation is highly sensitive in both the CAR and South Thailand contexts, all projects are working to ensure equitable but not quota-based processes for selecting project participants and recruiting staff who represent the diversity of the target populations.

Relevancy of religious dimensions to project implementation was de-emphasized by respondents in explaining conflict dynamics.

- Because the conflicts in South Thailand and CAR have often been oversimplified or incorrectly characterized as being caused by religion, both potential project participants as well as interviewed project staff de-emphasized the role of religion in explaining conflict dynamics. Implementing partner staffs explained that religion, religious leaders and religious values are not underlying causes of the conflicts.
- However, non-staff respondents who experienced personal loss or identity-based victimhood did assign religious identity of perpetrators.
- In terms of relevancy of religion and conflict transformation, CAR respondents were more explicit and enthusiastic in deeming religious dynamics as central to peacebuilding.

(2) EFFECTIVENESS: In what ways did religious dynamics affect intended, unintended and actual project results?

Expected changes in attitudes, knowledge, and behavior are primarily related to achieving gains in social cohesion and nonviolent mechanisms for conflict resolution. Connections of expected results to Peace Writ Large are related to transformations at both a community-based (e.g. local dispute resolution mechanisms, increased inter-communal trust) and national levels (e.g. formal peace negotiations, national political transition).

The level of efficacy of targeted religious actors or their secular counterparts in mitigating conflict and peacebuilding was unclear at baseline due to IPs not having identified targeted project beneficiaries at the time of evaluation data collection or not including religious actors in these roles. If the projects develop measurements of participants' baseline competency, the evaluation team can potentially develop tools for endline data collection to use for comparison.

Explicit religious messaging is not employed for project activities or as a means for achieving project objectives. Projects' emphasize universal human values that are not exclusively tied to religion. However, respondents affiliated with each of the three major religions practiced in the study areas highlighted religious values that are consistent with project objectives in terms of social cohesion, nonviolence and coexistence.

Six key project implementation components create opportunities for engaging, leveraging or being sensitive to religious dynamics. These include: Conflict Assessment, Staffing, Procurement, Participant Selection, Do No Harm, and Monitoring & Evaluation. At endline, the evaluation team will work with the projects to identify how projects' inclusion or exclusion of religious considerations may have impacted results.

Project theories of change (TOC, formulated as an If.... then.... logic statement) related to intra- and inter-religious conflict and peacebuilding will be analyzed at endline by documenting changes in TOCs over the process of implementation, validation of causal links, and degree of achievement of expected results.

- Although religious actors are not explicitly highlighted in project materials as the objects of change, there is language where religious people are implied to be a subset of a general category of project participants.
- Project TOCs' "if statements" as they pertain to religious considerations can be categorized into three project approaches: (1) Interaction between and engagement with key stakeholders, (2) Capacity building, and (3) Building understanding and increasing awareness

Linkages between project activities and Peace Writ Large at baseline relate to support for both national efforts (i.e., peace negotiations or political transition) and community-based conflict resolution mechanisms (e.g., Inter-Religious Platforms, Committees for Peace and Mediation, Community Peace Committees, inter-religious cooperation). At the community level, projects link the improved individual and institutional capacity for peaceful resolution of conflict to a reduction in cycles of violence that disrupt national peace efforts.

(3) SUSTAINABILITY: How are any changes in attitudes, knowledge and behaviors related to dynamics between religious groups likely to continue after the projects' conclusions?

Project approaches to sustainability of results or ability for ongoing adaptation to support desired effects fall into three categories:

- Selecting project participants who are established influentials or believed to be persuasive in the future, including religious leadership and youth.
- Institutionalizing change through inter-religious platforms and including religious leaders or identity representation on local dispute resolution committees.

- Seeking to achieve cultural shifts in attitudes within and between religious constituencies that will create an enabling environment for inter-religious peace and rejection of inter-communal strife.

External factors have a bearing on the sustainability and adaptability of results

for all four projects, with the following four likely to have the most impact on projects achieving goals:

- Progress or lack of progress of political transition is likely to have disparate effects on different religion-based identity groups with implications for the ability of projects to promote a message of nonviolent conflict resolution and cross-identity cooperation.
- Religious identity has taken on a transnational character with potential for peace-supporting interests as well as perpetrators of violence crossing national boundaries.
- Changes in levels of violence are likely to affect project outcomes. An increase in violence would likely reinforce patterns of identity-based victimhood and aggression, thereby deepening the divide between religious groups. On the other hand, a reduction in violence and easing of threats can motivate efforts to rebuild trust, restore relationships and build a foundation for mutual respect.
- Economic and social disparities keep local grievances alive and affected populations susceptible to being mobilized and hijacked by armed political groups for their own purposes. Prompt and tangible investments will be needed to emphasize the benefits of peace over that of war.

I. INTRODUCTION

USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM) works to create programming that effectively prevents, mitigates, and manages the causes and consequences of violent conflict, fragility, and extremism. Since 2004, DCHA/CMM has managed the Global Reconciliation Fund program,¹ which provides small grants to bring together people of different ethnic, religious, and political backgrounds from areas of unrest and war in order to promote conflict prevention, mitigation, and management.

To contribute to the limited body of knowledge on the nexus of religion, conflict, and peacebuilding relevant to development programming, DCHA/CMM has undertaken a thematic evaluation studying four Global Reconciliation Fund projects that engage conflicting groups whose differences include religious identity. The focus of the evaluation is not on the individual performance of the four projects but on the generalizable knowledge gained from studying implementation and results. The three key evaluation questions are as follows:²

1. **IMPLEMENTATION:** What are critical implementation activities and strategies needed to respond effectively to conflict where parties are mobilized around religious identities?
2. **EFFECTIVENESS:** In what ways did religious dynamics affect intended, unintended and actual project results?
3. **SUSTAINABILITY:** How are any changes in attitudes, knowledge and behaviors related to dynamics between religious groups likely to continue after the projects' conclusions?

The overall baseline report documents evaluation-relevant components of the four participating Global Reconciliation Fund Implementing Partners at project start-up. The report's contextual background section provides a brief overview of the four projects, their operational context and the evaluation methodology. The section on baseline findings addresses the three thematic evaluation questions related to implementation, effectiveness and sustainability. The recommendations section focuses on proposed modifications to the evaluation's endline activities. The report annex provides useful background on the evaluation and the four participating projects as well as additional documentation of project start-up activities.

¹ The fund is managed in accordance with Congressional appropriation, Section 7060(f) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76, Division K).

² For a comprehensive list of evaluation sub-questions, please see Table B-1: *Overall and Baseline Evaluation Questions and Sub-Questions* in Annex B: *Baseline Methodology*.

II. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

SUMMARY OF SOUTH THAILAND PROJECTS³

Since 2004, the Deep South region of Thailand (Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani provinces, and neighboring districts of Songkhla province) has seen a resurgence in 2004 of an ethno-nationalist conflict that dates back to the separatist movement of the early 1900s. Unlike the rest of Thailand, the region is predominantly Muslim and Malay-speaking but with a large Thai Buddhist minority. Key conflict drivers are grounded in long-standing center-periphery tensions rooted in Malay-Muslim grievances against the Thai state. Grievances include discrimination in local governance and social service delivery, political marginalization, and perceptions of injustice based on past human rights abuses and heavy-handed assimilation policies. Although religious identity is a characterization of the warring factions, the conflict is not driven by religious persecution, exclusion, or other religious-themed challenges. However, with conflicting parties trying to appropriate religion in order to garner support for their political positions and the persistence of identity-based inequity, tensions between Muslims and Buddhists in the South have become more prominent with formerly peaceful social relations unraveling. The result of the violence is increasing displacement, separation, isolation, and withdrawal into distinct communities. Efforts to restart formal peace talks between the Thai government and an umbrella group of rebels have faced multiple roadblocks.

The Reconciliation Fund projects in South Thailand that are part of this evaluation are as follows [For additional background information on these projects, see Annex C South Thailand Projects Summary.]:

- **Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand (PPST):** The Asia Foundation (TAF) and its seven local partners will implement PPST in the whole of the Deep South over a three-year period. PPST's overarching goal is to increase trust and common understanding among conflicting groups at the community and local elite levels. PPST also aims to improve the prospect of higher-level peace talks succeeding by helping to ameliorate day-to-day violence and building sustainable bottom-up support for peace. Planned PPST capacity building activities have a strong focus on women community leaders and local elites, with a targeted strategy to enable effective bottom-up advocacy for national peace negotiations. While the project takes religion of participants into consideration in several ways, the project does not specifically target religious leaders. While some may be included as members of local elites, they are selected on the basis of a variety of criteria. Local partners include civil society organizations that support intra-religious and inter-religious engagement, cross-identity mutual support, dialogue and advocacy. The project does not engage explicitly religious institutions, such as Buddhist temples, mosques or formal religious hierarchies.
- **Healing, Opportunity, Peace and Engagement of Youth in Yala (HOPE-Yala):** Implemented by the Kenan Institute Asia (KIA) and its two local university partners over

³ Description of conflict dynamics and projects are attributable to The Asia Foundation and Kenan Institute Asia's project proposals, work plans and monitoring and evaluation plans with updates based on evaluation team field work in March 2016.

a three-year period, the HOPE Yala's goal is to build trust between Muslims and Buddhists in six communities in Yala province by increasing inter-communal understanding that leads to changed attitudes and increased cooperation within project locations. Working through six partner schools and local communities, HOPE-Yala will strive to engage Muslim and Buddhist children (ages of about 13-14 years) to become young leaders among their peers, thereby resisting the use of violence and promoting social space for addressing grievances and development needs. Religious scholars serve as project advisors and validators. Community religious leaders educate student participants on cultural and historical themes. Students engage in inter-religious activities to enable cross-identity relationship building, cooperation and trust-building to challenge stereotypes and ignorance.

SUMMARY OF CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC PROJECTS⁴

In the Central African Republic (CAR), political and economic exclusion, high levels of corruption and illiteracy, weak state capacity for governance and service delivery, high unemployment and poverty rates, and inequitable access to proceeds of natural resources have underscored political instability in CAR since independence in 1960. CAR's current population of approximately four million includes about 80 percent Christians, 15 percent Muslims, and 5 percent practitioners of indigenous African religions and other faiths. In the most recent crisis, political actors mobilized and used the grievances of different identity groups to support their quests for power and control of resources. The Séléka coalition of loosely coordinated armed groups started as a regional assemblage fighting for political and economic justice and inclusion of the neglected northeastern part of the country. It rapidly acquired an Islamic label due to the Arabic speaking Muslim militant factions within the coalition. Similarly, the Anti Zaragina group—historically constituted in some parts of CAR to protect communities against armed robberies—became labeled as the Christian Antibalaka militia when its Christian-majority fighters took up arms against the Séléka, even though some Antibalaka militias have Muslims in its rank and file. [See Annex D – Central African Republic Projects Summary.]

The Reconciliation Fund projects in CAR are both implemented over a two-year period and are as follows:

- Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement (ASPIRE): Implemented by Mercy Corps and its local partner the Bouar Inter-Religious Platform, ASPIRE “aims to enable community leaders of all faiths and disaffected youth to work together to peacefully manage inter-group tensions, rebuild community cohesion and strengthen pluralism in the strategic town of Bouar.”⁵ The project focuses on building the capacity of faith and youth leaders in Bouar: (1) To promote inclusive community-led conflict resolution and prevention; (2) To support connector economic engagements between divided groups; and (3) To create positive attitudes for tolerance and nonviolent behaviors. Religious leaders individually and the Bouar Inter-Religious Platform organizationally will be key partners in project implementation and in leading

⁴ Description of conflict dynamics and projects are attributable to Mercy Corps and Search for Common Ground's project proposals and work plans with updates based on evaluation team field work in May 2016.

⁵ Mercy Corps Award Excerpt, Attachment B Program Description, APS-OAA-14-00003.

social cohesion activities. Additionally, inter-religious groups of community members will work collaboratively on joint economic projects of mutual benefit.

- Zo Kwe Zo: Implemented by Search for Common Ground (SFCG) and its local partner Association of Women Communications Professionals (l'Association des Femmes Professionnelles de la Communication or AFPC), Zo Kwe Zo seeks to prevent intercommunity violence and to support an inclusive national peacebuilding process. Project implementation is located in the towns of Bangui, Bangassou and Bossangoa and their nearby environs. Its three specific objectives are: (1) To increase the participation of young women and men from diverse identity groups in peacebuilding processes; (2) To amplify positive representations of nonviolent and collaborative voices in the media; and (3) To enhance the capacity of non-state institutions to support a credible, peaceful, inclusive and transparent transition process. Engagement of religious leaders is relevant to the project to the extent that they are influential in supporting messages of nonviolence and inclusion. The project creates a platform for disseminating a diversity of voices in support of both community-based and national dialogue to support reintegration of divided communities.

III. BASELINE METHODOLOGY

The evaluation includes establishing a baseline of key findings aggregated across all four projects, to be compared with endline findings compiled in the final quarter of each project. The primary activities for the baseline include review of project planning documentation; thematic literature scan on the nexus of peacebuilding, religion and conflict; key informant interviews (KII); focus group discussions (FGD); site visits; and mini-surveys in both South Thailand and CAR. Endline evaluation activities will include validation of initial and modified theories of change and corresponding assumptions as well as outcome harvesting to identify intended and unintended results related to religious components across projects. [For more detail on the evaluation design, please see Annex B: Baseline Methodology.]

Limitations on the evaluation methodology primarily relate to the fact that the Global Reconciliation Fund and the selected projects are not explicitly focused on religious dynamics. Religious identity is one of multiple identity characteristics of the projects' contexts and participants. Similarly, the people-to-people model is one approach to peacebuilding and may not offer direct relevance to other types of peacebuilding endeavors or projects focused primarily on humanitarian assistance or international development objectives. The narrow nature of the selected projects may therefore limit the generalizability of learning. It is important to note that this evaluation focuses on learning gleaned from the Global Reconciliation Fund projects and is not comprehensive of all activities in the targeted locations that may have a peacebuilding effect or involve religion in humanitarian or development activities. Within the constraints arising from the Global Reconciliation Fund projects serving as the evaluation's unit of analysis, the study is designed to identify valid findings that indicate useful adaptation for broader contexts.

IV. BASELINE FINDINGS

Baseline findings document aggregated observations across all four projects with illustrative examples drawn from individual project's planned activities or contextual factors at start-up. Whenever appropriate, the report provides disaggregated findings to support the endline comparison process and explanation of differences.

IMPLEMENTATION: *What are the critical implementation activities and strategies needed to respond effectively to conflict where parties are mobilized around religious identities?*

ROLES OF RELIGIOUS ACTORS

This thematic evaluation explores whether an improved understanding of the range of roles played by religious actors can support implementers to better conduct contextual analysis and project design. In the baseline, the evaluation team defined religious actors to include both individuals and institutions whose function is tied to religious identity. This definition expands the role beyond formal religious leaders and hierarchies to capture contributions made by a broader range of society members. In the baseline, the evaluation team identified and categorized key roles played by religious actors involved with the Global Reconciliation Fund projects. At endline, the evaluation team will identify effects on project outcomes of engaging or not engaging key religious actors in these roles along with any Do No Harm (DNH) implications.⁶

Respondents identified six main roles⁷ played by religious actors in at least one South Thailand and CAR Global Reconciliation Fund projects. [For illustrative examples of engagement for each project, see Table I Peacebuilding Roles of Religious Actors, by Global Reconciliation Fund Project. For more details on each of these role categories, see Annex E Peacebuilding Roles of Religious Actors, by Global Reconciliation Fund Project.]. Roles involving role modeling, identity-group representation, and community mobilization are common across all four projects. In both CAR projects, religious leaders and groups are anticipated to play a central role in conflict transformation and dispute resolution. ASPIRE and

⁶ Because the evaluation will assess the extent of projects' engagement with religious actors and to what effect, the illustrative examples at baseline emphasize each role's positive (as opposed to negative) contributions toward peacefully resolving conflict. The intent of the baseline is to identify the spectrum of planned roles across all four projects and the level of engagement of actors within these various roles. It was beyond the scope of the baseline study to determine the relevance of each role to conflict dynamics and projects' designs or the pre-project competency of project participants.

⁷ Although not considered a role, faith-based entities serve as projects' local partners to support implementation. All but one of the projects (Zo Kwe Zo) have formal contracts with the local partners. HOPE Yala has subcontracted with Prince of Songkhla University, which includes Islamic religious scholars serving as project advisors on cultural/religious sensitivities. PPST subcontracts with Buddhists for Peace (B4P) to support intra-religious activities with the Buddhist community in South Thailand and with Women's Peace Agenda (PAW) to support inter-religious advocacy efforts by Muslim and Buddhist women. ASPIRE subcontracts with Bouar Inter-Religious Platform (BIRP) and works to build BIRP's institutional capacity and leverage its influential voice for social cohesion across Bouar and in connection with national efforts in Bangui.

TABLE 1 *Peacebuilding Roles of Religious Actors, by Global Reconciliation Fund Project*

PEACEBUILDING ROLE	ROLES (by project)			
	HOPE Yala	PPST	ASPIRE	Zo Kwe Zo
Spiritual Leadership	Imams and monks as community advisors	None	Promotion of nonviolence and peace messaging	Intra-religious sensitization activities
Identity-Group Representation	(1) Students' inter-religious activities (2) Inter-religious community projects	Inter-religious advocacy for ceasefires (PAW)	Inter-religious economic engagement	(1) Inter-religious youth solidarity events (2) Diverse identity-based voices through media
Role Modeling	None	Exemplar religious leaders inspire peers to engage in peacebuilding	BIRP demonstrates inter-religious respect & effort	Radio soap operas demonstrate nonviolent conflict resolution
Community Mobilization	Mosque-based imams endorse/validate project	(1) Facilitate intra-religious dialogue (B4P) (2) Religious leaders feedback project advances to constituents	Inter-religious economic engagement	(1) Inter-religious youth solidarity events (2) Intra-religious radio stations outreaching to identity-based listenership
Dispute Resolution	None	Religious leaders as "Local Elite" to participate in negotiation process	(1) Community Peace Committees (2) BIRP	Committees for Peace & Mediation
Conflict Transformation	None	None	Promote social cohesion toward reconciliation and community resiliency in face of violence	(1) Inter-religious youth engagement (2) Promotion of social cohesion

Source: Evaluation interviews and focus group discussions in South Thailand (March 2016) and CAR (May 2016)

PPST include sub-activities within the role of conflict transformation that support larger peace processes. For example, ASPIRE supports BIRP to participate in the national convening of inter-religious platforms, and PPST supports individual religious actors to provide input to the formal peace negotiations.

Non-religious and secular actors can take on many of the same functions; however, there are some roles that respondents see as primarily within the religious or secular domains. For example, only the role of spiritual leader is exclusive to religious actors. On the other hand, roles reserved under the duty and jurisdiction of government secular actors relate to governance, security, rule of law, and universal access to basic public services. Respondents viewed the secular actors connected with the international community as having greater access to resources, such as what is required for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programs (DDR) or responding to humanitarian crises. Additionally, respondents preferred a secular actor play a primary role when religious identity was seen as leading to preferential treatment or bias. In these cases, the secular actor that does not have a religious affiliation can serve as a neutral party. Importantly, because government actions and statements have been perceived as favoring the majority religious group in both countries, Muslim respondents in South Thailand and Muslim respondents in CAR noted that government officials and agencies within their respective countries were not definitionally considered as religiously neutral secular actors.

Women in South Thailand and CAR are able to perform in the same roles as men. However, women in these roles are usually subordinate to men when operating within formal religious institutions. More often women will serve as a religious actor through a faith-based organization within civil society, including membership in religious women's associations, religious scholars in educational institutions, or charitable giving or service through a religion-affiliated aid agency. As individuals, women can play an influential role by garnering respect arising from behavior deemed exemplary of religious values. Both male and female respondents in both CAR and South Thailand indicated that women may be found to be more effective in certain peacebuilding roles than men, such as inter-religious trust-building and forgiveness. Their status as mothers was also seen as influential over their children, whether positively encouraging young minds towards coexistence or deepening divisions and distrust.

Respondents illustrated the dual nature of the six roles through examples of religious actors performing the same role with divergent intentions or results. This duality is evidenced when religious leaders and institutions use their faith foundations and societal influence to be connectors for peace or dividers for conflict. For example, religious actors serving in the role of spiritual leader may support a peacebuilding path inspired by religious values while another may draw upon sacred texts to outline when violence is justified or even a duty. One actor serving as a conflict transformer may forge common ground that builds bridges and promotes healing while another successfully derails a peace process as a spoiler. In CAR, for instance, respondents noted that some religious leaders offered themselves as spiritual directors or counselors to both the Séléka and Antibalaka militias. In Thailand, respondents spoke of a monk who has tried to mobilize Buddhists toward support of violence through anti-Muslim rhetoric.

Fluidity of adherence to a positive or negative intention is another dimension of these religious actors' roles. Actors might change the nature of their role played over time due to changing circumstances, the amount and quality of available information on the conflict, local and external support, or dissuasive mechanisms. In CAR, respondents noted that some religious leaders initially acted negatively by stoking the fires of the conflict through their pronouncements and biased engagements. For instance, a former Séléka leader turned from sectarian-based violent conflict toward mobilizing fellow Muslim fighters to favor dialogue. He formed the Séléka Rénovée to champion this new agenda for peace.⁸ In South Thailand, respondents explained that religious actors have not played a prominent peacebuilding role for various reasons. For example, respondents explained that Malay Muslim leaders are loath to actively represent constituent interests due to deadly repercussions and threats faced by those that had dared to formally engage in roles perceived by the state as political. However, PPST anticipates that supportive engagement through its project activities may see a shift from an inactive role towards increased engagement, especially in public input to the national peace process.

EXPECTED OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION RELATED TO RELIGIOUS DYNAMICS

At baseline, both staff and non-staff respondents described religion-related circumstances in their operating environments that could potentially facilitate project implementation. As the projects continue with implementation, project staffs will make determinations as to whether these identified circumstances are relevant to their specific objectives and contexts. The extent to which each project leverages these potential opportunities—and to what effect—will be examined at endline.

A key opportunity in both countries is the population's generally high regard of formal religious leaders, making them potentially influential project partners. In CAR, priests, pastors and imams are found to be the most "listened to" leadership in the country.⁹ Many of the country's Christian and Muslim leaders have already been instrumental in promoting social cohesion, and the projects will be seeking to build upon, formalize and strengthen what has already been achieved. In Thailand, however, exploring this potential opportunity will require careful attention to disincentives and Do No Harm concerns. Among Buddhists in South Thailand, monks are highly respected and central to performing religious ritual and attending to religious affairs of the Buddhist public. However, PPST staff emphasize that Buddhist tenants prescribe active engagement in politically-focused leadership. South Thailand's mosque-based imams are seen to have an intimate knowledge of and respect from their communities in which they live and serve.

⁸ In a public statement made in October 2015, General Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane made "a solemn appeal to all combatants of the former Séléka of all political tendencies to understand today that the path of weapons will never succeed and that it is now the time for consultation. Those who feel marginalized must place himself at the table. I ask them to follow the path that I have drawn from the Bangui Forum until today." (Translated from French: <https://ndjonisango.net/2015/10/21/le-general-dhaffane-se-demarque-de-nourredine-et-appelle-les-ex-seleka-a-privilegier-le-dialogue/>)

⁹ SFCG staff members referenced these findings from its project's baseline survey; the evaluation team will review source documentation prior to endline analysis to confirm.

But as explained in the previous section, imams in South Thailand are understandably cautious when it comes to political activity. In order to take advantage of this potential opportunity, PPST plans to explore options for overcoming serious threats to safety and legitimacy of religious leaders and strengthening their capacity to play a larger peacebuilding role that is consistent with their religious duties and authority.

A second opportunity identified by respondents is leveraging the **permanency and penetration of religious institutions as a means to supporting sustainability strategies**. By engaging religious actors that are integrated with these formal structures, projects could potentially develop a long-lasting home for improved capacities, inter-religious understanding and attitudes of tolerance. In both countries, community-based religious organizations can trace their institutional membership within a hierarchy that extends to national and international levels. In CAR, churches and mosques can be found in the most remote areas, where state institutions such as the police service, courts, or even schools and clinics are nonexistent. In Thailand, Buddhist monasteries and temples are part of a national network and hierarchy that have not only religious status, but also political status due to state funding and national identity. Islamic Councils in South Thailand extend from district, to provincial, to national levels with the Sheikh al Islam, who serves as the chief representative of Muslim interests to the state.¹⁰ Mosques serve as vital cultural and social centers not only within communities in South Thailand, but also throughout Thailand. Some mosques also have international ties through funding and educational instruction initiatives, notably from Turkey and the Arab world.

At baseline, ASPIRE is the only one of the four projects that has explicit plans to engage with formal religious structures. ASPIRE intends to strengthen the organizational capacity of its local partner BIRP as a means to institutionalizing the social cohesion activities and community-based conflict resolution mechanisms. Further, it intends to build a lasting relationship between BIRP based in Bouar with the network of other inter-religious platforms in Bangui and other parts of the county. At endline, the evaluation team will document whether the other three projects engage religious institutions to support sustained project results and how such engagement may be similar or different from engagement of secular institutions, such as civil society organizations or government agencies.

Religious leader respondents in both countries noted that religious institutions can offer **in-kind contributions for implementation that extend limited grant resources**. Religious buildings provide facilities for convening meetings and events, as will be used for intra-religious dialogue in CAR or for inter-religious exchange and learning in South Thailand. Religious academic institutions, such as private Islamic schools in South Thailand, offer ready access to young people for program engagement, if desired. In CAR, Christian and Muslim sermons and prayer services provide a pulpit for messaging and mobilization.

¹⁰ This largely symbolic position may have increased significance for Muslims in South Thailand because the current Shaik al Islam is the first imam from South Thailand to be in this role.

Religious actors also have congregations that form an attentive and often conforming audience. Both secular and religious respondents gave examples of how the formal and informal power, authority and influence that religious leaders and institutions wield provides greater access to population groups for messages of peace or even conflict than civil authorities may have. As a subset of the “local elite,” PPST is working with religious leaders to support their ability to communicate a peacebuilding understanding within their respective constituencies. ASPIRE has partnered directly with BIRP in recognition of the role religious leaders are already playing in encouraging social cohesion with their congregants.

In the case of HOPE Yala, the project staff and advisors see Muslims and Buddhists’ limited understanding of each other’s beliefs and practices (something that could be seen as a challenge) as a productive opportunity for cross-community learning. Project staff and advisors highlighted the growing physical and relational separation between formerly integrated communities of Buddhists and Muslims as a challenge to peaceful inter-communal relationships. This increasing physical isolation contributes to a lack of knowledge regarding the different religious and religiously-defined cultural differences. HOPE Yala believes that the lack of knowledge and exposure is linked to attitudes of pervasive fear, suspicion and distrust of the other. Therefore, HOPE Yala’s project design embraces this unfamiliarity to stimulate curiosity and mutual exploration. Through demystifying religious practices and beliefs (e.g. prayer rituals, dietary constraints, and religious dress) the project intends to break down stereotypes and to build meaningful and trusted relationships.

At endline, the evaluation team will review the extent to which projects leveraged these expected opportunities to support implementation. The team will also identify unexpected opportunities and DNH considerations emergent over the life of project implementation.

EXPECTED CHALLENGES FOR IMPLEMENTATION RELATED TO RELIGIOUS DYNAMICS

Projects have identified several significant challenges to implementation related to religion, falling into three main categories:

Divisionism: The most frequently mentioned challenge across all projects is addressing fault lines that create both inter- and intra-religious divisions. The four projects describe communities marked by varying levels of inter-religious distrust arising from historical grievances and current cycles of aggression, victimhood and revenge. Isolation brought on by segregated communities, poor communication infrastructure, and diminishing “neutral” spaces for inter-religious interactions contribute to destructive rumors and perpetuate intolerance. For example, Christian respondents in CAR described a religion-tagged economic divide in which the Muslim merchants and business owners were viewed as richer, exploitative or living off the toils and resources of the local, native, and economically poorer population who are predominantly Christian.

Within religions, there are also stark divisions. Oppositional attitudes toward cross-identity collaboration can sometime cause those engaged in peacebuilding activities to lose legitimacy in their own communities. In South Thailand, imams and those working with religious leaders highlighted this vulnerability facing Muslim leaders who promoted or participated in inter-religious efforts their Buddhist counterparts. Disputes over supremacy of different beliefs within a faith tradition can also lead to internal conflicts. In South Thailand, Muslim respondents highlighted differences in cultural practices as well as religious practices between “traditional” Malay Muslims and Salafi Muslims, many of whom have been educated abroad. On the other hand, Buddhist respondents explained that Buddhists in South Thailand (as well as in other parts of the country) can be divided in terms of the relationship between religion and the state, with some advocating for constitutional designation of Thailand as a Buddhist state and others more supportive of the current arrangement with five officially recognized religions. In CAR, Catholics and Protestants can be competitive for congregants and African Muslim imams are seen as less legitimate than “true” imams of Arab descent.

State Interests and Interference: In both South Thailand and CAR, state actors have attempted to instrumentalize religion by mobilizing constituencies through identity-based fears, grievances and prejudice to achieve self-interested political aims. In South Thailand, state agents have been implicated in persecution of imams and religious teachers of Islam. Threats, imprisonment, torture and death have had a chilling effect on Islamic leaders engaging in any capacity that might bring them into confrontation with the state, including advocating on behalf of their constituent communities. With the growing transnational nature of religious movements—including militant factions—state actors may deem believers within state boundaries connected to a larger international threat. In CAR where militias from neighboring Islamic countries fortified the Séléka movement, some within the Christian-dominated state apparatus defined the armed groups as an invading, Islamic threat intending to convert CAR into a caliphate. State cooption of religious leadership is another challenge that directly impacts the legitimacy and influence of religious actors working with the four projects. A religious leader in CAR emphasized this point in explaining his avoidance of joining inter-religious platforms. Interviewed teachers and religious leaders in South Thailand cited similar apprehensions as reasons for avoiding state-sponsored normalization and peacebuilding activities.

Representation: Given identity-based divisions within the operating environments of the projects, staff respondents recognized that addressing issues of representation is highly sensitive with DNH implications for achievement of project objectives. All projects are working to ensure equitable participant selection processes that are balanced but not quota-based and that are inclusive but do not inappropriately preference religious identity over other considerations. All projects have noted the importance of recruiting staff who represent populations that will be served. But staff members in both countries described difficulties identifying qualified candidates from religious minorities. Project staffs also pay attention to religious identity as a relevant characteristic in determining appropriate project validators. Further, project staffs recognized that differing conditions and circumstances could lead to shifting relevancy of identities, with religion being but one characteristic. And finally, all projects noted that working with religious leadership could

secure religious diversity but limit inclusion of women and young people, whom are under-represented in formal religious leadership positions in both South Thailand and CAR.

At endline, the evaluation team will review the extent to which projects were able to address these expected challenges related to religion as well as other challenges presented over the course of implementation. Endline analysis will also assess how challenges affected ability of projects to achieve stated goals.

RELEVANCY OF RELIGIOUS DIMENSIONS TO PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

Because the conflicts in South Thailand and CAR have often been oversimplified or incorrectly characterized as being caused by religion, focus groups of potential project participants as well as interviewed project staff were reluctant to emphasize religious considerations in explicit project designs or objectives.

In South Thailand, project staffs consistently de-emphasized the role of religion in explaining conflict dynamics. Some staff and non-staff respondents carefully avoided linking religion or religious identity groups with conflict dynamics. But while most respondents were careful to avoid blaming any particular religious group, some non-staff Muslim respondents did point to Buddhists and Buddhists respondents to Muslims as causing the current conflict. This attribution of culpability to “the other” was usually accompanied by descriptions of personal loss or experiences of identity-based victimhood. These respondents explained that the “others” should be held to account but seemed at a loss to identify a satisfactory mechanism to enforce the desired justice.

In CAR, ASPIRE and to a lesser extent Zo Kwe Zo staffs were more explicit and enthusiastic in deeming religious dynamics as central to peacebuilding. ASPIRE underlined the importance of the reconciling and relationship-building role of religious members of the inter-religious platforms while deemphasizing the divider role of other religious actors who fomented conflict. When non-staff respondents discussed the relationship between religion and conflict, the responses were very diverse with no obvious pattern pertaining to sex, location of residence, age or religious identity to explain differences.

QUESTION 2 EFFECTIVENESS: *In what ways did religious dynamics affect intended, unintended and actual project results?*

EXPECTED CHANGES IN ATTITUDES, KNOWLEDGE AND BEHAVIOR RELATED TO RELIGION

As noted in IP application documents and in field interviews with staff, changes related to relationships within and among religious groups are expected in terms of attitudes, knowledge and behavior.¹¹ **Types of changes common across the four projects are primarily related to achieving gains in social cohesion and nonviolent mechanisms for conflict resolution.** [For a listing of the expected changes at baseline, please see Table 2 Expected Changes in Attitudes, Knowledge and Behavior. For a listing of explicit and implicit theories of change for each project, including specific expected results, please see Annex F Program Theories of Change.]

Table 2 Expected Changes in Attitudes, Knowledge and Behavior

Type of Change	Expected Changes Related to Religion
Attitudes	Improve inter/intra-religious social cohesion (coexistence, trust, empathy) Increase inter/intra-religious support for nonviolent political transition Increase inter/intra-religious support for national peace processes Increase empathy for suffering of the Other Increase support for reintegration of displaced into mixed communities Decrease support for violent means for addressing grievances Decrease fear of engaging in inter-religious cooperation
Knowledge	Increase inter-religious knowledge of the Other Increase understanding of negotiation and peace processes Increase understanding of local dispute resolution mechanisms
Behavior	Increase inter-religious cooperation for joint action (political, social, economic) Increase application of conflict resolution skills and mechanisms to resolve inter/intra-religious conflicts Increase religious leaders' participation in national level negotiations Increase religious leaders' participation in national advocacy and dialogue Increase in public statements supporting inter-religious coexistence Disrupt inter-religious cycles of aggression, victimization, revenge Decrease reactions to unfounded rumors regarding identity-based conflict

Source: Project documentation, interviews and focus groups in South Thailand (March 2016) and CAR (May 2016).

¹¹ Each project has worked to set baselines for targeted changes. Three projects (PPST, ASPIRE, Zo Kwe Zo) conducted community surveys and focus groups to document targeted attitudes, knowledge and behaviors at start-up. HOPE Yala conducted pre-testing of student participants to capture these baseline measurements. If these baseline surveys and pre/post tests are made available to the evaluation team, this analysis could be included as part of the endline comparisons.

Based on evaluation survey results in CAR,¹² attitudes of FGD participants at start-up indicate a **strong belief in peaceful inter-religious relations in the past.**¹³ Nearly all respondents (98%, 113 of 115 respondents¹⁴) strongly agreed with the statement “Christians and Muslims have coexisted peacefully in the Central African republic for many decades.” There was little variation by sex (97%, 65 of 67 male; 100%, 44 of 44 female), religion (99%, 77 of 78 Christians; 97%, 31 of 32 Muslims), age (96%, 27 of 27 youth; 98%, 40 of 41 adults) or location (100%, 27 of 27 in Bangui, 91%, 21 of 23 in Bangassou, 96%, 26 of 27 in Bossangoa; 100%, 39 of 39 in Bouar). One hundred percent of nearly all respondents types (i.e., CPM members, IRP members, Peer Educators, past awareness workshop participants, women group members, youth leaders and journalists) strongly agreed with only a slightly lower percentage of performers, referred to as comédiens (91%, 10 of 11 comédiens) and Local Authorities (92%, 11 of 12 local authorities) strongly agreeing.

However, survey results in CAR indicate slightly lower confidence in the morality of a religious group other than one’s own. Although the majority of all respondents (70%, 78 of 112 responding Agree or Strongly Agree) are in agreement with the statement “People who belong to another religion are probably just as moral as the people in your religion,” only 36 percent overall (40 of 112 respondents) strongly agreed. The percentage of those strongly agreeing with this statement varies notably by location, ranging from only 11 percent (3 of 27 respondents) in Bangui to 55 percent in Bangassou (12 of 22 respondents). Thirty-three percent (12 of 36 respondents) in Bouar strongly agreed and 48 percent (13 of 27 respondents) in Bossangoa. Type of respondent also indicates a range of percentages strongly agreeing, with IRP members, peer educators, former awareness workshop participants, women group members, journalists and actors all between 18 and 25 percent. Youth leaders have the highest proportion of strong agreement (80%, 8 of 10 youth group members). Men are slightly more likely to Strongly

¹² These surveys were conducted at the end of CAR FGDs with key stakeholder groups in both projects. None of the CAR KII respondents participated in the survey. The evaluation team did not conduct a comparable survey in Thailand. In the case of HOPE Yala, the IP explained that the evaluation team’s presence in the six project communities could undermine the project’s new relationships at project start-up. TAF was in the process of finalizing project design so was still identifying specific groups with which to engage.

¹³ These survey results have weak generalizability across the relevant populations. They are included in the baseline report to document data collected at start-up but may not be useful for endline comparisons. Threats to generalizability arise from non-random surveying of FGD participants who were selected by IPs based on community members with whom the projects had previously worked. Therefore, all participants had prior exposure to social cohesion activities and may not be representative of the general population. Further, these respondents may not be typical of Global Reconciliation Fund projects’ participants because IPs had not yet finalized project activities or participant selection criteria. Further, the written surveys were in French, which some respondents are unable to read. Although interpreters read the survey questions in French as written, many of the survey respondents outside of Bangui required that interpreters restate the questions into Sango. Therefore, the interpreters’ elaboration is likely to lead to inconsistencies across FGDs in how the meaning of each question was stated. Inconsistencies are likely in terms of possible differences between the two interpreters and possible differences among FGD sessions for the same interpreter.

¹⁴ In some surveys, respondents did not provide key identifying characteristics (e.g., sex, age) or skipped a question. Therefore the total number of respondents varies by question but is indicated parenthetically. For more detailed data, please see Annex G HOPE Yala Mini-Survey Results.

Agree (39%, 26 of 67 male) than are women (34%, 14 of 41 females) but there are marked differences in levels of strong agreement among Christians (35%, 27 of 78 Christians) and Muslims (45%, 13 of 29 Muslims).

Interestingly, survey results in CAR indicate a similar pattern of weak confidence in the morality of one's own religious group. Although the majority of all respondents (70%, 76 of 109 responding Agree or Strongly Agree) are in agreement with the statement “Most people in your religion are moral,” only 39 percent overall (42 of 109 respondents) strongly agreed. The percentage varies notably by location, ranging from 21 percent (7 of 34 respondents) in Bouar to 58 percent in Bossangoa (15 of 26 respondents). Thirty-five percent (9 of 26 respondents) in Bangui strongly agreed and 48 percent (11 of 23 respondents) in Bangassou. Type of respondent also indicates a range of percentages strongly agreeing, with women's group members at the low end (165, 3 of 19 women's group members) and past awareness workshop (4 of 8 workshop participants) and local authorities (50%, 6 of 12 local authorities) at the high end. Men are more likely to Strongly Agree (40%, 27 of 65 male) than are women (33%, 13 of 40 females) but there are similar levels of strong agreement among Christians (38%, 29 of 77 Christians) and Muslims (37%, 10 of 27 Muslims).

EFFICACY OF RELIGIOUS ACTORS IN PEACEBUILDING

The evaluation team was unable to determine the level of efficacy of targeted religious actors or their secular counterparts in mitigating conflict and peacebuilding. In three of the four projects, the specific actors had not yet been identified, so a baseline measure of competency was not possible. In the case of HOPE Yala, the project does not target religious actors in these roles. Over the course of implementation, if the projects develop measurements of baseline competency of their participants, the evaluation team can potentially develop tools for endline data collection to use for comparison.

RELIGIOUS MESSAGING

None of the four projects rely on explicitly religious messages for their activities or as a means for achieving project objectives. Overtly religious messaging would have included excerpts from sacred texts or statements regarding actions that are condoned or not condoned according to religious guidance. Although ASPIRE and PPST both leverage the role of religious actors as spiritual leaders and authoritative voices within their respective communities, the projects' themselves emphasize universal human values that are not exclusively tied to religion.

However, respondents affiliated with each of the three major religions practiced in the study areas highlighted religious values that are consistent with project objectives related to social cohesion, nonviolence and coexistence. Christian and Muslim respondents emphasized values related to forgiveness, prayer and brotherhood. Christians focused on the importance of love and Muslims on religious tolerance and respect. Buddhists emphasize peacebuilding as adherence to avoidance of the five “sins,” which prohibit killing (including suicide), theft, lies, intoxication and adultery.

Over the course of implementation, IPs may opt to explore emphasizing these religiously-grounded values when appropriate to the activity, context, or stakeholders. At endline, the evaluation team will determine the extent to which religious messaging is introduced in any of the projects, to what effect, any differences related to the South Thailand and CAR contexts, and any related DNH considerations.

RELIGIOUS CONSIDERATIONS FOR PROJECT COMPONENTS

The evaluation will seek to identify how the inclusion of religious considerations into various project components influences successful or unsuccessful achievement of results. At baseline, IP and local partner staffs' respondents and project documentation indicated the extent to which projects will include religion in six components that are typical considerations in development project design and implementation. These components include:

- Conflict assessment
- Project staffing
- Procurement policies and practices
- Participant selection processes and priorities
- Do No Harm considerations
- Monitoring and evaluation

Over the course of implementation, the evaluation team will note any modifications to these plans; at endline, the actual practice of including or not including religious considerations will serve as an independent variable when examining possible explanatory factors for achieving intended objectives. See Table 3 Plans for Inclusion of Religious Considerations in Project Components for an aggregate summary of how religion has or has not factored into each of these six project implementation areas at baseline.

Table 3 Plans for Inclusion of Religious Considerations in Project Components

Implementation Component	Integration of Religion
Conflict Assessment	<p>All four projects provide nuanced understanding of religion’s role in the conflict and in peacebuilding.</p> <p>All describe inter-religious tension as result (and not cause) of cycle of violence.</p>
Project Staffing	<p>Degree of religious diversity of IP staff partially addressed through diverse local partners (ASPIRE, PPST) and community-based validators (HOPE-Yala, Zo Kwe Zo).</p> <p>All acknowledge importance of staff members who represent target population in order to support identity-based awareness and model inter-religious cooperation.</p> <p>All face similar barriers to recruiting minority group staff members, including: lack of qualified personnel, low education achievement, language fluency, and religious homogeneity of operational environment.</p>
Procurement	<p>None of the projects establish procurement policies, practices, and procedures based on religious considerations.</p> <p>CAR projects noted that the religion-neutral “best value” standard tends to result in procurement primarily through Muslim businesses because Muslims are over-represented in commerce.</p>
Participant Selection Processes & Priorities	<p>2 IPs closely link religious identity of participants with conflict transformation and social cohesion objectives (ASPIRE, HOPE Yala)</p> <p>All avoid applying a quota standard for measuring “balanced” representation of participants.</p> <p>Recruitment strategies for securing diverse participation include: (a) selection criteria applied by project advisors instead of project staff (HOPE Yala), (b) selection from members of groups in which religious identity is known (ASPIRE, PPST, Zo Kwe Zo), (c) partnering with associations with inter-religious membership (ASPIRE, HOPE Yala, PPST, Zo Kwe Zo), (d) focus on parties in conflict (Zo Kwe Zo).</p>
Do No Harm	<p>All exercise caution to avoid overemphasis on religious identity.</p> <p>All avoid any implication that religion is cause of conflict or violence. No project has specifically addressed the following DNH considerations at baseline:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) To what extent does participation in peacebuilding activities or human rights advocacy increase vulnerability? (2) To what extent does inter-religious cooperation undermine local legitimacy of project participants?
Monitoring & Evaluation	<p>All disaggregate participants by religion to measure representation. Evaluation team will review M&E plans to draw on learning related to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) How can disaggregated data be used to analyze identity-based variation in results? (2) How can projects measure changes in attitudes, behaviors and knowledge about “the other” religion (e.g., social cohesion, tolerance, trust, joint action, cooperation)?

Source: *Project documentation, interviews and focus groups in South Thailand (March 2016) and CAR (May 2016).*

THEORIES OF CHANGE RELEVANT TO RELIGION

An important contribution of this evaluation will be determining the validity of projects' theories of change (TOC) related to intra- and inter-religious conflict and peacebuilding. This baseline report documents both explicit TOCs as stated in project documentation as well as implicit TOCs derived by the evaluation team from the project activities and intended results for each of the four projects. Project staff indicated that they will track key assumptions and external conditions that may lead to necessary TOC revisions. [For a comprehensive listing of implicit and explicit TOCs as identified and developed by the evaluation team, see Annex F: Project Theories of Change.]

At endline, the evaluation team will determine if and how project implementers modified these initial TOCs through the implementation experience. Shifts in TOCs due to emergent contextual factors are not uncommon, especially in contexts of uncertainty and volatility. Contextual factors can relate to increased or decreased intensity of violence or successful or unsuccessful conflict resolution initiatives. Shifts in TOCs due to implementation factors can provide useful learning for project design, adaptive management and resource allocations. If projects do not lead to anticipated results, the endline analysis will examine the extent to which faulty logic or failed assumptions on which original TOCs are based explain outcomes. Alternatively, the endline analysis may indicate that TOCs and assumptions hold up but failure to achieve results is due to a project not being implemented as planned. Tracking the evolution of TOCs, over the process of implementation and validation of baseline assumptions will help to explain results at the end of each project.

Reviewing the compiled listing of TOCs demonstrates that religious identity or agency of religious actors is not emphasized in the explicit TOCs. This absence of religious variables in the implicit TOCs is consistent with the projects' caution to avoid implications that religion is causing conflict or that project beneficiaries are exclusively selected based on religious affiliation. The Thailand projects refer to specific faiths in their theories of change (i.e., Buddhists and Muslims) but the CAR projects do not. The "strategic who" evidenced in the CAR theories of change are generic and could apply to any number of conflicts. Framing the TOC without specific reference to religion is consistent with USG policies that disallow the funding of programs that explicitly preference or target beneficiaries based on religious identity.

The lack of explicit reference to religion in IPs' TOCs is not surprising given that the Reconciliation Fund Request for Application does not exclusively target or specifically emphasize the role of religion or religious actors and institutions in target populations. Instead, it "invite[s] applications for funding from qualified entities to carry out activities that mitigate conflict and promote reconciliation by bringing together individuals of different ethnic, religious, or political backgrounds from areas of civil conflict and war in the countries listed below." In addition, "This type of work can address divisions within a community that may be rooted in group differences such as ethnicity, religion, status, class, or political affiliation."¹⁵ Since the applications were free to address any type of

¹⁵ RFA-OAA-15-000007, p.1, p.4, p.5.

identity conflict, of which religion is but one, the evaluation team expects in this cohort of applications that the involvement of religion and religious individuals and institutions in the projects is dependent upon whether they are the most relevant to the conflict (e.g., agents of peace or have potential for violence). Therefore for purposes of this evaluation, the analysis goes beyond TOCs as stated in IPs' applications to include implicit TOCs, religious identity-based interpretation of the "strategic who," expected results related to changes in attitudes, knowledge and behavior linked to religion, and assumptions likely to influence results.

Although religious actors are not explicitly highlighted in project materials as the objects of change, there is language where religious individuals are implied to be a subset of a general category of project participants. For example, all projects make reference to "identity groups," which includes religious-based identities. PPST refers to the "local elite," which is explained to include both imams and monks who are known to be respected and influential within their communities. Among the community leaders that provide societal links and local knowledge relevant for students' community projects, HOPE Yala actively engages religious leaders as well. ASPIRE is the most directly tied to religious actors, given that its local implementing partner is the Bouar Inter-Religious Platform (BIRP). The expanded version of Mercy Corps' TOC notes that "The Platform has potential to play a much greater role in establishing community-based mechanisms to successfully resolve disputes." Interviews with Mercy Corps staff both in Bangui and Bouar cite BIRP as a strategic partner, both as a target of change in its institutional capacity building activities and a change agent. Zo Kwe Zo has the least focus on religious actors, emphasizing civil society groups instead. There are also terms that supersede religion such as "disaffected youth," who may or may not be religious. No program directly targets the perpetrators of violence in their TOCs, beyond saying the "conflicting parties." [For a summary of the key change agents identified in project documentation, please see Table 4 The "Strategic Who" in Theories of Change, by Project.]

Table 4 The "Strategic Who" in Theories of Change, by Project

SOUTH THAILAND		CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	
HOPE Yala	PPST	Zo Kwe Zo	ASPIRE
Religious leaders Different identity groups Communities Muslims and Buddhists	Intra-communal Muslims & Buddhists Community Groups Local elites	Civil society Transitional institutions Conflict parties Young people Women Diverse identity groups	Community leaders Disaffected youth National decision-makers Religious Leaders

Source: Project documentation, interviews and focus groups in South Thailand (March 2016) and CAR (May 2016).

For the four projects, the TOCs' "If" statements—which represent the independent variable expected to lead to the desired change—can be categorized into three project approaches: (1) Interaction between and engagement with key stakeholders; (2) Capacity building; and (3) Building understanding and increasing awareness. [For a listing of the types of activities for each approach please see Table 5 Approaches and Activities

Leading to Expected Change.] Of these approaches, “interaction between and engagement with key stakeholders” is common to all four projects and is a more often utilized approach than all the other identified approaches combined. Given that the projects are grounded in people-to-people peacebuilding, this observation is not surprising.

Table 5 Approaches and Activities Leading to Expected Change

Approach	Project Activities (Implementing Partner)
Interaction / Engagement	Experience other realities (PPST) Intertwined narratives (PPST) Exerting pressure (PPST) Interactions (HOPE Yala) Experience interactions (HOPE Yala) Collective enterprises (HOPE Yala) Parents and community inter-connections (HOPE Yala) Engage collaboratively and constructively (Zo Kwe Zo) Design and implement durable peace strategies (Zo Kwe Zo) Collaborate to monitor (ASPIRE) Identify and implement economic projects (ASPIRE) Speak out in favor of peace (ASPIRE)
Capacity Building	Enhanced individual actor capacity (PPST) Enhanced institutional actor capacity of (ASPIRE) Leaders capacity (HOPE Yala) Confidence building (HOPE Yala) Skills, motivation, confidence SFCG (Zo Kwe Zo)
Understanding / Awareness	Dialogue and understand (PPST) Understanding, accepted & trusted (HOPE Yala) Become aware (Zo Kwe Zo)
Other	Tensions are reduced (PPST) Address grievances (HOPE Yala) Reduce support for violence (ASPIRE)

Source: Project documentation, interviews and focus groups in South Thailand (March 2016) and CAR (May 2016).

This evaluation will provide an opportunity to better understand the efficacy of these various approaches by defining and validating the TOCs. At endline, the outcome harvesting exercise will identify both intended and unintended results for each project. These outcomes will be linked to TOCs to understand the mechanism for achieving results and to determine explanations for logical successes or failures. Given that multiple partners in a variety of contexts will implement several approaches, the analysis should provide insight into factors that may increase or decrease efficacy of the defined strategies, including whether the U.S. government’s approach to avoid explicit targeting of project participants and beneficiaries by religious affiliation affects ability to achieve objectives.

RELIGIOUS LINKS TO PEACE WRIT LARGE

At baseline, projects have identified both national level and community-based linkages between project activities and Peace Writ Large. Actual and additional contributions will be explored during the outcome harvesting process at endline.

Three of the projects expect to **support national peacebuilding efforts by contributing to either peace negotiations or peaceful political transition**. In South Thailand, PPST is focused on preparing “local elite” to both understand negotiation processes and develop the confidence and courage to actively represent their constituencies’ interests. The project asserts that increasing knowledgeable and skills of leaders—both secular and religious—will give voice to a silent majority of the affected public that has been left out of past efforts. Similarly, these locally-grounded participants will be conduits of information back to their home communities, thereby contributing to transparency and consultative processes. Overall, PPST sees this inclusion as facilitating a two-way flow of information that will not only lead to a more inclusive settlement but also build public support for the process and resulting agreements.

In CAR, both ASPIRE and Zo Kwe Zo work to develop a national consensus supportive of the political transition that has followed the most recent national elections. ASPIRE is working directly with religious actors who are BIRP members to build their organizational capacity and be effective in advocating for an inter-religious commitment to nonviolent conflict resolution. Although most of the project’s activities are within the leaders’ home communities, ASPIRE also includes supporting BIRP members to participate in a national convening of other religious platform members from around the country. The project anticipates that properly prepared BIRP members will reinforce the model of inter-religious collaboration and mutual support with key political actors and the broader CAR public. Zo Kwe Zo is working through national radio programming to create a platform for a diversity of voices to be expressed and heard, thereby, inserting both majority and minority concerns into the public realm. By providing a forum for discussing and modeling political participation, the project expects a combination of effects related to public preference for an end to violent conflict and an openness and empathy for people from a variety of backgrounds, all pointed toward peaceful transition to an accountable, responsive and capable national government.

All of the projects expect to **support community-based efforts by contributing to increased social cohesion**. ASPIRE, PPST and Zo Kwe Zo were still developing specific activities at the time of the field work but anticipate focusing on both intra- and inter-religious actions. Within religious groups, these projects will facilitate opportunities for dialogue to prepare religious constituencies to better know, understand and develop relationships with the other. They will also encourage inter-religious engagement, especially with joint political, economic and social efforts of involving women and youth. HOPE Yala describes its young students as being the principle agent of transformation. They will begin with inter-religious relationship building between Buddhist and Muslim students, who will then reach out to their respective communities to encourage intra-religious acceptance and then inspire inter-religious interactions of their parents and community leadership.

Two of the projects will be focused on building sustainable local dispute resolution mechanisms to entrench community capacity for peacefully addressing future conflicts. ASPIRE is building the capacity of Bouar-based Community Peace Committees and BIRP to perform this function. Similarly, Zo Kwe Zo is building organizational capacity of Committees for Peace & Mediation (CPMs) and the conflict management and communication skills of their membership.

QUESTION 3 SUSTAINABILITY: *How are any changes in attitudes, knowledge and behaviors related to dynamics between religious groups likely to continue after the projects' conclusions?*

SUSTAINABILITY AND ADAPTABILITY OF RESULTS

Although projects have not undertaken detailed sustainability planning at this phase of implementation, interviewed IP staff identified project approaches related to religion that could potentially contribute to sustainability of results or ability for ongoing adaptation to support desired effects. Approaches fall into three categories:

Participant selection: Projects have focused on working with established influentials or those they believe will be persuasive in the future. In the case of PPST in South Thailand and ASPIRE in CAR, project participants include religious leaders in capacity building and leadership opportunities. These participants are selected on a diverse range of criteria related to their role as key shapers of norms and public opinion. When identifying key influential, religious affiliation is an important factor for ASPIRE and of less importance for PPST. These religious actors potentially play societal roles consistent with the social cohesion and conflict resolution objectives of both of these projects. HOPE Yala and Zo Kwe Zo have strategically targeted work with young people from different religious backgrounds. HOPE Yala respondents emphasized that the young Buddhist and Muslim students (13-14 year olds) have more flexible attitudes than adults and are the hope for a more peaceful future. In the case of Zo Kwe Zo, respondents explained the need to focus on both Christian and Muslim young adults (up to age 35 years) because of their direct participation in violent conflict. By investing in skill-building and inter-communal relationships building, the project expects to continue to reflect and promote their experience of respectful and mutually-beneficial co-existence.

Institutionalization: When transformation is institutionalized, it has a higher likelihood of lasting over time. At baseline, ASPIRE was the only project specifically working toward institutionalization of local capacities through religious bodies. Specifically, ASPIRE intends to strengthen the BIRP in order to secure ongoing application of its social cohesion efforts. Activities to institutionalize BIRP will involve not only supporting organizational development but also linking its members and functions to the growing national network of platforms from other communities and at the national level. ASPIRE is also working to bolster the effectiveness and sustainability of Community Peace Committees (CPC)—which include religious leaders—to formalize the provision of locally grounded dispute resolution services able to adapt to the changing needs and conflicts of future

generations. As an interesting point of comparison, PPST's institutionalization efforts are focused on community-based and civil society organizations, not religious institutions.

Cultural Shifts: In a very short amount of time, projects are seeking to change attitudes within and between religious constituencies that will create an enabling environment for inter-religious peace and rejection of inter-communal strife. Each project has activities related to breaking down stereotypes, increasing cross-identity understanding, and engaging differences within religious groups. These combined efforts are intended to lead to a transformative shift in attitudes within and among religious groups and towards the preferential use of nonviolent means for resolving conflict. Zo Kwe Zo is focused on this approach through its radio programming that promotes transformational understanding of diverse perspectives. All projects create face-to-face learning encounters through joint training and joint effort.

EXTERNAL FACTORS LIKELY TO AFFECT SUSTAINABILITY AND ADAPTABILITY OF RESULTS

Although projects have identified several external factors that have a bearing on the sustainability and adaptability of results, four stand out as including religious aspects. At endline, the evaluation team will review these four to determine if they in fact had an impact and what additional unexpected factors may have also come into play. Those highlighted by respondents are as follows:

Political Transition: The progress of political transition is likely to have disparate effects on communities based on religious identity. In CAR, the Muslim population's long-standing core grievances include the lack of access to political power and vulnerability to being denied CAR citizenship, especially for those who primarily speak Arabic. For this population, the inclusivity of Muslims in government positions will be indicative of whether they believe themselves to have a place in the new CAR.¹⁶ Among the Christian elite who are accustomed to monopolizing political power, they will need reassurance that power sharing with Muslim counterparts will not dramatically reduce their influence. Both Muslims and Christians hope that the current President will not only enable political and economic opportunity but also provide urgently needed security, starting with a credible and effective Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program.¹⁷

In South Thailand, Malay Muslims are awaiting evidence that formal negotiations can lead to gains in equal opportunity and treatment while Buddhists are losing patience with a state that seems unwilling or unable to provide physical security. If hope in achieving fair treatment cannot be achieved through political processes, identity-based schisms are likely to persist and widen with frustration expressed through a return or intensification

¹⁶ Muslim respondents pointed to President Faustin-Archange Touadéra's facilitation of securing a Muslim leader of parliament as evidence that the government may provide new pathways to political leadership for Muslim citizens of CAR. These respondents indicated that having a Muslim in a senior government post greatly enhances the legitimacy of the national government for this religious minority across the country.

¹⁷ Subject matter experts knowledgeable about DDR programs both in CAR and other contexts commented that the CAR context requires DDRR, in which the second "R" is for repatriation of the many foreign fighters that are part of the loose coalition of *Séléka* militias.

of violence. Under those conditions, both projects will face even greater challenges in promoting a message of nonviolent conflict resolution and cross-identity cooperation.

Regional Dynamics: Religious-identity in both countries has taken on a transnational character with the potential for peace as well as violence crossing national boundaries. In CAR, instability in countries to the northern, eastern, and southern flanks of the country (Chad, Sudan, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) coupled with weak national security services greatly facilitates cross border movements and operations of armed groups, both from CAR and neighboring countries. Instability in the countries along CAR's porous borders has a tremendously destabilizing effect. In South Thailand border issues have been a lesser concern but remains a fluid situation. Subject matter experts reported forays of Daesh militants offering support to separatists in exchange for backing their caliphate vision. Respondents further explained that these foreign fighters have not gained traction, and the Malay population does not currently indicate shared values or goals. However an intensification of persecution, little expansion of economic opportunity, or failed progress addressing root causes of the conflict may shift the balance toward seeking external support.

Violence Reduction or Intensification: Although there is a general agreement across all four projects that religion has not been the cause of the conflicts, cycles of identity-based victimhood and aggression have deepened the divide between religious groups. If violence should increase following a similar pattern, the likelihood of project success may be undermined. On the other hand, a reduction in violence could have the opposite effect and motivate rebuilding trust, restoring relationships and setting a foundation for mutual respect. In CAR, tangible progress on long-awaited DDR initiatives would likely generate an upswell in support for project efforts. A ceasefire between separatists and the Thai government in South Thailand could have a similar effect.

Economic and Social Disparities: Economic and social disparities keep local grievances alive and affected populations susceptible to being mobilized and hijacked by armed political groups for their own purposes. In Thailand, persistent disparities in per capita income and provincial share of national GDP¹⁸ between the Deep South and Bangkok alienate this region from the rest of the country. Further, lower educational achievement and significantly underweight children of Malay Muslims in comparison with Thai Buddhists living in the Deep South reinforce identity-based grievances. Malay militant groups point to these inequities in support of separation. At the same time, Thai efforts to address these issues in the 1980s can be linked to temporary reduction in the separatists' appeal.

In CAR, Muslims are concentrated in the northeastern region of the country with notably less state services. Some respondents described Muslim families sending their children across national boundaries to receive basic education. More generally along border areas, there are both Muslim and Christian youth who have war experience but

¹⁸ See Adam Burke et al, *Contested Corners of Asia: Subnational Conflict and International Development Assistance, The Case of Southern Thailand*. The Asia Foundation, 2013.

no prospect of post-conflict economic livelihoods. These dynamics increase the vulnerability of such areas to being used as the staging grounds for insurgencies. Prompt and tangible investments will be needed to demonstrate that the benefits of peace are greater than those achieved through the alternative of war.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENDLINE ANALYSIS

With the conclusion of the baseline activities, it would be useful to develop a revised evaluation plan that takes into account improved understanding of field work logistics, actual project implementation plans, and learning opportunities specific to the topic of religion and peacebuilding. Following are proposed changes in the current plan for consideration.

Refining Evaluation Questions: The three evaluation questions and additional II sub-questions are overly ambitious for an evaluation of this scale. To help in prioritizing questions to guide subsequent evaluation activities, the evaluation team should work with DCHA/CMM's team to refocus on the Utilization Focused Evaluation (UFE) approach. A first step would be a review of the key audiences and uses of the evaluation. To this end, the evaluation team should consult with DCHA/CMM, the four participating Global Reconciliation Fund IPs (and as appropriate, their local partners), evaluation experts focused on effective evaluation related to religious dynamics, and implementers working in regions where religion is an important consideration. The criteria for refinement should include the likelihood that lessons from the targeted projects will be generalizable to other contexts, data collection design is feasible for a small evaluation team, data relevant to analysis is available, and there is an appetite within the community of practice for the identified lines of inquiry.

Based on the initial findings developed through the baseline phase, the targeted Global Reconciliation Fund projects are best positioned to offer learning opportunities specific to the following themes:

- **Effective roles of religious actors for peacebuilding objectives**, both individual and institutional as well as examples specific to women and youth. Special attention can be given to differences or similarities in efficacy between religious and secular actors in these various roles.
- **Utility and strategies for taking religious dynamics and identities into account as they pertain to the six identified project components** related to design and implementation (i.e., conflict assessment, project staffing, procurement, participant selection, Do No Harm, and monitoring and evaluation).
- **Validated Theories of Change** that leverage participation of religious actors in order to achieve intended changes in attitudes, knowledge and behavior.

- **Do No Harm precautions** of working in contexts in which religion is a relevant consideration for the context or implementation strategy. Although examination of DNH considerations was not a specific line of inquiry in baseline data collection, respondents raised points of concern that should be explored at endline to capture useful learning in future project design and implementation.

Endline Planning: Based on the refined evaluation questions, the evaluation team should develop a work plan specific to the endline activities. Development of this plan should include identification of thematic areas that relate directly to a baseline/endline comparisons. A priority area is determining efficacy of religion-based implementation strategies by linking project design components to expected and unexpected outcomes and then determining contributions of religious components to results. This analysis would need to explain any disparities in results based on religious identity or contextual factors related to religious dynamics. Another is identification of Do No Harm precautions based on implementation experience. The plan should also allow time to simulate endline findings to test the evaluability of the refined questions and to be sure the design will lead to useful analysis. These are standard practices for UFE. DCHA/CMM and IP input into the simulation will ensure that the resulting report informs learning objectives and use. The simulation process should lead to any needed revisions of the endline work plan.

Addressing Interpreter Challenges: At times, interpreters did not provide precise interpretation in interviews and focus groups. In both countries, interpreters would paraphrase information or misunderstand evaluation questions and respondent answers. To improve translator effectiveness at endline, the evaluation team will (1) confirm competency by having bi-lingual staff interview interpreter candidates, (2) translate all tools into all relevant local languages, including phonetic translation of non-written languages (i.e., Sango and Yawi), and (3) train interpreters on a glossary of technical terms specific to the evaluation (e.g., conflict transformation, religious actor, instrumentalization).

Use of Project Baseline Materials: All projects have completed or are near completion of their own baseline activities. These include community perception surveys, target beneficiary focus groups, needs assessments and knowledge and attitude pre/post testing. By being provided access to these materials, the evaluation team can assess the usefulness of the raw data, select subcomponents of IPs' tools that are relevant to this thematic evaluation, and work with the IPs to construct endline comparisons useful for this study.

Redesign of survey methodology: The validity of baseline survey data collected is weak for several reasons related to local language usage and literacy. In each case, a local evaluation team member administered the written surveys in-person in the local language. The written surveys did not seem to present confusion for those able to read in either Thai or French. However, in both South Thailand and CAR, many respondents' primary language is not a written language. The strategy of verbally translating the written question into the spoken language (e.g., Yawi or Sango) led to inconsistent communication of the questions by the different evaluation team members. For those

that were illiterate, written surveys appeared to be alienating and the request to check boxes on a form that they did not understand led to confusion and perhaps embarrassment. The concepts addressed in the questions themselves may not have been well-understood, even to our local team members. The contribution of a survey is providing a quantitative measure of prevalence on common themes. If this methodology is used at endline, the evaluation team should develop a non-written implementation format, pre-testing of the tool, and careful enumerator training. The endline report will also need to take into account any potential bias that might be introduced by this redesign, when comparing endline to baseline responses.

IP monitoring and evaluation plans: In order to reduce burden on Implementing Partners, the evaluation team recommends reviewing projects' final monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plans to identify existing indicators and M&E activities that will support this thematic evaluation. Whenever feasible and practical, the evaluation team would like to review IP data disaggregated by religion, sex, and age. IPs would need to set-up this approach immediately, and USAID would need to ensure that these data disaggregations are required in the activity M&E plans. After review of the existing plan, the evaluation team would recommend a consultative meeting with USAID personnel and IP staff to discuss how the evaluation efforts can be mutually supportive. Ideally, this discussion would take place before the beginning of the second year of implementation.

IP Quarterly Reports: In order to track interim adjustments to project design and progress toward results, the evaluation team should review quarterly reports as they are made available. The evaluation team recommends establishing a systematic process for receiving quarterly reports at the time of the IP's submission to USAID in order to avoid any delays. Within a week of receipt, the evaluation team should send any questions on content to increase the likelihood that the report author(s) will still be on staff and have recent knowledge of report contents. This process avoids a burdensome document review at endline and reduces risk of recall bias. It also supports seeding the process of Outcome Harvesting. Further, if the evaluation team observes that key information is not provided through the reporting process, it can recommend adjustments immediately for USAID's consideration with improvements implemented in the next reporting cycle. If these reports are able to provide sufficient information for the evaluation team to understand interim results as well as implementation steps for achieving these results, requesting IPs to also submit an Outcome Journal could be avoided.

Evaluation Rubric: A proposed tool to be developed through this evaluation is a rubric useful for the analysis of the extent to which a project integrates religious dynamics into its project design, implementation and results. The tool would identify key issues for analysis such as context analysis, participant roles, theories of change, implementation components, messaging, sustainability and adaptability planning, and changes related to attitudes, knowledge and behavior. For each issue, the tool would describe a standard that measures the level of inclusion of religious considerations. Future use of the tool could be to measure the degree of a project's centrality of religious considerations. It would also ensure that key issues are addressed in contexts in which religious dynamics are especially relevant. And it would also support analysis seeking to understand links

between project results and the project's religious components. The application of this rubric is to support categorization of projects as they relate to religious factors. However, a "low" assessment for any particular variable should not be interpreted as a low-performance rating. Depending upon the context, project objectives and other considerations, inclusion of religious components may not be appropriate or desirable. The tool would be a form of categorization of projects related to religion as well as a checklist to identify any potential missed opportunities. IP input on usability and value would greatly enhance relevance of this tool to the implementation community. [For a preliminary draft of a rubric drawing on the current evaluation, see Annex I *Evaluation Rubric applied to Reconciliation Fund Projects*.]

ANNEX

ANNEX A: EVALUATION STATEMENT OF WORK

AID-OAA-TO-15-00056

SECTION C - DESCRIPTION / SPECIFICATIONS / STATEMENT OF WORK

C.1 OVERVIEW

This Task Order is estimated to be a five-year contract with two distinct Tasks:

Task One – Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in the People-to-People (P2P) Reconciliation Fund Program

Task Two – Impact Evaluation of the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Learning Program

The statement of work (SOW) describes the general framework of each task with sufficient detail for initial planning purposes. Due to the collaborative nature of the evaluation work involving field Missions and several implementing partners, detailed work plans will be developed after the Task Order is awarded based on technical direction provided by the Task Order Contracting Officer's Representative (TOCOR).

C.2 TASK ONE – UNDERSTANDING RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND PEACEBUILDING IN THE PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RECONCILIATION FUND PROGRAM

C.2.1 Purpose

Following on previous work,¹ DCHA/CMM is embarking on a second phase to evaluate Reconciliation Fund activities entitled “Understanding Religious Identity and Peacebuilding in the People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Program.”

The contractor will evaluate the outcomes of Reconciliation Fund peacebuilding programs working through different theories of change to address grievances manifested as inter-religious tensions in two study countries to (a) determine to what extent religious identity and work with religious actors factored into program design, including theories of change,² implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and results achieved, and (b) validate and/or revise the nine “Lessons Learned” as published in USAID’s “Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding Toolkit,”³ and (c) contribute to the body of evidence regarding which inter-religious, peacebuilding programming strategies are effective and potentially replicable.

The results of the evaluation will be used to (a) update guidance⁴ for USAID field staff and implementing partners for lessons learned and best practices for peacebuilding programs in inter-religious conflict contexts, (b) inform design of future year Reconciliation Fund programs and DCHA/CMM’s new training course for “Advanced Conflict-Related Program Design, Monitoring and Evaluation” for USAID staff, and (c) publish and support adoption of lessons learned and best practices in the broader development and peacebuilding communities, including the United States Government (USG) interagency.

C.2.2 Background

DCHA/CMM Mission Statement

USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM) strives to create programming that effectively prevents, mitigates, and

¹ “Evaluative Learning Review Synthesis Report: USAID/CMM’s People-to-People Reconciliation Fund Annual Program Statement (APS)” at pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pbaa370.pdf

² “Theories of Change and Indicator (THINC) Development in Conflict Management and Mitigation” at pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADS460.pdf

³ “Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding: An Introductory Programming Guide” at pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADR501.pdf

⁴ Such as the Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding Programming Guide, DCHA/CMM’s THINC work, and the “USAID Guide to Best Practices for People to People Programming” at <http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/CMM/P2PGuidelines2010-01-19.pdf>

manages the causes and consequences of violent conflict, fragility, and extremism. DCHA/CMM leads USAID's efforts to identify and analyze sources of fragility and conflict, supports early responses to address the causes and consequences of fragility and conflict, and seeks to integrate conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding approaches into USAID's analyses, strategies, and programs.

Reconciliation Fund

Since 2004, USAID has managed the Reconciliation Fund program in accordance with a Congressional appropriation to provide a central source of funding for reconciliation-related programming. Section 7060(f) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76, Division K), includes the following language:

“(f) RECONCILIATION PROGRAMS.—Of the funds appropriated by this Act under the headings “Economic Support Fund” and “Development Assistance”, \$26,000,000 shall be made available to support people-to-people reconciliation programs which bring together individuals of different ethnic, religious, and political backgrounds from areas of civil strife and war: *Provided*, That the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall consult with the Committees on Appropriations, prior to the initial obligation of funds, on the uses of such funds...”

To meet Congressional intent, USAID has issued annual solicitations for applications to support “people-to-people” (P2P) conflict mitigation and reconciliation programs and activities.

The objective of the Reconciliation Fund is to make significant strides in the overall goal of conflict mitigation, peace, and reconciliation through the implementation of people-to-people (P2P) activities in selected eligible conflict-affected countries.

People-to-People Programming

P2P programs offer one approach among many to conflict prevention, mitigation, and management. While a range of programs and approaches may be considered P2P in nature, most entail bringing together representatives of conflict-affected groups to interact purposefully in a safe space. This type of work can address divisions within a community that may be rooted in group differences such as ethnicity, religion, status, class, or political affiliation. P2P programs generally address patterns of prejudice and demonizing that reinforce the perceived differences between groups and hinder the development of relationships among parties to a conflict. The aim is to create opportunities for a series of interactions between conflicting groups in the community or broader society to promote mutual understanding, trust, empathy, and resilient social ties.

Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding

Conflict is an inherent and legitimate part of social and political life, but in many places conflict turns violent, inflicting grave costs in terms of lost lives, degraded governance, and destroyed livelihoods. The costs and consequences of conflict, crisis, and state failure are high. Violent conflict disrupts traditional development and can spill over borders and reduce growth and prosperity across entire regions.

Religious identities can be important factors in conflict dynamics. These identities can be manipulated to drive violence, but can also contribute meaningfully to peacebuilding and reconciliation processes. Development assistance and conflict mitigation programming does not always consider this linkage, nor does it fully address the complexity of the relationship between religion and conflict. As a main mobilizing force in many societies, proper engagement of religion and its leaders is crucial. In many cases, peacebuilding, reconciliation and conflict mitigation activities may delineate a theory or theories of change aimed to engage inter-religious peacebuilding strategies in order to foster peace and/or mitigate violence or potential violence.

To help Missions, and the broader peacebuilding community, program more effectively in contexts where inter-religious grievances are an integral part of conflict dynamics, USAID published the “Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding Toolkit” in 2009. Based on analysis of several case studies, the Toolkit defined nine “Lessons Learned:”

- 1- Understand religious Dimensions
- 2- Engage all relevant faith communities
- 3- Get buy-in from religious leaders
- 4- Pay attention to intra- and inter-group dynamics
- 5- Frame program in appropriate language
- 6- Allot time to build trust
- 7- Expand the programming repertoire
- 8- Invest in monitoring and evaluation
- 9- Establish institutional capacity.

While the importance of understanding the nexus of religion, conflict, and peacebuilding is widely acknowledged, very little evaluation reporting is available in this field. DCHA/CMM has a unique opportunity to contribute to the body of knowledge in this area by conducting a targeted evaluation of approximately four FY2014 (or FY2015) Global Reconciliation Fund programs (for planning purposes, two in Asia and two in Africa) that seek to apply people-to-people peacebuilding interventions between conflicting groups whose differences include religious affiliation. Using these programs as important learning opportunities, DCHA/CMM seeks to better understand how religious differences can define or shape conflict dynamics as conflict drivers and/or as mitigating factors, how these dynamics affect the implementation of and results from P2P peacebuilding activities, and how engaging in inter-religious P2P programming can affect the efficacy of the program and its effect on peacebuilding.

C.2.3 Program Information

Up to four Reconciliation Fund programs from the FY2014 and/or FY2015 Global Reconciliation Fund cycle will be identified for evaluation under Task One. DCHA/CMM will identify up to four projects for evaluation in consultation with USAID Missions and field-based implementing partners. It is anticipated that two projects will be identified in an Asian country and two in an African country where religious identity and/or mobilization along religious lines plays an important role in conflict dynamics. For planning purposes, the contractor can use Thailand and Central African Republic as illustrative countries. The illustrative projects are described below:

Asia Projects	
Project Name	<i>Project A</i>
Implementing Partner	U.S. NGO
Award Number	TBD
Estimated duration	3 years (o/a September 2015 – August 2018)
Estimated budget	\$1,000,000

Geographic areas	TBD
Project Name	<i>Project B</i>
Implementing Partner	Local NGO
Award Number	TBD
Estimated duration	3 years (o/a September 2015 – August 2018)
Estimated budget	\$500,000
Geographic area	TBD
Africa Projects	
Project Name	<i>Project C</i>
Implementing Partner	U.S. NGO
Award Number	TBD
Estimated duration	2 years (o/a August 2015 – July 2017)
Estimated budget	\$1,000,000
Geographic Area	TBD
Project Name	<i>Project D</i>
Implementing Partner	U.S. NGO
Award Number	TBD
Estimated duration	2 years (o/a August 2015 – July 2017)
Estimated budget	\$1,000,000
Geographic Area	TBD

C.2.4 Illustrative Evaluation Questions

This evaluation seeks to address the following questions:

- What are the roles and impact (both positive and negative) of religious leaders from different faith communities in project implementation and how are these similar to, and different

from, other types of community leaders (traditional chiefs, civil society representatives, business leaders, government officials, etc.)?

- How does incorporating activities with religious leaders or engaging religious identities influence the participation of women and of youth in specific people-to-people peacebuilding activities?

- Do program interventions specifically address religious identity differences? If so, how?

- How, and to what extent, were the theory of change and associated program activities initially tailored to different religious identities? Was the theory of change and/or activities modified during program implementation due to engagement with religious identity communities playing out differently than anticipated? If so, in what ways?

- To what extent are there similarities/differences among the program's proposed units of change (attitudes, behaviors or institution) and are interreligious peacebuilding approaches more likely to be successful based on the unit of change proposed?

- To what extent, if any, were religious identity/community differences integrated into the program's monitoring and evaluation plan (i.e. indicators, data collection methodologies, results reporting, etc.) and how were results used for project management?

- To what extent did the peacebuilding approach contribute to "peace writ small"? to "peace writ large"?⁵

- Which of the outcome or impact results reported at the conclusion of project implementation were sustained one year later?

Based on the results of this evaluation, the contractor will provide recommendations for:

- Best practices --- while also highlighting ineffective practices --- for designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating (i.e. suggested indicators, data collection methods, etc.) peacebuilding projects in contexts where inter-religious grievances are an integral part of conflict dynamics and/or where inter-religious peacebuilding approaches are being applied.

- Revising/updating the Lessons Learned section of the "Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding Toolkit".

- Provide suggestions for new topics/content related to inter-religious grievances and/or inter-religious peacebuilding approaches for inclusion in other DCHA/CMM products, specifically, the People-to-People Program Guide and the "Theories of Change and Indicator (THINC) Development in Conflict Management and Mitigation" guidance.

⁵ See "USAID Guide to Best Practices for People to People Programming" at <http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/CMM2PGuideLines2010-01-19.pdf> for more information.

In developing its work plan and preparing recommendations, the contractor should be cognizant that the Establishment Clause (separation of church and state) limits USAID's engagement in religious communities to supporting only activities and programs that have a secular purpose and which do not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Accordingly, USAID-financed activities and programs may not (i) result in government indoctrination of religion, (ii) define its recipients by reference to religion, or (iii) create an excessive entanglement with religion. USAID implementers must allocate assistance on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and such assistance must be made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.

C.2.5 Evaluation Design and Methodology

The design and methodology for this evaluation must generate the highest quality and most credible evidence that corresponds to the evaluation questions. Evaluation work is expected to be conducted in four phases:

Phase 1 – Collaborative Design of the Religious Identity and Peacebuilding Evaluation

The Task Order Contracting Officer's Representative (TOCOR) will provide the evaluation contractor with country-specific technical requirements including:

A. Project Information

- Name of project, implementing partner, award number, total estimated cost, project start and end dates, detailed description of activities including geographic scope

B. Country-Specific Aspects of the Evaluation Methodology

- Country-specific issues (e.g. security considerations, language requirements, etc.)
- Illustrative list of documents for use in evaluation

The final evaluation approach will be developed in close consultation with USAID (the TOCOR, other DCHA/CMM staff, and Mission personnel) and with the implementing partners managing the projects to be evaluated. The Reconciliation Fund evaluation must be designed to avoid duplication of routine monitoring and evaluation activities to be conducted by the project partners and must not place an undue burden on project participants. During consultations, the evaluation team may also be asked to suggest key indicators that could be collected by the implementing partners across the four projects. Copies of the approved project work plans, Monitoring and Evaluation plans, quarterly and annual progress reports, and evaluation reports produced by the implementing partners will be provided to the evaluation team.

Data collection methods may include focus group discussions, group interviews, key informant interviews, and possibly small-scale, targeted surveys. The methodology should also optimize evaluation design for more valid and reliable data through innovative approaches such as gathering additional baseline data from existing sources, including perspectives of community members/leaders who were not direct participants in project activities, and integrating mixed methods or other ways to measure change

such as, but not limited to, contribution analysis, Most Significant Change (MSC) studies and outcome mapping. The methodology should include an approach to validate results.

The evaluation design must include a detailed explanation of how “Do No Harm” principles will be effectively integrated into all stages of the work, including recruitment of participants, data collection and management, and reporting.

To augment the information provided by the TOCOR, the evaluation contractor will conduct a review of existing literature and information regarding current state-of-the-art knowledge about the nexus of religious identity, conflict, and peacebuilding. In addition, the evaluation contractor will convene at least four meetings/conference calls with DCHA/CMM, the relevant USAID Missions, and the field-based implementing partners to discuss the purpose and design of the evaluation.

The literature review and consultative process will inform the contractor’s development of a detailed evaluation package comprised of a final staffing plan (including local consultants), evaluation design, work plan, budget (including level of effort), and literature review (as an annex) for Task One. The evaluation package will be submitted to the TOCOR for review, comment, and approval.

Phase 2 – Baseline Data Collection and Analysis

Phase 2 activities will be conducted sequentially, that is, baseline data collection in one of the target countries will be completed before proceeding to the second. This approach will allow for lessons learned from the initial field work to inform modifications of the evaluation tools or approach for use in baseline data collection in the second target country.

Phase 2 also includes periodic evaluation team engagement in reviewing quarterly and annual progress reports from the implementing partners as well as other routine monitoring and evaluation reports from the implementing partners or from Mission staff. In addition, the evaluation team leader will participate in quarterly conference calls with DCHA/CMM, the relevant USAID Missions, and implementing partners, if requested by the TOCOR, to periodically discuss progress, challenges, monitoring and evaluation results, etc.

Phase 3 – End-of-Project Data Collection and Analysis

Phase 3 data collection will take place within approximately four months prior to the conclusion of project activities. Some flexibility will be required as the end dates of the field-based projects may be extended by USAID due to programmatic considerations during implementation.

Note: Depending on technical considerations and available resources, USAID may seek to fund an additional set of field visits to be conducted approximately 12 months after the conclusion of the Reconciliation Fund programs. The purpose this data collection would be to determine which results noted at the end of each project were sustained and to determine, to the extent feasible, how and why achievements were sustainable (or not). While this subsequent data collection stage is not part of this contract, the offeror is expected to take into consideration this potential while developing evaluation instruments and indicators.

C.2.6 Evaluation Team Composition

The Contractor will furnish an adequate mix of experts and support staff with the appropriate education, skills, experience, and roles to produce a high quality evaluation. USAID has identified the following two Key Personnel for Task One: The Evaluation Team Leader and Senior Conflict/Subject Matter Specialist #1.

Use of highly skilled local consultants is encouraged for field work in each target country. The contractor will propose other members of the evaluation team consistent with its technical and management approach. The evaluation team must have a thorough understanding of the conflict dynamics in the target countries relevant to this statement of work. The overall team composition must include relevant subject matter expertise, skills, and experience. The key personnel must meet the following requirements:

Evaluation Team Leader

The Evaluation Team Leader will have overall responsibility for all aspects of the study. S/he will be primarily responsible for communicating technical issues with the USAID TOCOR, developing and implementing the detailed evaluation methodology, managing and implementing the work plan and all related evaluation team activities, leading the literature review, conducting interviews, and writing technical products (draft and final evaluation reports, Technical Briefs, PowerPoint presentations). S/he shall also be responsible for presenting findings during in-briefings, out-briefings, and dissemination events.

Minimum requirements:

- Masters or PhD in international development, conflict and peacebuilding, sociology, evaluation, or related area
- Experience in conducting and leading field-based development project evaluations related to conflict, peacebuilding, democracy and governance, or a related field; prior experience related to evaluating conflict and peacebuilding in an inter-religious context highly desirable. A candidate with a PhD must have a minimum of four (4) years of relevant experience whereas a candidate with a Masters degree must have a minimum of six (6) years of relevant experience.
- Relevant subject matter expertise as demonstrated by published evaluations or peer-reviewed articles
- Strong analytic skills related to conflict, peacebuilding, and conflict dynamics; experience with religious dimensions of conflict and peacebuilding desired
- Excellent written and oral communication skills in English
- Strong organizational and team management skills

Senior Conflict/Subject Matter Specialist #1

In addition, the Senior Conflict/Subject Matter Specialist #1 will be designated as a Key Personnel position and must meet the specified criteria below.

Minimum requirements:

- At least five (5) years' relevant experience working for a university, development agency, or non-governmental organization, preferably engaged in development or humanitarian assistance
- Some relevant expertise and experience conducting program evaluation or similar research and analytical work
- Working-level written and verbal communication skills in English
- Fluency in relevant local languages desirable but not required.

At least one senior-level conflict/subject matter specialist for each target country will serve on the evaluation team and will support the Evaluation Team Leader with research, data collection, analysis, and

writing. The contractor should compose a team with complementary expertise and experience to support learning across different country contexts. Identification of highly qualified local expertise is encouraged.

USAID expects that the evaluation team will have other, non-Key Personnel members including, but not limited to:

Senior Conflict/Subject Matter Specialist #2

This second Senior Conflict/Subject Matter Specialist should meet the same criteria as listed above.

***Logistician #1 and
Logistician #2***

A logistics/management/administrative specialist for each target country can provide administrative and logistical support to the assessment, including arranging for transportation, communication, purchase of materials, completion of paperwork, and similar tasks. This individual may be required to provide services prior to the expatriate team's departure and during the length of the data collection process.

Suggested qualification requirements:

- Understanding of the local country context and systems
- Excellent organizational skills
- Excellent communication skills in English
- Fluency in local language(s), if appropriate

All team members will be required to provide a signed statement attesting to a lack of conflict of interest or describing an existing conflict of interest. In addition, members will sign non-disclosure statements limiting the use of project materials, as provided to the team, to purposes of conducting the evaluation.

C.2.7 Illustrative Evaluation Schedule

The following illustrative schedule is provided for planning purposes and may be adjusted accordingly. The schedule is based on the assumption that all four projects selected for evaluation will be awarded by the end of Fiscal Year 2015.

Date	Action
September 29, 2015	Evaluation Task Order Award
October 2015	TOCOR provides country-specific technical information
October/November 2015	Phase 1 - Literature review and consultations ⁶ with USAID and implementing partners
November/December 2015	Phase 1 - Draft Evaluation Package due to TOCOR USAID comments provided

⁶ Consultations may be conducted in Washington DC with DCHA/CMM staff and/or by conference call with individuals in the field.

ANNEX B: BASELINE METHODOLOGY

EVALUATION PURPOSE

To contribute to the limited body of knowledge on the nexus of religion, conflict, and peacebuilding relevant to development programming, USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM) has undertaken a thematic evaluation of four Global Reconciliation Fund¹⁹ projects. These projects are located in South Thailand and the Central African Republic (CAR) and seek to apply people-to-people peacebuilding interventions between conflicting groups whose differences include religious affiliation.

As stated in this evaluation's Terms of Reference Section C, the objectives of this evaluation are:

- To determine to what extent religious identity and work with religious actors factored into program design, including theories of change, implementation, monitoring and evaluation and results achieved.
- To validate and/or revise the nine "Lessons Learned" as published in USAID's "Religion, Conflict and Peacebuilding Toolkit."
- To contribute to the body of evidence regarding which inter-religious, peacebuilding programming strategies are effective and potentially replicable.

The evaluation findings and recommendations are intended to be used for the following:

- To update guidance for USAID field staff and implementing partners on lessons learned and best practices for peacebuilding programs in inter-religious conflict contexts.
- To inform design of future year Reconciliation Fund programs.
- To inform DCHA/CMM's new training course for "Advanced Conflict-Related Program Design, Monitoring and Evaluation" for USAID staff.
- To publish and support adoption of lessons learned and best practices in the broader development and peacebuilding communities, including the United States Government (USG) interagency.

APPROACH & AUDIENCE

The overall approach to this evaluation is grounded in Utilization-Focused Evaluation (UFE). UFE is based on the principle that an evaluation should be designed to address the intended uses of the evaluation's targeted audience. This approach invites active engagement of intended

¹⁹ Since 2004, USAID has managed the Global Reconciliation Fund program in accordance with a Congressional appropriation to provide funding for reconciliation-related programming (Section 7060(f) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76, Division K). The objective of the Global Reconciliation Fund is "to make significant strides in the overall goal of conflict mitigation, peace, and reconciliation through the implementation of people-to-people (P2P) activities in selected eligible conflict-affected countries." (SOL-OAA-15-000138 - Task One Statement of Work, p. 6.) USAID administers these funds through an annual grants program. These grants support projects that bring together people of different ethnic, religious, and political backgrounds from areas of unrest and war in order to promote conflict prevention, mitigation, and management.

users in evaluation design and implementation throughout the evaluation process. This evaluation is intended to be useful to a community of practice that includes audiences within and outside of U.S. government agencies. Specifically, DCHA/CMM seeks to apply learning to support its guidance, training and dissemination activities to improve peacebuilding and development objectives. USAID Mission staff from the Regional Development Mission for Asia (RDMA) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) oversee the selected Global Reconciliation Fund programs and will prioritize learning objectives useful for ongoing oversight of program activities and future planning related to peacebuilding programming. The USG interagency audience relates to other federal agencies that apply a conflict lens in better understanding operational environments and developing effective programming responsive to local dynamics. The four implementing partners as well as their local partners are also key evaluation audiences, both to support their own assessment of the grant-funded projects but also to apply to future engagement in analogous contexts. More broadly, the evaluation results are intended to support the international community of practice of donors, implementers, evaluators, and researchers focused on a range of issues related to the nexus of religion, conflict, and peacebuilding.

Related to the end users' priority on developing insight to effective implementation and sustainability, the evaluation also follows Theory-Based and Process evaluation approaches that address key learning priorities. Theory-based evaluation is a method for testing hypotheses to confirm the program's underlying strategies are well-understood and valid. This approach connects why, how, what and so what inquiry by articulating over-arching Theories of Change (TOC) and interim theories that map the causal links for expected progression of outcomes. At the end of the program, the evaluation team and implementers are then able to examine the extent to which these initial TOCs explained actual outcomes. Such an analysis is useful in determining if the articulated TOCs should continue to be applied in future programming and under what conditions. To connect projects' theoretically-based strategies with how the project strategies are implemented, the team will also apply a Process evaluation approach that captures planned and actual implementation activities. Combining these approaches will help the team to distinguish between failure in theory (e.g., flawed causal relationship, incomplete conflict analysis, mismatched objectives) and failure in implementation.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

In consultation with DCHA/CMM, the evaluation team has developed three primary research questions relevant to this evaluation. (For a list of primary and sub-questions, please see Table B-1: *Evaluation Matrix*.) The evaluation is not designed to assess overall performance of the participating grant recipient projects. Nor are these questions considered to be exhaustive of all lines of inquiry related to religious dynamics in peacebuilding and international development. They are intended to support learning that informs improved program design, planning, and implementation in contexts in which religious aspects of operational contexts, identities, grievances, norms and institutions are relevant. The three primary questions are:

1. **Implementation** – What are the critical implementation activities and strategies needed to respond effectively to conflict where parties are mobilized around religious identities?

2. **Effectiveness**²⁰ – In what ways did religious dynamics affect intended, unintended and actual project results?
3. **Sustainability** – How are any changes in attitudes, knowledge and behaviors related to dynamics between religious groups likely to continue after the projects' conclusions?

Table B-I Overall and Baseline Evaluation Questions and Sub-Questions

OVERALL	BASELINE
1. Implementation – What are the critical implementation activities and strategies needed to respond effectively to conflict where parties are mobilized around religious identities?	1. Implementation – At start-up, what implementation activities and strategies were designed to respond effectively to conflict where parties are mobilized around religious identities?
1A. How were <i>religious actors</i> (i.e., individuals and institutions) engaged as key stakeholders, partners and beneficiaries in program activities to support peacebuilding objectives? How did this engagement vary from secular actors?	1a. At project start-up, what were the roles of <i>religious actors</i> (i.e., individuals and institutions) in project activities? How did these roles vary from secular actors?
1B. What were the expected and unexpected implementation <i>challenges, facilitators and opportunities</i> related to religious dynamics? What were project responses?	1b. What were the expected implementation <i>challenges, facilitators and opportunities</i> related to religious dynamics? How did the project take these into account at start-up?
1C. Over the course of implementation, in what ways did the program participants and beneficiaries find the religious dimensions of the program to be <i>relevant</i> to the conflict?	1c. At project start-up, in what ways did the program participants (including project staff) and beneficiaries consider the religious dimensions of the project to be <i>relevant</i> to the conflict?
2. Effectiveness – In what ways did religious dynamics affect intended, unintended and actual project results?	2. Effectiveness – At start-up, in what ways were religious dynamics expected to affect intended project results?
2A. What, if any, contributions were made by the projects toward changes in <i>attitudes, knowledge and behaviors</i> toward, within and among religious actors as well as secular actors?	2a. At project start-up, what were the <i>attitudes, knowledge and behaviors</i> of religious actors as well as secular actors that the projects seek to change or influence?
2B. What were the <i>roles of religious actors</i> (i.e., individuals and institutions) and how effective were they in mitigating conflict and peacebuilding? How did this differ from and interact with related secular leaders or institutional structures?	2b. At project start-up, how <i>effective are the targeted religious actors</i> (i.e., individuals and institutions) in mitigating conflict and peacebuilding [NOTE: relevant to project's peacebuilding objectives]? How did this differ from and interact with related secular leaders or institutional structures?
2C. How did <i>messaging</i> by religious actors referencing religious practices, beliefs and values affect program outcomes?	2c. At project start-up, what <i>messaging</i> was articulated by religious actors (i.e., individuals and institutions) in reference to religious practices, beliefs and values as they relate to the project's intended outcomes?
2D. To what extent did engaging religious components of the program affect intended results? How did these results vary by <i>religious identity and for men, women, youth and minority groups</i> ?	2d. At project start-up, what are the religious considerations for project components?
2E. To what extent did program results validate <i>theories of change</i> related to intra- and inter-religious conflict and peacebuilding? Did these Theories of Change related to	2e. What were the initial project <i>theories of change</i> related to intra- and inter-religious conflict and peacebuilding?

²⁰ For the purposes of the thematic evaluation, effectiveness is defined consistent with OECD DAC evaluation criteria report (2007) on adaptations for peacebuilding: assessment of whether a program (1) Achieves or can be reasonably expected to achieve its stated or implicit objectives, and (2) Remains relevant to the issues of division or conflict (i.e., core grievances, contributions to peace). [K. Van Brabant. *Peacebuilding How? Criteria to Assess and Evaluate Peacebuilding*. Interpeace—International Peacebuilding Alliance. (2010)]

OVERALL	BASELINE
religious dynamics need to be revised through the course of implementation? If so, in what ways and around what issues?	
2F. How did the projects' efforts to address intra- and inter-religious dynamics contribute to "peace writ large"?	2f. At project start-up, how did the project define the intended contributions of intra- and inter-religious dynamics to "peace writ large"?
3. Sustainability – How are any changes in attitudes, knowledge and behaviors related to dynamics between religious groups likely to continue after the projects' conclusions?	3. Sustainability – How are any changes in attitudes, knowledge and behaviors related to dynamics between religious groups expected to continue after the projects' conclusions?
3A. What capabilities, processes, institutions or relationships were established or enhanced that are likely to support ongoing adaptability of achieved results? What else might contribute to sustainability?	3a. What aspects of the planned project design and activities related to religion are intended to support adaptability of expected results?
3B. What external conditions are likely to support or undermine sustainability?	3b. At project start-up, what are the foreseeable factors that are likely to support or undermine sustainability?

EVALUATION DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

The evaluation has three phases: collaborative design (January-February, April 2016), baseline data collection and analysis (March, May-August 2016), and end of project data collection and analysis (March 2017, June 2018). Democracy International's evaluation team was responsible for design, implementation and management of the overall evaluation. The DI team members include DI home office staff (Director of Analytical Services, Senior Program Manager, Program Officer and Program Assistant), Evaluation Team Leader, Senior Conflict Specialist, two Local Conflict Specialists, two Logisticians, and five Interpreters. USAID evaluation team members provided technical input and guidance on issues of contract adherence and evaluation implementation. In Thailand, USAID personnel (DCHA/CMM Contracting Officer's Representative, DCHA/CMM Conflict Analyst, USAID/RDMA Project Management Specialist) participated in some interviews and preliminary analysis and provided real-time guidance on adapting the evaluation design to the local context. When involving USAID personnel in the field data collection in Thailand, careful attention was made regarding Do No Harm concerns relevant to both IPs' USAID branding waivers. Specifically, IPs indicated that the evaluation team was not to identify the evaluation or Reconciliation Fund projects with the U.S. government when meeting with project beneficiaries or other community members. This created some ethical tension for the evaluation team between "informed consent" and Do No Harm considerations, as at IPs' request some participants were intentionally not informed that the project itself and DI's work were commissioned by USG.

Phase I: Collaborative Design

During Phase I (Thailand prep: January to February, 2016; CAR prep: April 2016), the evaluation team finalized evaluation design and prepared for baseline data collection. The team consulted with key evaluation end users; reviewed background materials on the two geographic locations and four grant-supported projects; prepared a thematic study on current research related to the nexus of religion, conflict and peacebuilding; designed evaluation activities and tools; and worked with projects' Implementing Partners to schedule field activities.

Prior to field departure to Thailand, the evaluation team developed KII guides to ensure consistent collection of data across sites and respondents and customized collection for

respondents with unique perspectives. Although the team did not pilot the tools, they underwent a process of data simulation to assure the tools are likely to lead to useable data responsive to evaluation questions. An essential step in Utilization-Focused Evaluation, data simulation is a process in which the evaluation team constructed likely findings based on the data collection tools. Based on this process as well as input from DCHA/CMM and IP staff, tools were amended prior to field work in Thailand. To respond to issues arising from actual use of tools, all data collection instruments were re-examined mid-way through data collection in Thailand and prior to data collection in CAR. To ensure both continuity of use combined with flexibility responsive to field conditions, the evaluation team stayed true to the evaluation questions but applied a collaborative process with IP and Mission staffs for adapting interview instruments. Once finalized, to support accurate interpretation in the field, the evaluation team also identified key concepts and terminology for translation.

Phase 2: Baseline Data Collection and Analysis

During Phase 2, the evaluation team conducted baseline data collection and analysis activities in both Thailand (March 2016) and CAR (May 2016) for all four IP projects. Field work was conducted over three-week periods in each country with site visits to all activity locations.²¹ Field-based activities included the in-briefs with both USAID Missions, IP staffs and local project partners; semi-structured Key Informant Interviews (KII) in Thailand and CAR with IP staff and local partners and subject matter experts (1 hour); Focus Group Discussions (FGD) in CAR with likely beneficiaries (1 hour); written surveys of a sample of Mor I students in Thailand (10 minutes); written surveys of FGD participants in CAR (10 minutes); Participatory Workshops in Thailand with IP and local partner staff (3 hours); and outbriefs with Thailand Mission personnel and IP staff.

In consultation with evaluation team members, IP project staff recommended and recruited **KII and FGD participants** based on criteria defined by the evaluation team, including diversity of representation based on sex, religion, age and location. In Thailand, the evaluation team conducted KII with 91 respondents, 40 percent (36 of 91) were female. Respondents types included IP staff and local partners; project advisor; government and private Islamic school principals, teachers and students; Muslim and Buddhist religious leaders; government officials; CSO leaders; and subject matter experts that included academics and journalists. In CAR, the field team met with 181 respondents, 36 percent of whom were female (66 of 181), 75 percent Christian (135 of 181), 25% Muslim (46 of 181), 91 percent over the age of 25 years (164 of 177 respondents stating their age), and 9 percent 18 to 25 years of age (13 of 177 respondents stating their age). Types of respondents included IPs and local partners; prior or potential project participants (e.g., women group members, youth leaders, peer educators, Committee for Peace & Mediation members and awareness workshop participants), key stakeholders (e.g., religious leaders, government leaders and officials, journalists), and key subject-matter experts. Interviews and focus groups were conducted in English, Thai, Malay, French or Sango, dependent upon the preference of the respondents and with the support of local interpreters.

FGD were typically four to six individuals that included both men and women together, with the exception of FGDs with women leaders only. FGD included both Muslim and Christian

²¹ South Thailand site visits included activities in Bangkok, Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat provinces and border districts of Songkhla province. CAR site visits were in Bouar, Bangassou, Bossangoa and Bangui as well as nearby villages surrounding these principle towns.

participants except in Bossangoa where all Muslims had left or been evacuated from the area. Youth were defined as 18-25 years and adults above 25 years. Upon return from the field, the team post-coded written notes from both KII and FGD in order to identify baseline measures for the evaluation questions. Although the evaluation is an aggregate evaluation across the two countries, the baseline analysis highlights specific examples from the four projects whenever there was notable variation from a dominant pattern.

Joint field-based workshops in Thailand among evaluation team members and USAID/RDMA and DCHA/CMM team members provided an opportunity for mid-course review and corrections. Following completion of data collection activities focused on the KIA project, the teams met in Songkhla (South Thailand) to reflect on progress to date. This half-day discussion included review of the evaluation questions, emergent themes, gaps in understanding, and minor adjustments in data collection. The evaluation team with DCHA/CMM and RDMA evaluation participants conducted a similar review in Bangkok after completing all South Thailand data collection with the added focus on lessons learned and priorities for data collection in the upcoming field work in the Central African Republic.

Written survey respondents in South Thailand were Mor I students (i.e., aged 12 and 13 year olds) divided into two main groups. The first group was 42 students (64% girls, 36% boys, 69% Buddhist, 31% Muslim) from three (of six) HOPE Yala project participant schools that were government schools still in session during the field work period (i.e., the other three schools were on academic breaks so students were unavailable). The second group was comprised of 77 private Islamic school Mor I students (72% girls, 28% boys, all Muslim). The Local Conflict Specialist identified two private schools²² based on being (1) in session at the time of the field work, and (2) located in the same community as the selected HOPE Yala participant school. At each of the non-participant school, the school administration selected a class of boys and a class of girls to be surveyed. The Local Conflict Specialist conducted the survey and read each question in Thai as well as providing clarification in local Malay, if needed. Respondent rates were 100 percent; however. The evaluation team logistician entered all data into Survey Monkey; the Evaluation Leader exported data into Excel for analysis.

Written survey respondents in CAR included all Focus Group Discussion participants. Of the 116 respondents, 69 percent were from Zo Kwe Zo (77 or 116) and 34% were from ASPIRE (39 or 116). Respondents were distributed somewhat evenly across Bangui (23%, 27 of 116 respondents), Bangassou (20%, 23 of 116) and Bossangoa (23%, 27 of 116) with the majority conducted in and around Bouar (34%, 39 or 116). The larger proportion is explained by a particularly large focus group of 17 women in that location. Of those the 112 responds providing their gender, 60% were men (67) and 40% were women (45). Of the 111 respondents providing religious identity information, 71 percent were Christian (79) and 29% were Muslim (32).

Evaluation team interpreters conducted the surveys, which were written in French but were also verbally translated into local language Sango, which is not a written language. The response rate was 100 percent; however, some surveys were not completed correctly so were not

²² There were no private Islamic schools in session in the location where the third HOPE Yala participant school was located.

included in the data analysis. The Local Conflict Specialist entered data into SPSS and conducted analysis.

In South Thailand, the evaluation team with DCHA/CMM and USAID/RDMA conducted an individualized three-hour **participatory workshop** with each project to discuss the project design at baseline related to religious aspects of the operating environment, theories of change and project design. The HOPE Yala workshop included the KIA project manager and two project advisors. It focused on identification of key religious actors involved in project implementation, religious actor roles, and the baseline logic model that diagrammed expected change pathways and project results. The PPST workshop included the two TAF local project managers and representatives of six of the eight local partner organizations (attended: B4P, MAC, Patani Forum, PAW, SPAN, WePeace; did not attend: ISTF, Saiburi Looker). The first part of the workshop focused on proposed PPST activities related to religion, with the understanding that specific activities had not yet been finalized. The second half focused on targeted attitudes, knowledge and behaviors related to religion that PPST expects to shift from baseline. In turn, these changes were linked to Peace Writ Large objectives related to the negotiations with the Government of Thailand and community-based dispute resolution mechanisms. No workshops were conducted in CAR due to limitations on travel for evaluation team members and key IP personnel.²³

NEXT STEPS FOR PREPARATION OF PHASE 3 END OF PROJECT DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

Between the baseline and endline field data collection, the evaluation team will monitor in-country contextual developments and IP activities. The evaluation team will read formal IP quarterly reports, as coordinated with key staff during the initial baseline field visits. When appropriate, the evaluation team will substantiate interim outcomes with third-party individuals familiar with the described outcome but not directly involved with project implementation. Data collection tools for endline field data collection will be drafted and tested through simulated data prior to deployment to the field. The feasibility and appropriateness of meeting with or surveying the same individuals as at baseline or individuals with similar characteristics who have participated in IP project activities will be determined in consultation with IPs. Further, the evaluation team will continue to consult with DCHA/CMM and IPs to confirm approach in the field and ongoing utility of evaluation focus.

The evaluation team anticipates conducting similar activities in the field as was performed for data collection for the baseline line analysis. As described above, the team will likely meet with Subject-Matter Experts (SMEs) (e.g., focused on national dynamics or Peace Writ Large,) USAID Mission staff and IP project personnel. Dependent upon enabling security conditions, the evaluation team will travel to intervention sites to meet with local SMEs, IP and local partner staff, and beneficiaries, using KII protocols, FGD guides, and written surveys as appropriate to ensure standardized collection of data. The focus of these instruments will be on changes from baseline and explanation of these changes focusing on testing of TOC, effective or ineffective implementation strategies, intended and unintended outcomes as well as sustainability of results and contributions to Peace Writ Large. The evaluation team will design an Outcome Harvesting process dependent upon staff availability and operational feasibility. This approach is intended to

²³ Travel between Bangui and implementation sites are via small United Nation humanitarian flights with limited itineraries, which restrict reservations to two organization members per flight.

capture changes in behaviors with a contribution analysis to determine the extent to which the IP project activities played a role in any observable changes. This process will also inform the TOC testing.

IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS & LOCAL PROJECT PARTNERS

Interviewer:

Interpreter:

Notetaker:

Date:

Location:

Respondent: *[Name, title, organization, sex, religion, geographic location of work, status with IP]*

NOTE: “Status with IP” options are IP, Local Project Partner, or Other (*explain*).

Participants in Interview: *[Evaluation Team Member names]*

INFORMED CONSENT

Thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. *[Introduce team members.]*

- We are a research team studying religion, conflict and peace in international development programs.
- As part of this study, we are focusing on examples from South Thailand and the Central African Republic.
- The research will be used to help people to improve their support for peace and international development work in situations where religion is a part of the operating environment.
- Although religion is the main theme for our research, we also understand that the analysis of conflict in South Thailand is more complex and involves many other drivers, grievances and historical narratives.
- Your insight will help us to better understand the ways in which religion is and is not a part of the conflict or in efforts to support peace.

Your participation is voluntary and you can end this interview at any time. Any quotations from our discussions that are used in the research report will be anonymous and will not be attributed to you by name or any other identifier.

IC1. Do you have any questions about this interview process?

If “yes” what is the question?

IC2. We usually list the names of the people we have interviewed for this research in an annex of the report. Would you feel comfortable being included in this list of interviewees?

IC3. Do you willingly agree to participate in this evaluation?

OPENING
1. What are your <u>main duties and responsibilities</u> for the P2P Project?
2. <u>How long</u> have you been in this role?
3a. What are the <u>key factors driving the conflict</u> in Southern Thailand?
3b. What if any of these drivers <u>involve religion</u> ?
IMPLEMENTATION
4. How has the P2P project taken into account religion in terms of <u>project design and/or implementation</u> ? [NOTE: "Religion" may be in terms of religious actors, institutions, values, or practices.] [NOTE: Some local partners were not involved with design, only implementation.]
5. How did you <u>select participants</u> in the P2P project? [NOTE: Comments regarding selection might include outreach strategies, selection criteria, identity characteristics, willingness to participate, etc.]
6a. What if any <u>roles do you anticipate religious leaders</u> playing in the P2P project? [NOTE: Probe for any examples of participation to date.]
6b. How are the roles of religious leaders the <u>same or different from those of secular leaders</u> in the project?
7a. What if any <u>roles do you anticipate religious institutions</u> playing in the P2P project? [NOTE: Probe for any examples of participation to date.]
7b. How are the roles of religious institutions the <u>same or different from the role of secular institutions</u> in the P2P project?
8a. Which <u>religious leaders or religious institutions</u> has the project not been able to engage in participating in or supporting the P2P project?
8b. What were the barriers to engaging them in the P2P project?
8c. How will their lack of involvement or support affect the P2P project?
9. How might <u>involving religion hinder implementation</u> of the P2P project? [NOTE: "Religion" may be in terms of religious actors, institutions, values, or practices.] [NOTE: Probe for any examples to date and methods to address or overcome.]
10. How might <u>involving religion support implementation</u> of the P2P project? [NOTE: "Religion" may be in terms of religious actors, institutions, values, or practices.] [NOTE: Probe for any examples to date and methods to address or overcome.]
11. How does your project take religion into account when staffing the P2P project?

12. For the religious leaders who are involved in the P2P project, what are their current mechanisms for **influencing their communities**?

EFFECTIVENESS

13. In terms of achieving the P2P project's objectives and results, what are the potential **advantages or disadvantages of including religious components** in the project?

14a. Will the involvement of religious leaders, institutions or values in the project **affect men and women differently**? If so, how?

14b. Will the involvement of religious leaders, institutions or values in the project **affect youths and adults** differently? If so, how?

14c. Will the involvement of religious leaders, institutions or values in the project affect **religious minorities and majorities** differently? If so, how?

15. What are the **religious values, beliefs or practices** in the community that support peacebuilding efforts?

16. How do you think the P2P project will **support efforts for peace** in Southern Thailand?

SUSTAINABILITY

17. What external conditions do you anticipate are likely to support or undermine sustainability?

18. How will including religious leaders, institutions, practices and/or values in your project affect the long-term sustainability of project outcomes?

HOPE YALA (HAKAM) ADVISORS

Interviewer:

Interpreter:

Notetaker:

Date:

Location:

Respondent: CODE [Info for participant tracking worksheet: *Name, title, organization, sex, religion, province*]

Participants in Interview: [*Evaluation Team Member names*]

INFORMED CONSENT

Thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. [*Introduce team members.*]

- We are a research team studying religion, conflict and peace in international development programs.
- As part of this study, we are focusing on examples from South Thailand and the Central African Republic.
- The research will be used to help people to improve their support for peace and international development work in situations where religion is a part of the operating environment.
- Although religion is the main theme for our research, we also understand that the analysis of conflict in South Thailand is more complex and involves many other drivers, grievances and historical narratives.
- Your insight will help us to better understand the ways in which religion is and is not a part of the conflict or in efforts to support peace.

Your participation is voluntary and you can end this interview at any time. Any quotations from our discussions that are used in the research report will be anonymous and will not be attributed to you by name or any other identifier.

IC1. Do you have any questions about this interview process?

If “yes” what is the question?

IC2. We usually list the names of the people we have interviewed for this research in an annex of the report. Would you feel comfortable being included in this list of interviewees?

IC3. Do you willingly agree to participate in this evaluation?

QUESTIONS

1. Please tell us a little about your work and how you've been involved in or worked on the conflict in Southern Thailand.

2a. **How long** have you been involved in the Hakam project and what has been your role?

2b. What **motivated** you to become involved in the Hakam project?

3a. What are the **key factors driving the conflict** in Southern Thailand?

3b. What if any of these drivers **involve religion**?

3c. How do you think Hakam will reduce violence or support efforts for peace?

4a. How do you think the Hakam program will **reduce violence or support peace in the target communities**?

4b. How do you think the Hakam program will contribute to **Peace Writ Large** (i.e., the overall peace process between the Government of Thailand and the people in southern three provinces)?

5. How do **people in your community talk about religious values** in support of peace and/or conflict in South Thailand?

6. In terms of achieving Hakam's objectives and results, what are the potential **advantages or disadvantages of including religious components** in the project?

7a. Will the involvement of religious leaders, institutions or values in Hakam **affect boys and girls differently**? If so, how?

7b. Will the involvement of religious leaders, institutions or values in Hakam **affect Muslim students and Buddhist students** differently? If so, how?

8. What are some of your **initial thoughts** regarding the Hakam project?

9. **What else** do you think is important for us to know about the role of religion in peace and conflict in Southern Thailand?

SCHOOL PRINCIPALS & TEACHERS

Interviewer:

Interpreter:

Notetaker:

Date:

Location:

Respondent: *[Name, title, school, sex, religion, ethnicity, district, province, status with IP]*

NOTE: “Status with IP” options are Participant, Non-Participant.

Participants in Interview: *[Evaluation Team Member names]*

INFORMED CONSENT

Thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. *[Introduce team members.]*

- We are a research team studying religion, conflict and peace in international development programs.
- As part of this study, we are focusing on examples from South Thailand and the Central African Republic.
- The research will be used to help people to improve their support for peace and international development work in situations where religion is a part of the operating environment.
- Although religion is the main theme for our research, we also understand that the analysis of conflict in South Thailand is more complex and involves many other drivers, grievances and historical narratives.
- Your insight will help us to better understand the ways in which religion is and is not a part of the conflict or in efforts to support peace.

Your participation is voluntary and you can end this interview at any time. Any quotations from our discussions that are used in the research report will be anonymous and will not be attributed to you by name or any other identifier.

IC1. Do you have any questions about this interview process?

If “yes” what is the question?

IC2. We usually list the names of the people we have interviewed for this research in an annex of the report. Would you feel comfortable being included in this list of interviewees?

IC3. Do you willingly agree to participate in this evaluation?

OPENING
1. What are your <u>main duties and responsibilities</u> [for the P2P Project]?
2. <u>How long</u> have you been in this role? What motivated you to be involved in the Hakam program?
3a. What are the <u>key factors driving the conflict</u> in Southern Thailand?
3b. What if any of these drivers <u>involve religion</u> ?
QUESTIONS
4a. How does the conflict in Southern Thailand <u>affect school children</u> in grade Mor 1 (i.e., 13 year olds)?
4b. Are there ways in which the effects are <u>different for boys and girls</u> ? If so, in what ways?
4c. Are there ways in which the effects <u>are different for Muslim and Buddhist students</u> ? If so, in what ways?
4d. Are there any ways in which the <u>effects on children are different than on adults</u> ? If so, in what ways?
5a. How does a <u>focus on religion</u> in efforts to prevent violence and support peace affect students in Mor 1?
5b. Are there ways in which the effects are <u>different for boys and girls</u> ? If so, in what ways?
5c. Are there ways in which the effects are <u>different for Muslim and Buddhist students</u> ? If so, in what ways?
5d. Are there ways in which the effects are <u>different for children and adults</u> ? If so, in what ways?
6. What motivates Mor 1 <u>students to become involved in peacebuilding efforts</u> ?
7a. What can be done <u>to prevent Mor 1 students from getting involved in the conflict</u> ?
9. What are the <u>religious values, beliefs or practices</u> that encourage people in the ecommunity to work for peace?
10a. What <u>role do schools and other academic institutions</u> play in helping Mor 1 students to understand the conflict and efforts to support peace?
10b. What <u>role do teachers and principals</u> play in helping Mor 1 students to understand the conflict and peacebuilding efforts?
11. Who has the <u>most influence on helping Mor 1 students to understand</u> the conflict and efforts to support peace and why?
<i>Asked only to respondents from participating schools:</i>
12a. How do you think Hakam will contribute to efforts to reduce violence or support efforts for peace?
12b. Do the Hakam students currently influence other students' attitudes toward preventing violence and efforts to support peace? If so, how big is this influence? What would be an example?
12c. Do the Hakam students currently influence community members' attitudes toward preventing violence and efforts to support peace? If so, how big is this influence? What would be an example?

STUDENTS

Interviewer:

Interpreter:

Notetaker:

Date:

Location:

Respondent: CODE [Input into Respondent Tracking Form: *Student#1, school, sex, religion*]

Participants in Interview: [*Other Evaluation Team Member names*]

INFORMED CONSENT

Thank you for meeting with us today. [*Introduce team members.*]

- We are a team of researchers from the U.S. who are studying religion, conflict and peacebuilding.
- Doing this kind of research helps us to learn about people from different religions and the ways they are working to build peace and reduce violence in their communities.
- As part of this study, we are talking to students like you in the Hakam (HOPE Yala) program.
- The research will be used to help people who are working for peace in different parts of the world.
- If you agree, we would like to talk with you about your experience in Hakam and ways in which students in your community are working for peace.
- When we are finished with all of our meetings in South Thailand, we will write a report about what we have learned. This report will not include your name or that you were a part of this research.
- You do not have to be in this study if you do not want to be and you do not have to answer any questions you do not want to answer.

IC1. Do you have any questions about this interview or anything else about our research?

If “yes” what would you like to ask?

IC2. Are you willing to participate in this evaluation?

QUESTIONS

- 1a. How did you get involved in the Hakam program?
- 1b. Why did you want to join the Hakam program?
- 1c. What Hakam activities have you participated in?
- 1d. Please describe the Hakam community project in your school.
- 1e. How did the community project get selected?
- 1f. Who in the community did you talk to for the community project?
[PROBE: *If they don't mention any religious leaders, ask which Muslim and Buddhist leaders they talked to and for what purpose.*]
- 1f. What have you learned about the other religion through the Hakam project?

LEVEL OF SOCIAL EXPOSURE

- 2a. Other than the Hakam project, what are other places in which Buddhist and Muslim students like you come together in your community?
- 2b. How far away is the nearest Buddhist/Muslim community from where you live?
- 2c. Do you visit the other community?
- 2d. Why do you visit the other community?
- 2e. Do people from that community come to visit your community?
- 2f. If so, why do they come?

SOURCES OF VIOLENCE

- 4a. What do you think is causing the violence in Southern Thailand (i.e., 3 provinces)?
- 4b. Does religion have anything to do with the conflict?
- 4c. If so, what role does religion play?

ROLE OF CHILD (AGENCY)

- 6b. Is there anything you think you can do to help increase peace in your community? If so, what would it be?
- 6a. What do you think other people your age can do to prevent violence and build peace in your community?

STUDENT SURVEY

NOTE: FIELD VERSION TRANSLATED INTO THAI

Date:
School Name:
Participant Code:

INFORMED CONSENT

(read aloud by Local Conflict Specialist on Evaluation Team)

This survey is part of an international study to research the role of religion in support of peace in Southern Thailand. The study will be used to help organizations to improve their work in Southern Thailand. Your participation is voluntary. You can skip any questions you do not want to answer. Your responses will be anonymous so you do not need to provide your name.

D1. What is your religious background?

D2. Are you male or female?

- ☐ Male
☐ Female

D3. How old are you?

D4. Are you a participant in the Hakam program?

- ☐ Yes
☐ No

1. How important is religion in your life? *(please pick one)*

- ☐ Not at all important
☐ Somewhat unimportant
☐ Somewhat important
☐ Very Important

2. In what ways do you engage with your community? *(please check all that apply)*

- ☐ School activities/ school clubs
☐ Youth organizations (outside of school)
☐ Religious groups (outside of school)
☐ Community campaigns
☐ None of these
☐ Other *(please specify)*

3. Of the following choices, which two of these most motivate you to be involved with your community? *(please pick two)*

- ☐ To be with my friends
☐ It is my civic responsibility/duty
☐ It is my religious responsibility/duty
☐ It gives me something to do
☐ To support my family, friends or community
☐ To make the world a better place
☐ None of these
☐ Don't know
☐ Other *(please specify)*

<p>4. When I need to make an important decision, to whom do I usually go for guidance? <i>(please pick one)</i></p> <p> <input type="checkbox"/> Family <input type="checkbox"/> Teacher <input type="checkbox"/> Religious Leader <input type="checkbox"/> Government Leader <input type="checkbox"/> Friend <input type="checkbox"/> Religious Text <input type="checkbox"/> News <input type="checkbox"/> Other <i>(please explain)</i> </p>
<p>5. How often do you come in contact with youth from a religion different from your own? <i>(please pick one)</i></p> <p> <input type="checkbox"/> Many times every day <input type="checkbox"/> Once a day <input type="checkbox"/> A few times every week <input type="checkbox"/> Once a month <input type="checkbox"/> Less than once a month <input type="checkbox"/> Never met someone from a different religion </p>
<p>6. Where do you most frequently come in contact with youth from other religions? <i>(please check all that apply)</i></p> <p> <input type="checkbox"/> My school <input type="checkbox"/> Sporting events, playgrounds, recreation centers <input type="checkbox"/> Market, shopping centers <input type="checkbox"/> Youth centers/clubs (outside of school) <input type="checkbox"/> Social events with friends from other religions <input type="checkbox"/> Don't really come in frequent contact <input type="checkbox"/> Other <i>(please specify)</i> </p>
<p>7. How familiar are you with the religious beliefs and/or practices of religions that are different from yours? <i>(please pick one)</i></p> <p> <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all familiar <input type="checkbox"/> Not very familiar <input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat familiar <input type="checkbox"/> Very familiar </p>
<p>8. From whom have you learned about other religions? <i>(please check all that apply)</i></p> <p> <input type="checkbox"/> Parents/family <input type="checkbox"/> School/teachers <input type="checkbox"/> Friends from my religion <input type="checkbox"/> Friends from other religions <input type="checkbox"/> Religious leaders <input type="checkbox"/> Internet/social media <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know about others religion <input type="checkbox"/> Other <i>(please specify)</i> </p>
<p>9. Do you see people from different religions in your community working together toward peaceful co-existence?</p> <p> <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No </p>

10. If “ yes,” where do you see people from different religions working together toward peaceful co-existence? (*check all that apply*)
- ☐ Campaigns/public events
 - ☐ Joint community projects/initiatives
 - ☐ Holidays and celebrations
 - ☐ Don’t see people from different religions working together toward peaceful co-existence
 - ☐ Other (*please explain*)

11. Please indicate which of the following statements are true or false:

Most religious leaders from my religion support peace efforts.

☐ True ☐ False ☐ Don’t know

Most religious leaders from other religions support peace efforts.

☐ True ☐ False ☐ Don’t know

Most people from other religions are probably just as moral as the people from my religion.

☐ True ☐ False ☐ Don’t know

Most youth in my community are able to support peace efforts in my community.

☐ True ☐ False ☐ Don’t know

I feel that I am able to support peace efforts in my community.

☐ True ☐ False ☐ Don’t know

RELIGIOUS, SECULAR AND WOMEN LEADERS

Interviewer:

Translator:

Notetaker:

Date:

Location:

Respondent: *[Name, title, organization, sex, religion, geographic location of work, status with IP]*

NOTE: “Status with IP” options are Advisor, Direct Beneficiary, Indirect Beneficiary, Stakeholder, Other (explain).

Participants in Interview: *[Evaluation Team Member names]*

INFORMED CONSENT

Thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. *[Introduce team members.]*

- We are an independent research team studying religion, conflict and support for peace in international development programs.
- As part of this thematic study, we are focusing on examples from South Thailand and the Central African Republic.
- The research will be used to help NGOs improve their support for peace and international development work in situations where religion is a part of the operating environment.
- We understand that the analysis of conflict in South Thailand is more complex than our narrow focus on religion.
- Your insight will help us to better understand the ways in which religion is and is not a part of the conflict or in efforts to support peace.

Your participation is voluntary and you can end this interview at any time. Any quotations from our discussions that are used in the research report will be anonymous and will not be attributed to you by name or any other identifying designation.

IC1. Do you have any questions about this interview process?

If “yes” what is the question?

IC2. We usually list the names of the people we have interviewed for this research in an annex of the report. Would you feel comfortable being included in this list of interviewees?

IC3. Do you willingly agree to participate in this evaluation?

QUESTIONS
1. What are your <u>leadership roles and responsibilities</u> in your community?
2a. What are the <u>key factors driving the conflict</u> in Southern Thailand?
2b. What if any of these drivers <u>involve religion</u> ?
3. How is the conflict currently <u>affecting the Malay-Muslim, Thai-Buddhist and other communities</u> in Southern Thailand?
4. How does the <u>government engage religious leaders</u> in relation to the conflict in the Deep South?
5a. What are the <u>roles of Buddhist religious leaders and institutions</u> in preventing violence and promoting peace?
5b. What are the <u>roles of Muslim religious leaders and institutions</u> in preventing violence and promoting peace?
5c. What are the <u>roles of women leaders and organizations</u> in preventing violence and promoting peace?
6a. In terms of preventing violence and promoting peace, how do <u>the roles of religious leaders differ from non-religious leaders</u> , such as government officials or community leaders?
6b. To what do you attribute those differences?
7. Are there <u>differences between religious leaders who are men and those who are women</u> in terms of their involvement in preventing violence and promoting peacebuilding?
8. Can you please provide an example in the last 12 months of <u>Buddhist and Muslim religious leaders working together for peace</u> ?
9. How do you usually <u>learn about peace efforts</u> led by civil society actors (i.e., nongovernmental)?
10a. What formal and informal <u>religious institutions are involved in peace efforts</u> in the South?
10b. What roles do they play? (NOTE: <i>Probe for any examples.</i>)
11a. Do <u>religious practices support</u> peace efforts? If so, in what ways? (NOTE: <i>Probe for any examples to date and methods to overcome.</i>)
11b. Do <u>religious practices hinder</u> peace efforts? If so, in what ways? (NOTE: <i>Probe for any examples to date and methods to overcome.</i>)
12a. How does religious leaders' work in support of peace <u>affect men and women differently</u> ?
12b. How does religious leaders' work in support of peace <u>affect youth and adults differently</u> ?

12c. How does religious leaders' work in support of peace affect religious minorities and majorities differently? ☐

13. Which religious values, beliefs or practices support peacebuilding in Southern Thailand?

14. Which religious practices or religious values are likely to support or undermine efforts for long-lasting peace?

15a. What efforts to reduce violence or support peace have been the most successful?

16. *Asked only to respondents who are advisors or participants in P2P project:* How do you think the P2P project will contribute to general efforts to reduce violence or support peace efforts?

17a. How much influence do you have over the peace process?

17b. In what ways are you able to support efforts for peace?

18. How much do you agree with the following statements?

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Don't Know Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree

18a. Buddhist and Muslims have co-existed peacefully in Southern Thailand for many decades.

18b. There is a role for religious leaders to play in support of non-violent political debate.

18c. Most religious leaders from your religion are working for peace.

18d. Religious leaders have a lot of positive influence over the conflict in Southern Thailand.

18e. Most people in your religion are moral.

18f. People who belong to another religion are probably just as moral as the people in your religion.

EXTERNAL SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS

Interviewer:

Translator:

Notetaker:

Date:

Location:

Respondent: CODE [Data for respondent tracking worksheet: *Name, title, organization, sex, religion, province of work*]

Participants in Interview: [*Evaluation Team Member names*]

INFORMED CONSENT

Thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. [*Introduce team members.*]

- We are an independent research team studying religion, conflict and support for peace in international development programs.
- As part of this thematic study, we are focusing on examples from South Thailand and the Central African Republic.
- The research will be used to help NGOs improve their support for peace and international development work in situations where religion is a part of the operating environment.
- We understand that the analysis of conflict in South Thailand is more complex than our narrow focus on religion.
- Your insight will help us to better understand the ways in which religion is and is not a part of the conflict or in efforts to support peace.

Your participation is voluntary and you can end this interview at any time. Any quotations from our discussions that are used in the research report will be anonymous and will not be attributed to you by name or any other identifying designation.

IC1. Do you have any questions about this interview process?

If “yes” what is the question?

IC2. We usually list the names of the people we have interviewed for this research in an annex of the report. Would you feel comfortable being included in this list of interviewees?

IC3. Do you willingly agree to participate in this evaluation?

PRIMARY QUESTIONS
1. Please tell us a little about your work and how you've been involved or worked on the conflict in S. Thailand.
2. What are the <u>key factors driving the conflict</u> in Southern Thailand? What if any of these drivers involve religion?
3. What are the <u>most promising peacebuilding initiatives</u> currently in South Thailand? How, if at all, have these initiatives involved religion (leaders, institutions, messages, groups)?
4. Which <u>religious leaders and institutions have been most active in working toward peace</u> over the last three years? How have they supported peace efforts? How have these efforts been different from or the same as secular leaders?
5. Which <u>religious leaders and institutions have been most active in the conflict</u> ? How have they contributed to the conflict? How have these contributions been different from or the same as secular leaders?
6. How has the <u>government used (appropriated) religious leaders</u> to advance its interests in the Deep South?
7. How have the <u>non-state actors used (appropriated) religious leaders</u> to advance their interests in Southern Thailand?
8. Religions are often internally diverse. <u>Within the Buddhist faith tradition are there new voices or interpretations</u> that have evolved in response to the conflict? If, yes, please describe.
9. Within the <u>Islamic faith tradition are there new voices or interpretations</u> that have evolved in response to the conflict? If yes, please describe.
10. What do you think is <u>needed for the peace process to move forward</u> ?
11. At this point how could <u>religious leaders and institutions best contribute to the peace process</u> in Southern Thailand?
12. What are the <u>potential risks and harms of engaging religious leaders and institutions</u> in peacebuilding efforts?
13. What are the most <u>insightful conflict analyses</u> that you recommend we read?
14. <u>What else</u> do you think is important for us to know about the role of religion in peace and conflict in Southern Thailand?
TIME PERMITTING
15. How much do you know about the <u>TAF and Kenan P2P programs</u> they are beginning to implement?
16. What are some of your initial thoughts regarding these programs?

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC DATA COLLECTION TOOLS

IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS & LOCAL PROJECT PARTNERS

Interviewer:

Interpreter:

Notetaker:

Date:

Location:

Respondent: *[Name, title, organization, sex, religion, village/city of work]*

Others attending interview: *[non-respondent attendants in interview]*

INFORMED CONSENT

Thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. *[Introduce team members.]*

- We are a research team studying religion and peacebuilding in international development programs.
- As part of this study, we are focusing on examples from South Thailand and the Central African Republic.
- The research will be used to help organizations to improve their support for peace and international development work in situations where religion is a part of the operating environment.
- Although religion is the main theme for our research, we understand that the analysis of conflict in the Central African Republic is more complex than our narrow focus on religion.
- Your insight will help us to better understand the ways in which religion is and is not a part of the conflict or in efforts to support peace.

Your participation is voluntary and you can end this interview at any time. Any quotations from our discussions that are used in the research report will be anonymous and will not be attributed to you by name or any other identifier.

IC1. Do you have any questions about this interview process?

If “yes” what is the question?

IC2. We usually list the names of the people we have interviewed for this research in an annex of the report. Would you feel comfortable being included in this list of interviewees?

IC3. Do you willingly agree to participate in this evaluation?

OPENING
1. What is your <u>organization's role</u> in the implementation of the P2P project (e.g., key project activities)?
2. What are your <u>main duties and responsibilities</u> for the P2P Project?
3. <u>How long</u> have you been in this role?
4a. What are the <u>key factors driving the conflict</u> in Central African Republic?
4b. What if any of these drivers <u>involve religion</u> ?
IMPLEMENTATION
5. How did the P2P program include religion in the following <u>program components</u> : (a) Needs Assessment, (b) Conflict Analysis, (c) Program Theories of Change, (d) Procurement, (e) Do No Harm, (f) Monitoring, and (g) Evaluation? [NOTE: "Religion" may be in terms of religious actors (i.e., individuals, institutions, constituencies), identity, values, or practices.]
6. How was religion a factor in the <u>selection of participants</u> in the P2P project? [NOTE: Comments regarding selection might include outreach strategies, selection criteria, identity characteristics, willingness to participate, etc.]
7a. What if any <u>roles do you anticipate religious leaders</u> playing in the P2P project?
7b. How are the roles of religious leaders the <u>same or different from those of secular leaders</u> in the project?
8a. What if any <u>roles do you anticipate religious institutions</u> playing in the P2P project?
8b. How are the roles of religious institutions the <u>same or different from the role of secular institutions</u> in the P2P project?
9a. Which <u>religious leaders or institutions has the project not been able to involve</u> in the P2P project?
9b. What were the <u>barriers</u> to involving them in the P2P project?
9c. How will their <u>lack of involvement or support affect the P2P project</u> (e.g., spoilers)?
10. How does <u>religion create challenges for implementation</u> of the P2P project? [NOTE: "Religion" may be in terms of religious actors, institutions, identity, values, or practices.] [NOTE: Probe for any examples to date and methods to address or overcome.]
11. How does <u>religion support or facilitate implementation</u> of the P2P project? [NOTE: "Religion" may be in terms of religious actors, identity, institutions, values, or practices.] [NOTE: Probe for any examples to date and methods to address or overcome.]
12. How does your project take religion into account when <u>staffing</u> the P2P project?

13. For the religious leaders who are involved in the P2P project, what are their current methods for **influencing their communities to support peacebuilding efforts?**

EFFECTIVENESS

14. In terms of achieving the P2P project's objectives and results, what are the **advantages or disadvantages of including religion** in the project?

15a. How does involving religion in the project **affect men and women differently?**

15b. How does involving religion in the project **affect youths and adults** differently?

15c. How does involving religion s in the project affect **Christians and Muslims differently?**

16. What are the **religious messages** in the community that support peacebuilding efforts?

17a. How do you think the P2P project will **support efforts for peace at the national level** in the Central African Republic?

17b. How do you think the P2P project will **support efforts for peace at the community level?**

SUSTAINABILITY

18a. How will involving religion **support the sustainability** of project results after the end of the grant period?

18b. How will involving religion **undermine sustainability** of project results after the end of the grant period??

19. How will external factors related to religion **support sustainability** of project results after the end of the grant period??

[NOTE: *External factors related to religion include peace processes, inter-religious activities, intra-religious agreement/disagreement, religious leader actions, religious-based violence, state actions or policies, etc.*]

19b. How will external factors related to religion **undermine sustainability** of project results after the end of the grant period?

RELIGIOUS, SECULAR AND WOMEN LEADERS

Interviewer:

Translator:

Notetaker:

Date:

Location:

Respondent: *[Name, title, organization, sex, religion, village/city of work]*

Others attending interview: *[Non-respondents in attendance]*

INFORMED CONSENT

Thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. *[Introduce team members.]*

- We are an independent research team studying religion and peacebuilding in international development programs.
- As part of this thematic study, we are focusing on examples from South Thailand and the Central African Republic.
- The research will be used to help organizations improve their support for peace and international development work in situations where religion is a part of the operating environment.
- Although religion is the main theme for our research, we understand that the analysis of conflict in the Central African Republic is more complex than our narrow focus on religion.
- Your insight will help us to better understand the ways in which religion is and is not a part of the conflict or in efforts to support peace.

Your participation is voluntary and you can end this interview at any time. Any quotations from our discussions that are used in the research report will be anonymous and will not be attributed to you by name or any other identifying designation.

IC1. Do you have any questions about this interview process?

If “yes” what is the question?

IC2. We usually list the names of the people we have interviewed for this research in an annex of the report. Would you feel comfortable being included in this list of interviewees?

IC3. Do you willingly agree to participate in this evaluation?

QUESTIONS

1a. What are your leadership roles and responsibilities in your community?

1b. What is your role in the P2P project?

2a. What are the key factors driving the conflict in the Central African Republic?

2b. What are the key factors driving conflict in your local community?

2c. What if any of these drivers involve religion?

3a. How is the conflict currently affecting the Muslim and Christian communities in the areas where the P2P project is being implemented (e.g., Bangui, Bouar, Bossangoa, Bangassou)?

3b. Which other religions are also affected in these communities and how?

4a. In general, what are the differences in roles of religious leaders who are men and those who are women?

4b. In general, what are the differences in roles of religious leaders and secular leaders, such as government officials, tribal leaders, community leaders or CSO leaders?

5. Can you please provide an example in the last 12 months of Christian and Muslim religious leaders working together for peace?

6a. How do you usually become aware of peace efforts led by civil society actors (i.e., nongovernmental)?

6b. What would motivate you to become involved in a peace effort led by civil society actors?

7a. Which religious messages (beliefs, values or practices) support peacebuilding efforts? (NOTE: *Probe for any examples of how they have been applied to peacebuilding.*)

7b. Which religious messages (beliefs, values or practices) hinder peace efforts? (NOTE: *Probe for any examples to date and methods to overcome.*)

8a. Within the Christian faith tradition are there new voices or interpretations that have evolved in response to the conflict? If, yes, please describe.

8b. Within the Islamic faith tradition are there new voices or interpretations that have evolved in response to the conflict? If, yes, please describe.

9a. What are religious leaders able to do in support of peace at the national as well as local levels?

9b. How much influence do you have over the peace process in the Central African Republic?

9c. How much influence do you have over peace processes in your own community?

Asked only to respondents who are advisors or participants in P2P project:

10a. In the P2P project, what are the roles of Christian religious leaders and institutions?

<p>10b. In the P2P project, what are the <u>roles of Muslim religious leaders and institutions</u>?</p> <p>10c. In the P2P project, what are the <u>roles of secular leaders and institutions</u>?</p> <p>10d. In the P2P project, what are the <u>roles of women leaders and institutions</u>?</p>
<p><i>Asked only to respondents who are advisors or participants in P2P project:</i></p> <p>11a. How does involving religion in the P2P project <u>affect men and women differently</u>?</p> <p>11b. How does involving religion in the P2P project <u>affect youth and adults differently</u>?</p> <p>11c. How does involving religion in the P2P project <u>affect Christians, Muslims and other religions differently</u>?</p>
<p><i>Asked only to respondents who are advisors or participants in P2P project:</i></p> <p>12a. How do you think the <u>P2P project will contribute</u> to general efforts to reduce violence or support peace efforts in the Central African Republic?</p> <p>12b. How do you think the <u>P2P project will contribute</u> to general efforts to reduce violence or support peace efforts at the community level?</p>
<p>13. How much do you agree with the following statements?</p> <p><i>Strongly Disagree Somewhat Disagree Don't Know Somewhat Agree Strongly Agree</i></p> <p>13a. Christians and Muslims have co-existed peacefully in Central African Republic for many decades.</p> <p>13b. There is a role for religious leaders to play in support of non-violent political debate.</p> <p>13c. Most religious leaders from your religion are working for peace.</p> <p>13d. Religious leaders have a lot of positive influence over the conflict in the Central African Republic</p> <p>13e. Most people in your religion are moral.</p> <p>13f. People who belong to another religion are probably just as moral as the people in your religion.</p>
<p>14. <u>What else</u> do you think is important for us to know about the role of religion in peace and conflict in Central African Republic?</p>

EXTERNAL SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS

Interviewer:

Translator:

Notetaker:

Date:

Location:

Respondent: *[Name, title, organization, sex, religion, village/city of work]*

Others attending interview: *[Non-respondents in attendance]*

INFORMED CONSENT

Thank you for taking the time to meet with us today. *[Introduce team members.]*

- We are an independent research team studying religion and peacebuilding in international development programs.
- As part of this thematic study, we are focusing on examples from South Thailand and the Central African Republic.
- The research will be used to help organizations improve their support for peace and international development work in situations where religion is a part of the operating environment.
- We understand that the analysis of conflict in the Central African Republic is more complex than our narrow focus on religion.
- Your insight will help us to better understand the ways in which religion is and is not a part of the conflict or in efforts to support peace.

Your participation is voluntary and you can end this interview at any time. Any quotations from our discussions that are used in the research report will be anonymous and will not be attributed to you by name or any other identifying designation.

IC1. Do you have any questions about this interview process?

If “yes” what is the question?

IC2. We usually list the names of the people we have interviewed for this research in an annex of the report. Would you feel comfortable being included in this list of interviewees?

IC3. Do you willingly agree to participate in this evaluation?

QUESTIONS

1. Please tell us a little about your work and how you've been involved or worked on the conflict in the Central African Republic.

2. What are the **key factors related to religion that are driving the conflict** in the Central African Republic? [NOTE: *Religious involvement may pertain to leaders, institutions, messages, identity groups, etc.*]

3. What are the **most promising peacebuilding initiatives** that involve religion in the Central African Republic? [NOTE: *Religious involvement may pertain to leaders, institutions, messages, identity groups, etc.*]

4a. Which **religious leaders and institutions have been most active in working toward peace** over the last three years?

4b. How have they supported peace efforts? What has been their role?

4c. How have these efforts been different from or the same as secular leaders?

5a. Which **religious leaders and institutions have been most active in the conflict** over the last three years?

5b. How have they contributed to the conflict?

5c. How have these contributions to the conflict been different from or the same as secular leaders?

6b. How has the **government used (appropriated) religious leaders or messages** to advance its interests in the Central African Republic?

6b. How have the **non-state actors used (appropriated) religious leaders or messages** to advance their interests in Central African Republic?

7a. Which **religious messages (beliefs, values or practices) support** peacebuilding efforts? (NOTE: *Probe for any examples of how they have been applied to peacebuilding.*)

7b. Which **religious messages (beliefs, values or practices) hinder** peace efforts? (NOTE: *Probe for any examples to date and methods to overcome.*)

8a. **Within the Christian faith tradition are there new voices or interpretations** that have evolved in response to the conflict? If, yes, please describe.

8b. Within the **Islamic faith tradition are there new voices or interpretations** that have evolved in response to the conflict? If yes, please describe.

9. At this point how could **religious leaders and institutions best contribute to the process of peace** at the *national level*?

10. At this point how could **religious leaders and institutions best contribute to the process of peace** at the *community level*?

11. What are the **potential risks and harm of engaging religious leaders and institutions** in peacebuilding?

13. **What else** do you think is important for us to know about the role of religion in peace and conflict in Central African Republic?

14. *Ask only if respondent is familiar with the Search for Common Ground and/or Mercy Corps Programs:*
What are some of your initial thoughts regarding these programs?

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION BENEFICIARIES & PARTICIPANTS

Facilitator:

Translator:

Notetaker:

Location:

Date:

Implementing Partner: SFCG: _____ Mercy Corps: _____

Type of Participant: Peace Com: _____ IRP-Bouar: _____ IRP-Bangui: _____
Media: _____ Education: _____ Restitution: _____
Conflict Mgmt: _____ Women's Grp: _____ Youth Group: _____
Other: _____

Number of Men: Total: _____ Youth: _____ Adults: _____

Number of Women: Total: _____ Youth: _____ Adults: _____

Religious identity: Christian: _____ Muslim: _____ Other: _____
Unknown: _____

INTRODUCTION AND INFORMED CONSENT

[NOTE TO DATA COLLECTORS: *Be sure to write down everyone's first name and where they are sitting before you begin discussion.*]

INTRODUCTION: *Hello. My name is [YOUR NAME] and I am part of a research team that is studying the connection between religion and peacebuilding in international development. With me is [NAME OF INTERPRETER] who will be helping us with translation today.*

As part of this research, we are focusing on projects from South Thailand and the Central African Republic. The research will be used to help organizations improve their support for peace and international development work in situations where religion plays a role. Although religion is the main theme for our research, we understand that the analysis of conflict in the Central African Republic is more complex than our narrow focus on religion. Over the next three weeks, we are meeting with people who have participated or will participate in a [Mercy Corps or Search for Common Ground] activity.

At the end of this time, we will aggregate all the information from CAR and Thailand in a public report. None of your names will be in this report and all your comments will be anonymous.

I will ask you about 10 questions regarding the relationship between religion and peacebuilding. Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to answer any questions you do not want to answer and you can leave the discussion at any time. Any quotations from our discussions that are used in the research report will be anonymous and will not be attributed to you by name. It is important to give everyone an opportunity to speak about his or her experience, so I will do my best to be sure everyone has a chance to participate.

Do you have any questions about this process before we begin?

1. What role do religious leaders play in the conflicts in your community?
2. How do these leaders promote peace or conflict?
3. What role do religious institutions play in the conflicts in your community? (e.g., mosques, churches, faith-based women's groups, faith-based youth groups, Inter-Religious Platform, faith-based NGO, Catholic Bishops Conference, Council of Churches, Justice and Peace Commission, Islamic Council, etc.)
4. How do these institutions promote peace or conflict?
5. What can government leaders do to support peace that religious leaders cannot do? (e.g., politicians, government officials, local authorities)?
6. What can civil society organizations do that religious leaders cannot do? (e.g., women's associations, youth associations, NGOs, universities)?
7. What religious messages or teachings encourage peace in Central African Republic?
8. What religious messages or teachings encourage people to continue conflict in CAR?
9. What do you think you can do to support peace now in your community?
10. What do you think you can do to support peace now in the Central African Republic?

If the participants are literate: For each question on the mini-survey, please check whether you Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree, Strongly Disagree with each of the following statements:

If the participants are not literate: For each question, please drop your colored token in the box or pile for whether you Strongly Agree (Very big happy face), Somewhat Agree (Smile), Somewhat Disagree (straight line smile), Strongly Disagree (big unhappy face) with each of the following statements:

MINI SURVEY – READ BY INTERPRETER WITH FORM FOR WRITTEN RESPONSES

How much do you agree with the following statements?

Strongly Agree Somewhat Agree Somewhat Disagree Strongly Disagree

- a. Christians and Muslims have co-existed peacefully in Central African Republic for many decades.
- b. There is a role for religious leaders to play in support of non-violent political debate.
- c. Most religious leaders from your religion are working for peace.
- d. Religious leaders have a lot of positive influence over the conflict in Central African Republic.
- e. Most people in your religion are moral.
- f. People who belong to another religion are probably just as moral as the people in your religion.

11. Do you have any final comments related to religion and peacebuilding?

Thank you for your taking the time to participate in this discussion. If you have any questions about this research, please feel free to talk with me after this discussion

ANNEX C: SOUTH THAILAND PROJECTS SUMMARY

I. Deep South Operational Context

Key Conflict Factors

Since 2004, the Deep South region of Thailand has seen a resurgence of an indigenous, ethno-nationalist conflict that dates back to the separatist movement of the early 1900s. Unlike the rest of Thailand, the region is predominantly Muslim and Malay-speaking but with a large Thai Buddhist minority. Key conflict drivers are grounded in long-standing vertical center-periphery tensions rooted in Malay-Muslim grievances against the Thai state, including discrimination in local governance and social service delivery, political marginalization, and perceptions of injustice based on past human rights abuses and heavy-handed assimilation policies. However, with the persistence of inequity, horizontal tensions between Muslims and Buddhists in the South have become more prominent with formerly peaceful social relations unraveling. Current violence has led to high levels of fatalities, injuries and detentions. Men are disproportionately involved as both perpetrators and victims with a growing number of female-heads of households facing significant economic and familial burdens. Efforts to restart formal peace talks between the Thai government and an umbrella group of rebel groups have faced multiple road blocks.

Religious Contextual Factors

In the region of the three southernmost provinces of the Deep South, religion, ethnicity and nationalism are closely linked. This area was once part of a Buddhist kingdom called Langkasuka. However, it later became the Islamic kingdom of Patani. While the country is over 90 percent Thai Buddhist, the three southernmost provinces are more than 85 percent Malay Muslim. For generations, segments of the Malay Muslim population have sought political autonomy from Thailand. Over the last 11 years, the central Thai government has undergone several military coups, and Malay armed groups have fought against and negotiated with the state for varying levels of separation and autonomy. Since January 2004, the region has been under martial law and fighting has intensified with more than 6,500 people killed, most of them have been Muslim civilians. The conflict in the south has fed into a growing national movement of Buddhist ultranationalism that calls for designation of Buddhism as the State religion in Thailand's constitution.

Although religious identity is a characterization of the warring factions, the conflict is not driven by religious persecution, exclusion, or other religious-themed challenges. That said, at one point or another, all parties have tried to appropriate religion in order to garner support for their political positions. The result is increasing displacement, separation, isolation, and withdrawal into distinct communities. While religion is not a key driver of conflict in the Deep South, it will certainly be a significant consideration in any long-term peace process.

II. Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand (PPST)

Implemented by The Asia Foundation (TAF) and its local partners, the overarching goal of the Promoting Peace in Southern Thailand (PPST) project is to increase trust and common understanding among conflicting groups at the community levels and to improve the prospect of higher-level peace talks at the national level. PPST capacity building activities have a strong focus on women community leaders and local elites, with a targeted strategy to enable effective

bottom-up advocacy for national peace negotiations. The primary objectives over a three-year period are as follows:

Objective 1: Increase trust among community groups in support of the peace process.

Objective 2: Increase understanding and engagement among local elites—including both secular and religious leaders—to address intra-communal conflict and develop a common platform of demands for a peace agreement.

Objective 3: Enhance the capacities of local elites and civil society groups to monitor the situation and exert pressure for a peace agreement.

Local partners that will support implementation as follows:

- *Siaburi Looker* is an activist grassroots organization established in 2013. Its work centers on its team of young people who develop public space and dialogues that celebrate diversity and inclusion.
- *Islam Sri Thaksim Foundation (ISTF)* is determining its project priorities.
- *Women's Agenda for Peace (PAW)* is a network of 23 women's organizations in the southernmost provinces. Its mission is to establish a joint platform for women across different groups in the Deep South to promote sustainable peace and increase women's voices and participation in the peace process.
- *The Muslim Attorney Center Foundation (MAC)* is a legal service organization providing counseling and representation in court cases, reporting on human rights environment and community awareness raising.
- *Southern Paralegal Advocacy Network (SPAN)* was established in 2009 and is a group of young paralegal volunteers who assist local communities to understand and protect their rights.
- *Buddhists for Peace (B4P)* consists of approximately 100 volunteers working on human rights, civic education and peace promotion with a focus on promoting intra-religious dialogue within the Buddhist community in the Deep South.
- *Pattani Forum* is determining its project priorities.

PPST project activities will be implemented in Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani provinces, and neighboring districts of Songkhla. Specific locations are to be identified as PPST's priorities are identified by its local partners.

PPST is focused on increasing trust and common understanding among conflicting groups at the community and local elites levels. Increased trust will ameliorate day-to-day violence and result in bottom-up pressure in support of peace. This strengthened local voice will improve the likelihood of higher-level peace talks succeeding in the future. This pathway for change is depicted in Figure C.1 PPST Logic Model. Main activities that will be implemented over a three-year period include: Engaging Malay-Muslim and Thai-Buddhist groups to explore shared cultural histories, facilitating dialogue among Malay-Muslims and Thai-Buddhist women's organizations on common community concerns, developing a peacebuilding leaders curriculum for training of

trainer workshop, supporting community projects initiated and organized by trained active citizen leaders, supporting civil society groups to advocate for a political settlement, and providing technical assistance and exposure to other peace processes.

While the project takes religion of participants into consideration in several ways, the project does not specifically target religious leaders. While some may be included as members of local elites, they are selected on the basis of a variety of criteria. Local partners include civil society organizations that support intra-religious and inter-religious engagement, cross-identity mutual support, dialogue and advocacy. The project does not engage explicitly religious institutions, such as Buddhist temples, mosques or formal religious hierarchies.

III. Healing, Opportunity, Peace and Engagement of Youth in Yala (HOPE Yala)

Implemented by the Kenan Institute Asia (KIA) and its local partners, the Healing, Opportunity, Peace and Engagement of Youth in Yala (HOPE-Yala) project's goal is to build inter-communal trust between Muslims and Buddhists in six communities in Yala by changing individual and collective attitudes toward "the other." The HOPE-Yala project will work closely with advisors from its two local project partners: the Prince of Songkhla University, Pattani Campus, and the Yala Rajabhat University. Advisors will support the program through reaching out to the community to gain trust from and provide entry to target communities.

Working through six partner schools and local community leaders in the Yala province, HOPE-Yala strives to engage Muslim and Buddhist children (7th to 9th grade) to become young leaders among their peers and to serve as connectors within the broader community. HOPE Yala envisions their young participants to play a role in rejecting the use of violence and promoting social space for nonviolently addressing grievances and development needs. The project will be implemented over a three-year period in the Yala province.

HOPE Yala's seeks to achieve its goal overall goal of building inter-communal trust in its six target communities through three intermediate results:

- IR1.* Social space where people of different religious beliefs can interact naturally and discuss community needs, centered on youth and community development is created.
- IR2.* Youth leaders use their leadership skills to settle grievances and build trust.
- IR3.* Civil society leaders are confident to lead activities in support of community needs.

Selection criteria for the six communities included proximity to the HOPE Yala office in Yala city and their expressed interest in participating in the project. The project works with one government school in each of these communities. Although the majority of students attend private Islamic schools, HOPE Yala is working with exclusively with government schools in order to access both Buddhist and Muslim students attending school together.

HOPE Yala maintains that Muslim and Buddhist boys and girls can serve as important connectors to create social space where people can interact naturally. Further, this shared space will break down barriers; establish trust; and enhance links to home, community and a joint future. With the building of trust will come a shift in community members' attitudes

toward acceptance of those with whom they have been in conflict. The result will be the community working together to address their grievances through nonviolent political discourse. This pathway for change is depicted in Figure C.2 HOPE Yala Logic Model. The main activities planned over the three-year implementation period include youth camps for building inter-communal understanding and leadership skills, student clubs to provide venue for joint action, community projects that promote community engagement, university mentors to coach student leaders, and community-based advisory committees of local leaders.

Figure C.1 PPST Logic Model





Figure C.2 HOPE Yala Logic Model



ANNEX D: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC PROJECTS SUMMARY

I. Central African Republic Operational Context

Key Conflict Factors

Political and economic exclusions, high levels of corruption, high unemployment rates, inequitable distribution of proceeds of natural resource exploitation, and high illiteracy levels among the Central African Republic's (CAR) population have underscored political instability in CAR since independence in 1960. Multiple coup d'états, often involving the same political actors, have weakened the capacity of the state to deliver services, protect its citizens, and exert its influence throughout the country. At various stages, political actors mobilized and used the grievances of different identity groups to support their quests for power. The presence and operations of these groups further weakened state control in the country. Additionally, the use of ethno-regional blocks as the major fault lines for political mobilization created pockets of militia groups across the country, each professing to fight for political and economic inclusion for their respective groups. However, constantly changing coalitions and alliances within and between these armed groups often blurred identity lines, conflated the issues at stake in conflicts, and complicated resolution efforts.

In the most recent crisis, the *Séléka* coalition, which started as a regional group fighting for political and economic justice and inclusion of the neglected north-eastern part of the country, evolved into a loose coalition of armed groups and rapidly acquired an Islamic label because of the Arabic speaking Muslim militia members, even though some militants are Christians. Similarly, the Anti-Zaragina group, constituted before the current crisis to protect communities against armed robberies, became labeled as the Christian *Antibalaka* militia, even though it too includes Muslims in its ranks and file.

Socioeconomic factors that resulted from and reinforced the conflict cycles in CAR include, but are not limited to the following:

- *Persistent poverty* across the country, but most especially in outlying provinces such as the northeastern region.
- *High rates of illiteracy* due to poor or nonexistent educational systems that have generated large numbers of youth who are poorly equipped, unemployed, and unemployable in the formal sector.
- *Economic disparities* that run along identity (ethnicity, religious affiliation, racial and gender) lines.
- *Weak national security system* that failed to protect citizens from all forms of violence.

Religious Contextual Factors

Although the root causes of the current crisis are grounded in competition for political and economic gain, several notable dynamics have introduced religion as a mobilizing force for both conflict and peacebuilding. CAR's current population of approximately four million is about 80 percent Christians, 15 percent Muslims and 5 percent practitioners of indigenous African

religions and other faiths. Both the *Séléka* and *Antibalaka* initially targeted Christians and Muslims respectively on entry into communities; some Muslim and Christian youth cooperated with them on their arrival. However, membership of both militia groups is not exclusive of people from other faiths. Indeed, in the Bouar Township, the leaders of the *Antibalaka* are all Muslims. Additionally, both *Séléka* and *Antibalaka* militias attacked and looted from those perceived to be wealthy, often without consideration for their religious affiliations. Conversely, across the country, many Christian and Muslim leaders rapidly mobilized to counter the narrative that the conflict was a religious one, engaged the militias to prevent violence, and worked together to provide humanitarian assistance and security to people irrespective of their religious affiliations. These joint efforts demonstrate to the population that religion is not the cause of the conflict; it is only being used by the warmongers for ulterior motives. At the community level, mutual support and protection systems emerged, as both Christians and Muslims provided shelter, safe spaces, and protection to their neighbors of another faith against the onslaught of the militias.

II. Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement (ASPIRE)

Mercy Corps' Advancing Solutions for Peace through Intercommunity Reconciliation and Engagement (ASPIRE) "aims to enable community leaders of all faiths and disaffected youth to work together to peacefully manage inter-group tensions, rebuild community cohesion and strengthen pluralism in the strategic town of Bouar."²⁴ The project focuses on building the capacity of faith and youth leaders in Bouar to: (1) promote inclusive community-led conflict resolution and prevention, (2) support connector economic engagements between divided groups, and (3) create positive attitudes for tolerance and nonviolent behaviors. Mercy Corps's local implementing partner is the Bouar Inter-Religious Platform (BIRP). The project will also work closely with Bouar-based Community Peace Committees (CPC) and women's groups.

Bouar is home to a diverse group of indigenous, settler and migrant ethno-religious groups and transitory populations. The urban center and its surrounding villages lie along major trade routes between Cameroun's port city of Douala in the West, Bangui in the South, and Chad in the North. Bouar's Quartiers Hausa are Muslim communities of Hausa settlers from Nigeria, most of whom have acquired CAR citizenship through longevity of stay or because they were born there. Similar enclaves of predominantly Muslim settlements exist in other surrounding communities. Despite this spatial distancing between the indigenous and settler communities, Muslims and Christians have lived and transacted economic activities together peacefully until the advent of the *Séléka* and later the *Antibalaka* attacks. Both militant groups have tried to ride on preexisting local development challenges to impose religious identity distinctions among the population.

Bouar and its outlying communities face several particular conflict-related challenges:

- Being host to CAR's second largest military base, Bouar became a target of the *Séléka* insurgents, who easily overran the poorly equipped military. Some deserting soldiers of the national army joined the *Antibalaka*, bringing with them military training and weaponry that intensified the violence.

²⁴ Mercy Corps Award Excerpt, Attachment B Program Description, APS-OAA-14-00003.

- Bouar faces recent population movements in and out of the area. At least 14,000 people in and around Bouar, primarily Muslims, have fled to Cameroun and Chad. There are an additional 7,435 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Bouar as of March 2015.
- Poorly resourced mainly Muslim women are assuming responsibilities as heads of households after the men were killed or displaced, despite having limited knowledge, skills, and opportunities to meet their families' basic needs.
- Returning refugees and internally displaced have little or nothing to rely on for their livelihoods, since their property has been looted or destroyed.
- Youth face particular difficulties, as there are few opportunities for employment outside the informal sector.

Under the ASPIRE initiative, Mercy Corps believes sustainable peace can be achieved if community and youth leaders: (1) collaborate to monitor and resolve conflicts; (2) promote intergroup economic engagements that reduce disparities and associated inter-communal tensions; and (3) serve as voices of peace in advocating nonviolent means of resolving conflicts. Project initiatives therefore focus on building the capacities of these thought and action leaders in their respective communities to play lead roles in rebuilding inter-communal trust, peace, and social cohesion. The project uses integrated models in Bouar and its environs that weave together interfaith peacebuilding, cross-ethnic/faith economic engagements, and community-based dispute resolution mechanisms. [See Figure D.1 ASPIRE Logic Model.]

III. Zo Kwe Zo


Search for Common Ground's (SFCG) Zo Kwe Zo project has the overall goal of preventing inter-community violence and supporting an inclusive peacebuilding process in the Central African Republic (CAR). Its three specific objectives are to: (1) increase the participation of young women and men from diverse identity groups in peacebuilding processes; (2) amplify positive representations of nonviolent and collaborative voices in the media; and (3) enhance the capacity of non-state institutions to support a credible, peaceful, inclusive and transparent transition process.²⁵ SFCG works in partnership with the Association of Women Communications Professionals (AFPC), and a range of media and community-based civil society groups. Zo Kwe Zo's three primary target groups: young women and men from conflict parties, civil society and community based organizations, and media institutions, primarily radio. Primary activities over the two-year implementation period include training youth to deliver peace messages and promote solidarity events, broadcast radio soap operas and vox-pop programs to transform attitudes in support of nonviolence, work with local civil society groups to apply dialogue plans for peacebuilding initiatives, and develop institutional capacity of its local partners.

SFCG and its partners will implement Zo Kwe Zo in Bangui, Bossangoa, and Bangassou. In 2012, Bangassou was one of the first areas that the *Séléka* rebels seized on their march to Bangui, which is the national capital and center of political decision-making. In Bangui half the population was

²⁵ Search for Common Ground proposal submitted to USAID East Africa Mission in response to APS-OAA-14-00003, July 3, 2015.

displaced during the escalation of violence in 2013. Many members of the Muslim merchant class fled Bangui while others were literally barricaded in the PK 5 zone. As the home area of former president Bozizé, *Séléka* fighters targeted Bossangoa with particular brutality. Nearly all government officials and security forces fled, leaving both Christians and Muslims unprotected from the *Séléka* incursions and occupation as well as ruthless counter-attacks led by Antibalaka fighters. The town became physically divided with Christians taking shelter in the Catholic cathedral and Muslims gathered in the traditionally Muslim neighborhood of Boro. In 2014, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) escorted out of Bossangoa all Muslims who had not already fled the town and surrounding area. In all three locations, women have been particularly impacted by the conflict with some contributing to peacebuilding efforts through intra- and inter-religious women's associations and membership on local community-based dispute resolution committees. [See D.2 Zo Kwe Zo Logic Model.]

Figure D.1 ASPIRE Logic Model



KEY

Project Activities


Outputs

Short-term Outcomes

Medium-term Outcomes

Long-

Figure D.2 Zo Kwe Zo Logic Model



ANNEX E: PEACEBUILDING ROLES OF RELIGIOUS ACTORS, BY PROJECT

ROLE	HOPE Yala	PPST	ASPIRE	Zo Kwe Zo
Spiritual Leadership <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pastoral duties Spiritual guidance / interpretation / moral authority Ritual and symbolism Messaging and narrative formation (dissemination) Religious education/formation 	Mosque-based imams and monks as project educators on historical, cultural, religious matters (community project advisors)	none	Promotion of nonviolence and peace messaging	Intra-religious sensitization activities
Identity-Group Representation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Spokesperson Intra-religious dialogue Interfaith dialogue Advocacy (identity-based) 	(1) Inter-religious (inter-communal) activities of student participants (2) Inter-religious community participation in student-initiated projects	Inter-religious advocacy for peacebuilding (PAW)	Identity representation in inter-religious (inter-group) economic engagement	(1) Identity representation in inter-religious (cross-identity) youth engagement in solidarity events (2) Diverse identity-based voices to deepen understanding through media storytelling & messaging
Role Modeling Collaboration and Nonviolence <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exemplar Aspirational Heroic / Courageous 	none	Exemplar religious leaders expected to inspire peers to engage in peacebuilding activities	Bouar Inter-Religious Platform demonstrates joint respect & effort	Role model of collaborative and nonviolent peacebuilding

ROLE	HOPE Yala	PPST	ASPIRE	Zo Kwe Zo
Community Mobilization <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gatekeeper • Validator • Outreach & feedback liaison • Convening • Inter-religious joint activity • Advocacy (issue-based) 	(1) Mosque-based imams endorse/validate project	(1) Intra-religious dialogue (B4P) (2) Religious leaders feedback project advances to constituents (not project requirement)	Inter-religious (inter-group) economic engagement	Inter-religious (cross-identity) solidarity events
Dispute resolution <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mediation • Negotiation • De-escalation • Fact-finding • Faith-based diplomacy 	none	Participants in formal negotiation process as part of “local elite” (capacity-building beneficiaries)	(1) Community Peace Committees (2) Bouar Inter-Religious Platform	Committees for Peace & Mediation (capacity-building beneficiaries)
Conflict Transformation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Forgiveness, apology, confession, (re)conciliation • Trauma healing & psycho-social support • Reintegration • Social Cohesion & Trust-bldg 	none	none	Promotion of social cohesion for community-based reconciliation and resiliency	(1) Inter-religious youth engagement (training, joint reconciliation efforts) (2) Promotion of social cohesion for reconciliation and resiliency objectives
Justice <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Observation and witness • Restorative justice • Retributive justice • Truth and reconciliation commissions • 	none	none	none	none

ANNEX F: PROJECT THEORIES OF CHANGE

Program theories of change are helpful in understanding how and why change happens. P2P applications are required to include overarching theory of change, usually at the highest level of the results framework. Implicit within any design are specific program theories of change that explain the logic connecting lower level results to higher level results. To articulate the implicit program theories of change in each application the evaluation team first identified all results referenced in the application, both in the narratives and the log frames. These were then organized into an overall logic model (see annex X) for each program. Based on the application and the logic model the evaluation team framed the given and implicit program theories of change as “if...then...” statements. These are listed for each program in the tables below.

In Thailand the logic models and implicit program theories of change were shared with IP's. Unfortunately, there was not enough time for an in-depth validation of the logic model and theories. The models and theories for CAR were developed after the field work and have yet to be validated by the IPs.

SOUTH THAILAND PROJECTS	
HOPE Yala – Implicit Program Theories of Changes (7)	
If community and religious leaders have enhanced capacity and interactions with religious and community leaders are structured, then civil society leaders will have the confidence to lead activities in support of community needs.	
If community leaders are confident in leading activities, then they will be able to organize communities for positive change.	
If youth from different identity groups experience a series of interactions, and are trained in communications, then youth leaders will have (and use) the skills to settle grievances and build trust.	
If highly visible small-scale collective enterprises are implemented, 7 th -9 th graders will be able to connect parents and communities.	
If communities are organized for positive change and parents and communities are connected then the links between home, community and future will be strengthened and attitudes will be more understanding and accepting.	
If attitudes are more understanding, accepting and trusting and the links between home, community and future are more widely shared then people will be more inclined to address grievances through non-violent political discourse.	
If people address grievances through non-violent political discourse, the trust between Muslims and Buddhists will increase.	
PPST - Implicit Program Theories of Change (7)	
If local elites are trained, have experienced other realities and are informed, then they will address intra-communal conflict and monitor the situation.	
If local elites, with enhanced capacity and experience settling intra-communal conflict, monitor the situation, then they will be more effective in exerting pressure for the resumption of peace process.	
If Muslim and Buddhist women's organization dialogue and understand how their historical narratives are intertwined, then they will jointly generate action plans and implement community driven projects.	

If a documentary film is produced and disseminated about intertwined narratives and community projects are implemented, then there common understanding between community groups .
If common understanding between community groups & local elites increases then tensions will decrease.
If local elites are more effective in exerting pressure for the resumption of the peace process, then they can develop a common platform of demands for a peace agreement.
If inter-communal tensions are reduced and there is a common platform of demands then the prospects of higher-level peace talks succeeding is increased.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Zo Kwe Zo
Grand Theory 1 (from proposal): Transitional Institutions
If capacity and strategic support is provided to civil society to participate in transitional processes, then both civil society and transitional institutions will be better equipped to design and implement durable peace strategies.
Related implicit program theories of change (identified by the evaluation)
Responsive, credible interface: If civil society functions as a channel for popular demand and transitional structures respond to those demands then the dialogue platform will be a credible interface with citizens, government, population and the international community because participants believe their interests will be addressed.
Transition support: If the dialogue platform serves as an effective interface with citizens, government, population & international community then non-state institutions capacity to support credible, peaceful, inclusive transparent transition will be enhanced because they will be aware of and bring their resources to bear on the challenges and obstacles.
Prevention strategies: If civil society and transitional institutions design & implement durable peace strategies then inter-communal violence will be prevented because they will have already addressed many of the issues fueling violence.
Grand Theory 2 (from proposal): Shifting Attitudes
If conflicting parties engage collaboratively and constructively in their community through joint learning and action, then they will become less distrustful, more understanding of each other, and more resistant to violent mobilization.
Related implicit program theories of change (identified by evaluation)
Skilled handling of conflict: If young people have increased skills, motivation and confidence then they will be able to analyze conflict and mediate disputes because they will be familiar with non-violent means of handling conflict.
Personal responsibility: If diverse identity groups become aware of their personal responsibilities for peace then they will be less distrustful and more understanding of each other because they will no longer blame others for their situation.
Resilience to mobilization for violence: If conflict parties engage collaboratively and constructively in their communities then they will become more resilient mobilization for violence, because they are less likely to engage in violence with people they know.

ASPIRE
Theory of Change 1: If community leaders and disaffected youth from across lines of division collaborate to monitor and peacefully respond to conflicts, then they will be better able to help their communities resolve disputes and mitigate rising tensions, and violence will be reduced in targeted areas.
<i>Related implicit program theory of change (identified by evaluation)</i>
<i>Skilled handling of conflict:</i> If men, women, and youth leaders have the relevant and enhanced knowledge and skills on how to effectively mobilize and lead their communities to resolve conflicts peacefully, then they will actively champion initiatives that build peace and promote social cohesion because they would have enhanced self-image, confidence, influence, and authority to lead and guide their communities in the peaceful resolution of conflicts.
Theory of Change 2: If community leaders and disaffected youth identify and implement inter-group social and economic development projects, then they can have a direct impact on inter-group tensions and social cohesion at the community level.
<i>Related implicit program theory of change (identified by evaluation)</i>
<i>Resilience to mobilization for violence:</i> If communities in conflict have the opportunity to work together on economic activities that directly benefit them, then they will collaborate to create a peaceful environment that maximizes economic benefits to all because they would more directly connect the need for peace to their personal economic interests and gains.
Theory of Change 3: If community leaders and disaffected youth speak out in favor of peace, then community members will be less likely to view violence as a legitimate way to resolve differences, and strong constituencies for peace will connect with national decision-makers .
<i>Related implicit program theory of change (identified by evaluation)</i>
<i>Resilience to mobilization for violence:</i> If communities are mobilized to strongly articulate a desire for peace, and if community members refuse to join in fighting at their community levels and elsewhere in the country, then national leaders advocating for violent ways of resolving conflicts will have to work for peace because they will not have the moral, logistics, and material support and fighting forces to prosecute their agenda of violence.

ANNEX G: HOPE YALA STUDENT SURVEY SUMMARY

Date:
School Name:
Participant Code:

INFORMED CONSENT

(read aloud by Local Conflict Specialist on Evaluation Team)

This survey is part of an international study to research the role of religion in support of peace in Southern Thailand. The study will be used to help organizations to improve their work in Southern Thailand. Your participation is voluntary. You can skip any questions you do not want to answer. Your responses will be anonymous so you do not need to provide your name.

119 valid surveys used in analysis

161 initial respondents

38 respondents dropped - over the age of 13 years

4 respondents dropped - did not provide age

D1. What is your religious background? 119 responding
76%, 90 Muslims 24%, 29 Buddhists
D2. Are you male or female? 119 responding
<input type="checkbox"/> Male 31%, 37 <input type="checkbox"/> Female 71%, 82
D3. How old are you? 119 responding
9%, 11 12-year olds 91%, 108 13-year olds
D4. Are you a participant in the Hakam program? 119 responding
<input type="checkbox"/> Yes 35%, 42 <input type="checkbox"/> No 65%, 77
1. How important is religion in your life? (please pick one) 118 responding
<input type="checkbox"/> Not at all important 0%, 0 <input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat unimportant 0%, 0 <input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat important 3%, 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Very Important 97%, 114
2. In what ways do you engage with your community? (please check all that apply) 117 responding
<input type="checkbox"/> School activities/ school clubs 43%, 50 <input type="checkbox"/> Youth organizations (outside of school) 13%, 15 <input type="checkbox"/> Religious groups (outside of school) 21%, 24 <input type="checkbox"/> Community campaigns 42%, 51 <input type="checkbox"/> None of these 1%, 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) 1%, 1
HAKAM ACTIVITIES

<p>3. Of the following choices, which two of these most motivate you to be involved with your community? (please pick two) 119 responding</p>	
<input type="checkbox"/> To be with my friends	18%, 21
<input type="checkbox"/> It is my civic responsibility/duty	39%, 47
<input type="checkbox"/> It is my religious responsibility/duty	34%, 41
<input type="checkbox"/> It gives me something to do	57%, 68
<input type="checkbox"/> To support my family, friends or community	36%, 43
<input type="checkbox"/> To make the world a better place	20%, 24
<input type="checkbox"/> None of these	0%, 0
<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	0%, 0
<input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify)	0%, 0
<p>4. When I need to make an important decision, to whom do I usually go for guidance? (please pick one) 119 responding</p>	
<input type="checkbox"/> Family	76%, 91
<input type="checkbox"/> Teacher	20%, 24
<input type="checkbox"/> Religious Leader	4%, 5
<input type="checkbox"/> Government Leader	3%, 4
<input type="checkbox"/> Friend	4%, 5
<input type="checkbox"/> Religious Text	4%, 5
<input type="checkbox"/> News	2%, 2
<input type="checkbox"/> Other (please explain)	1%, 1
FRIENDS, FAMILY, TEACHER, COMMUNITY LEADER, RELIGIOUS LEADER	
<p>5. How often do you come in contact with youth from a religion different from your own? (please pick one) 119 responding</p>	
<input type="checkbox"/> Many times every day	37%, 44
<input type="checkbox"/> Once a day	8%, 9
<input type="checkbox"/> 3 to 5 times a week	11%, 13
<input type="checkbox"/> Once a month	8%, 10
<input type="checkbox"/> Less than once a month	22%, 26
<input type="checkbox"/> Never met someone from a different religion	13%, 15
<p>6. Where do you most frequently come in contact with youth from other religions? (please check all that apply) 119 responding</p>	
<input type="checkbox"/> My school	48%, 57
<input type="checkbox"/> Sporting events, playgrounds, recreation centers	26%, 31
<input type="checkbox"/> Market, shopping centers	9%, 11
<input type="checkbox"/> Youth centers/clubs (outside of school)	11%, 13
<input type="checkbox"/> Social events with friends from other religions	30, 36%
<input type="checkbox"/> Don't really come in frequent contact	12%, 14
<input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) - FACEBOOK	1%, 1
<p>7. How familiar are you with the religious beliefs and/or practices of religions that are different from yours? (please pick one) 117 responding</p>	
<input type="checkbox"/> Not at all familiar	21%, 25
<input type="checkbox"/> Not very familiar	18%, 21
<input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat familiar	40%, 47
<input type="checkbox"/> Very familiar	21%, 25

<p>8. From whom have you learned about other religions? <i>(please check all that apply)</i> 117 responding</p> <table> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Parents/family</td> <td>17%, 20</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> School/teachers</td> <td>77%, 90</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Friends from my religion</td> <td>7%, 8</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Friends from other religions</td> <td>24%, 28</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Religious leaders</td> <td>9%, 11</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Internet/social media</td> <td>18%, 21</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Don't know about others religion</td> <td>3%, 4</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Other <i>(please specify)</i></td> <td>0%, 0</td> </tr> </table>		<input type="checkbox"/> Parents/family	17%, 20	<input type="checkbox"/> School/teachers	77%, 90	<input type="checkbox"/> Friends from my religion	7%, 8	<input type="checkbox"/> Friends from other religions	24%, 28	<input type="checkbox"/> Religious leaders	9%, 11	<input type="checkbox"/> Internet/social media	18%, 21	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know about others religion	3%, 4	<input type="checkbox"/> Other <i>(please specify)</i>	0%, 0														
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<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know about others religion	3%, 4																														
<input type="checkbox"/> Other <i>(please specify)</i>	0%, 0																														
<p>9. Do you see people from different religions in your community working together toward peaceful co-existence? 117 responding</p> <table> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Yes</td> <td>84%, 98</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> No</td> <td>16%, 19</td> </tr> </table>		<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	84%, 98	<input type="checkbox"/> No	16%, 19																										
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<input type="checkbox"/> No	16%, 19																														
<p>10. If "yes," where do you see people from different religions working together toward peaceful co-existence? <i>(check all that apply)</i> 117 responding</p> <table> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Campaigns/public events</td> <td>53%, 63</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Joint community projects/initiatives</td> <td>46%, 55</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Holidays and celebrations</td> <td>17%, 20</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Don't see people from different religions working together toward peaceful co-existence</td> <td>13%, 15</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Other <i>(please explain)</i></td> <td>0%, 0</td> </tr> </table>		<input type="checkbox"/> Campaigns/public events	53%, 63	<input type="checkbox"/> Joint community projects/initiatives	46%, 55	<input type="checkbox"/> Holidays and celebrations	17%, 20	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't see people from different religions working together toward peaceful co-existence	13%, 15	<input type="checkbox"/> Other <i>(please explain)</i>	0%, 0																				
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<input type="checkbox"/> Other <i>(please explain)</i>	0%, 0																														
<p>11. Please indicate which of the following statements are true or false:</p> <p>Most religious leaders from my religion support peace efforts. 117 responding</p> <table> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> True</td> <td>77%, 90</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> False</td> <td>9%, 10</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Don't know</td> <td>15%, 17</td> </tr> </table> <p>Most religious leaders from other religions support peace efforts. 117 responding</p> <table> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> True</td> <td>47%, 55</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> False</td> <td>15%, 17</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Don't know</td> <td>38%, 45</td> </tr> </table> <p>Most people from other religions are probably just as moral as the people from my religion. 117 responding</p> <table> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> True</td> <td>36%, 47</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> False</td> <td>32%, 37</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Don't know</td> <td>32%, 37</td> </tr> </table> <p>Most youth in my community are able to support peace efforts in my community. 116 responding</p> <table> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> True</td> <td>67%, 78</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> False</td> <td>12%, 14</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Don't know</td> <td>21%, 25</td> </tr> </table> <p>I feel that I am able to support peace efforts in my community. 117 responding</p> <table> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> True</td> <td>62%, 72</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> False</td> <td>15%, 18</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Don't know</td> <td>23%, 27</td> </tr> </table>		<input type="checkbox"/> True	77%, 90	<input type="checkbox"/> False	9%, 10	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	15%, 17	<input type="checkbox"/> True	47%, 55	<input type="checkbox"/> False	15%, 17	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	38%, 45	<input type="checkbox"/> True	36%, 47	<input type="checkbox"/> False	32%, 37	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	32%, 37	<input type="checkbox"/> True	67%, 78	<input type="checkbox"/> False	12%, 14	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	21%, 25	<input type="checkbox"/> True	62%, 72	<input type="checkbox"/> False	15%, 18	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	23%, 27
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ANNEX H: CAR PROJECTS MINI-SURVEY SUMMARY

I. Profile of Interview Respondents

116 respondents with direct working relations with the two CMM Implementing partners participated in interviews or focus group discussions. The research conducted mini surveys with this category of respondents. In all, 77 of the respondents, representing 66% were from SFCG project locations/implementing partners while the remaining 34% worked under Mercy Corps.

Figure 1: Distribution of Respondents by CMM




Figure 2 presents the geographical distribution of respondents per interview sites. Notably, Bouar had a higher representation due to an over representation of women in one focus group. The women had scheduled their regular meeting for the same time and day. Even though the research team had asked the local partners to restrict participation in the FGD to not more than six (6), all the 17 women who came for the meeting joined and participated in the discussions.

Figure 2: Distribution of Respondents by Interview Site




Table 1 below shows the gender and age distribution of respondents who stated their gender and age.

Table 1
The

Table 1: Type of Participant by Gender Category of Respondent				
Type of Participant	Gender Category of Respondent			Total
	1 Male	2 Female	3 Not Stated	
1 Committee for Peace & Mediation	11	6	0	17
10 Not Indicated	7	4	4	15
2 Inter-Religious Platform	5	0	0	5
3 Peer Educator	9	1	0	10
4 Awareness workshop participant	5	3	0	8
5 Women's Group	0	23	0	23
6 Youth Leader	8	2	0	10
7 Journalists	4	0	0	4
8 Actor	6	6	0	12
9 Local Authority	11	1	0	12
Total	67	45	4	116

By religion, 68.1% (79/116) of respondents of all participation categories were Christians, with 27.6% (32/116) being Muslims. Five participants did not have their religion or participation categories captured in the data – Table 2.

Table 2: Type of Participant by Religion of Respondents

Type of Participant	Religion of Respondents			Total
	1 Christian	2 Muslim	4 Not Indicated	
1 Committee for Peace & Mediation	14	3	0	17
2 Inter-Religious Platform	4	1	0	5
3 Peer Educator	8	2	0	10
4 Awareness workshop participant	7	1	0	8
5 Women's Group	6	17	0	23
6 Youth Leader	9	1	0	10
7 Journalists	4	0	0	4
8 Actor	10	2	0	12
9 Local Authority	11	1	0	12
10 Not Indicated	6	4	5	15
Total	79	32	5	116

In all, 69 respondents provided data on their age categories. Figure 3 presents the distribution of the age categories of respondents by CMM Partner. The majority of respondents fell in the adult age group of 36 years and above, with the modal group of respondents being in the 36-55 age

category. The youth category, comprising respondents aged 18-35 constituted 40.6% (28/69) of the mini survey respondents who provide their ages – see Figure 3.

Figure 3a: Age Categories of Respondents by CMM Partner





Figure 3b Classification of Participants by Age Category



II. Preliminary Findings

1. Christians and Muslims have coexisted peacefully in Central African Republic for many decades

- Overall, 97.4% (113/116) of all respondent in all the locations of the survey strongly agreed that Christians and Muslims have coexisted peacefully in Central African Republic for many decades – Table 1.1
- By Implementing Partner, while all of the 39 respondents of Mercy Corps agreed strongly with the statement, only 96.1% of SFCG's respondents expressed the same level of agreement Table 1.2
- Of the 112 men and women, 109 (97.32%) strongly agreed that Christians and Muslims have coexisted peacefully in Central African Republic for many decades. About the same percentages of both male and females strongly agreed with the statement – 97.8% (44/45) females and 97.01% (65/67) males – Table 1.3
- By religious affiliations, 97.5% of Christians (77/79) and 96.9% Muslims (31/32) strongly agreed with the statement – Table 1.4
- Both youth and adults were about evenly split in respect of strong agreement with the statement – 96.4% for the youth and 97.6% for the adults – Table 1.5
- Except for the Actors and Local Authority categories of respondents, 100% of all other types of participants in the mini survey strongly agreed with the statement. However, 83.3% of Actors and 91.7% of the Local Authority respondents strongly agreed with the statement – Table 1.6

2. There is a role for religious leaders to play in support of nonviolent political debate

- 87.1% of respondents of all study sites strongly agreed with the statement that there is a role for religious leaders to play in support of nonviolent political debate. However, respondents from Bangui had the lowest rate for strong agreement with the statement (4.1% (20/27)); while Bossangoa registered 88.9% of respondents in strong agreement – Table 2.1
- 87.5% of respondents who indicated their gender category in the mini survey (98/112) strongly agreed with the statement that there is a role for religious leaders to play in support of nonviolent political debate. Male respondents of this category were more likely to agree strongly (89.6% or 60/67) than female respondents 84.5% or 38/45) – Table 2.2.
- By age categories, while 92.9% of the youth strongly agreed with the statement, the adults had 8.8% of their members strongly agreeing with the statement. – Table 2.3
- By religion, of the 112 respondents in the survey who indicated their faith affiliations, 87.39% strongly agreed with the statement. Muslim respondents were more likely to agree strongly with the statement (90.6% or 29/32) than Christian respondents 86.1% or 68 out of 79 in that subcategory – Table 2.4.
- Interviewees working with Mercy Corps had a higher level of strong agreement with the statement (92.3%) than those with SFCG (84.4%) – Table 2.5
- By type of participant, except for the Actors group which had 66.7% of its members strongly agreeing with the statement, all other categories had more than 80% of their members consenting to the statement – Table 2.6

3. Most religious leaders from your religion are working for peace

- Overall, 86.2% of respondents in all study sites strongly agreed with the statement that most religious leaders from their religion are working for peace. However, variations existed between sites. While all 2 respondents in Bossangoa agreed strongly with the statement, only 59.3% of respondents in Bangui, 89.7% in Bouar, and 95.7% in Bangassou agreed strongly with the statement – Table 3.1
- By Implementing Partner, only 84.4% of respondents working with SFCG and 89.7% for Mercy Corps agreed with the statement strongly – Table 3.2
- 87.5% of respondents who indicated their gender category in the mini survey (n=112) strongly agreed with the statement that there is a role for religious leaders to play in support of nonviolent political debate. Female respondents of this category were more likely to agree strongly (91.1% or 41/45) than male respondents 85% or 57/67) – Table 3.3.
- By faith category, in all 87.38% (n= 111) of the respondents who indicated what religion they belonged to strongly agreed with the statement. However, Muslim respondents (90.6% or 29/32) agreed more with the statement than Christian respondents (86.1% or 68/79) – Table 3.4
- By type of participants, youth leaders, Journalists, and participants in awareness creation workshops agreed strongly with the statement. However, only 60% of respondents from Interreligious Platforms (3/5) agreed with the statement strongly – Table 3.5
- By age, respondents were about evenly split – 87.% for youth and 85.4% for adults who strongly agreed with the statement – Table 3.6

4. Religious leaders have a lot of positive influence over the conflict in Central Africa Republic

- Overall, only 65.5% of the respondents (n = 116) agreed strongly that religious leaders have a lot of positive influence over the conflict in Central Africa Republic; with 1.6% somewhat agreeing. Respondents from Mercy Corps were more likely to agree strongly with the statement (84.6%) than their counterparts from SFCG – 55/8% - Table 4.1
- Respondents from Bangui were least positive in their level of strong agreement with the statement - 40.7% (11/27). Bossangoa reported 59.3% in strong agreement – Table 4.2
- 65.17% of the mini survey respondents who indicated their gender categories (n=112) strongly agreed that religious leaders have a lot of positive influence over the conflict in Central Africa Republic. More male respondents were willing to agree with the statement (71.6% or 48/67) than female respondents (25/45). Notably, 37.77% of the female respondents (17/45) wavered between somewhat agreeing to totally disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the statement, compared with 28.35% for men – Table 4.3.
- Along the faith divide, of the 111 respondents who indicated their faith affiliations, 73 or 65.76% strongly agreed with the statement. Between faiths, 64.6% of Christians and 68.8% of Muslims strongly agreed with the statement. There were more Christians in doubt or disagreeing with the statement (28/79) than Moslems 6/32 or 18.75% - Table 4.4
- By age, 1.4% of the youth respondents and 73.2% of adults agreed strongly with the statement – Table 4.5
- More than 65% of respondents in all participant categories strongly agreed with the statement. However, while 90% of Peer Educators were willing to express strong agreement with the statement, only 33.3% of Actors could subscribe to the same level of agreement – Table 4.6

5. Most people in your religion are moral

- Of the 116 respondents across both Implementing partners, only 36.2% (i.e. 42/116) agreed strongly with the statement that most people in their religion of affiliation are moral people; 29.3% somewhat agreed and 19.8% somewhat disagreed. Respondents from Mercy Corps participants recorded the lowest level of strong agreement (17.9) or 7/39 against SFCG's 45.5% (35/77) who strongly agreed with the statement - Table 5.1.
- By site of interview Bouar respondents recorded 17.9% (7/39), Bangui, 33.3% (9/27) strong agreement, and Bangassou, 47.8% (11/23). Bossangoa had the highest percentage of respondents who strongly agreed with the statement – 55.6% (15/27) – Table 5.2
- Of the 112 men and women who answered the question, only 35.7% (40/112) strongly agreed with the statement; Male respondents were more likely to agree strongly with the statement (40.3% or 27/67; or 24.1% of all respondents, n=112) than female respondents - 13/45 in that subcategory or 11.6% (or 13/112) of the all the respondents – Table 5.3.
- By faith traditions, 35.14% or 39 out of the 111 respondents who indicated their faith affiliations strongly agreed that most people in their religion groups are moral. Another 29.73% somewhat agreed, with the remaining 28.82% (32/112) either somewhat disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the statement. Between them, more Christians agreed very strongly with the statement (29/79 or 36.7% or 25.89% of all respondents) than Muslims – 10/32 i.e. 31.2% of Muslim respondents or 8.92% of n = 112 – Table 5.4
- By type of participants, only 13% of participants from women's groups (3/23) agreed strongly with the statement. Other groups with low levels of strong agreement are members of the IRPs and, Journalists. Respondents from Local Authorities had the highest score of 50% agreeing strongly with the statement. – Table 5.5
- By age, 31.2% of adults strongly agreed with the statement, compared to 17.9% of the youth – Table 5.6

6. People who belong to another religion are probably just as moral as the people in your religion

- Overall, only 34.5% of respondents from the two partner institutions agreed strongly with the statement that people who belong to another religions are probably just as moral as the people in their religion; 32.8% somewhat agreed, and 22.4% somewhat disagreed. Mercy Corps participants recorded 12.8% respondents who strongly disagreed with the statement, compared to the 3.9% from SFCG's participants. – Table 6.1
- By location of interview, Bangui had the lowest percentage of respondents who strongly agreed with the statement, with 55.6% of respondents from that location (15/2) indicating somewhat disagreement. Bouar, however, had the highest percentage of respondents who strongly disagreed with the statement (12.8% or 5/39) – Table 6.2
- 35.71% of all respondents who indicated their gender categories (n = 112) strongly agreed that people who belong to another religion are probably just as moral as the people in their religion. However, more men were likely to hold that view than women – 38.8% of men (26/67) than women 31.1% or 14/45 – Table 6.3.
- By religious affiliations, 36.03% of respondents (n=111) strongly agreed with the statement. Higher percentage of Muslims (40.6% or 13/32) agreed strongly with the statement than Christians 34.2% or 27/79) – Table 6.4.
- By type of participants, 34.5% of respondents of all categories strongly agreed with the statement. However, there were wide variations between categories, ranging from 20.0% levels of strong agreement for members of the IRP and Peer Educators, to 80% for youth leaders. Notably, 16.% of Actors, 20% of IRP members and Peer Educators, as well as, 25% of journalist, strongly disagreed with the statement – Table 6.5
- By age categories, while 39% of adults strongly agreed with the statement, 1.9% strongly disagreed with it – Table 6.6

III. Aggregated Raw Data

I. Christians and Muslims have coexisted peacefully in Central African Republic for many decades

Table I.1 Christians and Muslims Coexisted Before BY Place of Interview					
Responses	Locality Place of Interview				Total
	1 Bangui	2 Bangassou	3 Bossangoa	4 Bouar	
1 Strongly Agree	27	21	26	39	113
	100.0%	91.3%	96.3%	100.0%	97.4%
2 Somewhat Agree	0	0	1	0	1
	0.0%	0.0%	3.7%	0.0%	0.9%
3 Somewhat Disagree	0	1	0	0	1
	0.0%	4.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%
5 Skipped	0	1	0	0	1
	0.0%	4.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%
Total	27	23	27	39	116
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table I.2 Christians and Muslims Coexisted Before BY IP Implementing Partner			
Responses	IP Implementing Partner		Total
	Mercy Corps	Search For Common Grounds	
1 Strongly Agree	39	74	113
	100.0%	96.1%	97.4%
2 Somewhat Agree	0	1	1
	0.0%	1.3%	0.9%
3 Somewhat Disagree	0	1	1
	0.0%	1.3%	0.9%
5 Skipped	0	1	1
	0.0%	1.3%	0.9%
Total	39	77	116
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 1.3 Christians and Muslims Coexisted Before BY Gender Category of Respondent			
Responses	Gender Category of Respondent		Total
	Male	Female	
Strongly Agree	65	44	109
	97.00%	97.80%	97.32%
Somewhat Agree	1	0	1
	1.50%	0.00%	0.89%
Somewhat Disagree	1	0	1
	1.50%	0.00%	0.89%
Skipped	0	1	1
	0.00%	2.20%	0.89%
Total	67	45	112

Table 1.4 Christians and Muslims Coexisted Before by Religion of Respondents

Response	Christian	Muslim	Total
Strongly Agree	77	31	108
	97.5%	96.9%	97.29%
Somewhat Agree	1	0	1
	1.3%	0.0%	0.9%
Somewhat Disagree	0	1	1
	0.0%	3.1%	0.9%
Skipped	1	0	1
	1.3%	0.0%	0.9%
Total	79	32	111

Table 1.5 Christians and Muslims Coexisted Before By New Age Category of Respondents

Responses	New Age Category of Respondents		Total
	Youth ≤ 36 years	Adult >36 years	
Strongly Agree	27	40	67
	96.4%	97.6%	97.1%
Somewhat Disagree	0	1	1
	0.0%	2.4%	1.4%
Skipped	1	0	1
	3.6%	0.0%	1.4%
Total	28	41	69
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 1.6 Christians and Muslims Coexisted Before BY Type of Participant

Responses	Type of Participant										Total
	1 Committ ee for Peace & Mediation	10 Not Indicate d	2 Inter-Religio us Platfor m	3 Peer Educat or	4 Awarene ss worksho p participa nt	5 Women 's Group	6 Yout h Leade r	7 Journalis ts	8 Actor	9 Local Authori ty	
1 Strongly Agree	17 100.0%	15 100.0%	5 100.0%	10 100.0%	8 100.0%	23 100.0%	10 100.0%	4 100.0%	10 83.3%	11 91.7%	113 97.4%
2 Somewh at Agree	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	1 8.3%	1 0.9%
3 Somewh at Disagree	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	1 8.3%	0 0.0%	1 0.9%
5 Skipped	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	1 8.3%	0 0.0%	1 0.9%
Total	17 100.0%	15 100.0%	5 100.0%	10 100.0%	8 100.0%	23 100.0%	10 100.0%	4 100.0%	12 100.0%	12 100.0%	116 100.0%

2. There is a role for religious leaders to play in support of nonviolent political debate (NonviolentRole)

Table 2.1 Religious Leaders Support Nonviolence BY Locality Place of Interview

Responses		Locality Place of Interview				Total
		1 Bangui	2 Bangassou	3 Bossangoa	4 Bouar	
1 Strongly Agree		20	21	24	36	101
		74.1%	91.3%	88.9%	92.3%	87.1%
2 Somewhat Agree		7	1	2	3	13
		25.9%	4.3%	7.4%	7.7%	11.2%
4 Strongly Disagree		0	0	1	0	1
		0.0%	0.0%	3.7%	0.0%	0.9%
5 Skipped		0	1	0	0	1
		0.0%	4.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%
Total		27	23	27	39	116
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Table 2.2 Role of Religious Leaders Support Nonviolence
by Gender Category of Respondent**

	Male	Female	Total
1 Strongly Agree	60	38	98
	89.60%	84.40%	87.10%
2 Somewhat Agree	6	6	13
	9.00%	13.30%	11.20%
4 Strongly Disagree	1	0	1
	1.50%	0.00%	0.90%
5 Skipped	0	1	1
	0.00%	2.20%	0.90%
Total	67	45	112

**Table 2.3 Religious Leaders Support Nonviolence
BY New Age Category of Respondents**

Response	New Age Category of Respondents		Total
	Youth ≤ 36 years	Adult > 36 years	
1 Strongly Agree	26	36	62
	92.9%	87.8%	89.9%
2 Somewhat Agree	1	5	6
	3.6%	12.2%	8.7%
5 Skipped	1	0	1
	3.6%	0.0%	1.4%
Total	28	41	69
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Table 2.4 Religious Leaders Support Nonviolence
BY Religion of Respondents**

Responses	Christian	Muslim	Total
Strongly Agree	68	29	97
	86.10%	90.60%	87.39%
Somewhat Agree	9	3	13
	11.40%	9.40%	11.71%
Strongly Disagree	1	0	1
	1.30%	0.00%	0.90%
Skipped	1	0	1
	1.30%	0.00%	0.90%
Total	79	32	111

Table 2.5 Religious Leaders Support Nonviolence BY IP Implementing Partner			
Religious Leaders Support Nonviolence	IP Implementing Partner		Total
	Mercy Corps	Search For Common Grounds	
1 Strongly Agree	36	65	101
	92.3%	84.4%	87.1%
2 Somewhat Agree	3	10	13
	7.7%	13.0%	11.2%
4 Strongly Disagree	0	1	1
	0.0%	1.3%	0.9%
5 Skipped	0	1	1
	0.0%	1.3%	0.9%
Total	39	77	116
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 2.6 Religious Leaders Support Nonviolence BY Type of Participant											
Responses	Type of Participant										Total
	1 Committee for Peace & Mediation	10 Not Indicated	2 Inter- Religious Platform	3 Peer Educator	4 Awareness workshop participant	5 Women's Group	6 Youth Leader	7 Journalists	8 Actor	9 Local Authority	
Strongly Agree	15	11	4	10	8	21	10	3	8	11	101
	88.2%	73.3%	80.0%	100.0%	100.0%	91.3%	100.0%	75.0%	66.7%	91.7%	87.1%
Somewhat Agree	2	4	1	0	0	2	0	0	3	1	13
	11.8%	26.7%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	8.7%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	8.3%	11.2%
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%
Skipped	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	8.3%	0.0%	0.9%
Total	17	15	5	10	8	23	10	4	12	12	116
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

3. Most religious leaders from your religion are working for peace (WorkforPeace)

Table 3.1 Religious Leaders Work for Peace BY Locality Place of Interview						
Responses		Locality Place of Interview				Total
		Bangui	Bangassou	Bossangoa	Bouar	
1 Strongly Agree		16	22	27	35	100
		59.3%	95.7%	100.0%	89.7%	86.2%
2 Somewhat Agree		8	0	0	3	11
		29.6%	0.0%	0.0%	7.7%	9.5%
3 Somewhat Disagree		1	0	0	1	2
		3.7%	0.0%	0.0%	2.6%	1.7%
5 Skipped		2	1	0	0	3
		7.4%	4.3%	0.0%	0.0%	2.6%
Total		27	23	27	39	116
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 3.2 Religious Leaders Work for Peace BY IP Implementing Partner			
Religious Leaders Work for Peace	IP Implementing Partner		Total
	1 Mercy Corps	2 Search For Common Grounds	
1 Strongly Agree	35	65	100
	89.7%	84.4%	86.2%
2 Somewhat Agree	3	8	11
	7.7%	10.4%	9.5%
3 Somewhat Disagree	1	1	2
	2.6%	1.3%	1.7%
5 Skipped	0	3	3
	0.0%	3.9%	2.6%
Total	39	77	116
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 3.3 Religious Leaders Work for Peace BY Gender Category of Respondent			
Responses	Gender Category of Respondent		
	1 Male	2 Female	Total
1 Strongly Agree	57	41	98
	85.10%	91.10%	87.50%
2 Somewhat Agree	6	3	11
	9.00%	6.70%	9.82%
3 Somewhat Disagree	2	0	2
	3.00%	0.00%	1.79%
5 Skipped	2	1	3
	3.00%	2.20%	2.68%
Total	67	45	112

Table 3.4 Religious Leaders Work for Peace BY Religion of Respondents

Responses		Christian	Muslim	Total
1 Strongly Agree		68	29	97
		86.10%	90.60%	86.20%
2 Somewhat Agree		7	2	11
		8.90%	6.20%	9.50%
3 Somewhat Disagree		2	0	2
		2.50%	0.00%	1.70%
5 Skipped		2	1	3
		2.50%	3.10%	2.60%
Total		79	32	111

Table 3.5 Religious Leaders Work for Peace BY Type of Participant

Responses	Type of Participant										Total
	1 Committee for Peace & Mediation	10 Not Indicated	2 Inter-Religious Platform	3 Peer Educator	4 Awareness workshop participant	5 Women's Group	6 Youth Leader	7 Journalists	8 Actor	9 Local Authority	
Strongly Agree	16	10	3	8	8	22	10	4	8	11	100
	94.1%	66.7%	60.0%	80.0%	100.0%	95.7%	100.0%	100.0%	66.7%	91.7%	86.2%
Somewhat Agree	1	4	1	2	0	0	0	0	3	0	11
	5.9%	26.7%	20.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	25.0%	0.0%	9.5%
Somewhat Disagree	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	8.3%	0.0%	1.7%
Skipped	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	3
	0.0%	6.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	8.3%	2.6%
Total	17	15	5	10	8	23	10	4	12	12	116
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Table 3.6 Religious Leaders Work for Peace
BY New Age Category of Respondents**

Response	Youth ≤ 36 years	Adult > 36 years	
Strongly Agree	24	35	59
	85.70%	85.40%	85.50%
Somewhat Agree	3	4	7
	10.70%	9.80%	10.10%
Somewhat Disagree	1	1	2
	3.60%	2.40%	2.90%
Skipped	0	1	1
	0.00%	2.40%	1.40%
Total	28	41	69

4. Religious leaders have a lot of positive influence over the conflict in Central Africa Republic (PositiveInfluence)

Table 4.1 Religious Leaders Have Positive Influence BY IP Implementing Partner			
Religious Leaders Have Positive Influence	IP Implementing Partner		Total
	1 Mercy Corps	2 Search For Common Grounds	
1 Strongly Agree	33	43	76
	84.6%	55.8%	65.5%
2 Somewhat Agree	5	20	25
	12.8%	26.0%	21.6%
3 Somewhat Disagree	1	9	10
	2.6%	11.7%	8.6%
4 Strongly Disagree	0	1	1
	0.0%	1.3%	0.9%
5 Skipped	0	4	4
	0.0%	5.2%	3.4%
Total	39	77	116
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 4.2 Religious Leaders Have Positive Influence BY Locality Place of Interview						
Religious Leaders Have Positive Influence		Locality Place of Interview				Total
		1 Bangui	2 Bangassou	3 Bossangoa	4 Bouar	
1 Strongly Agree		11	16	16	33	76
		40.7%	69.6%	59.3%	84.6%	65.5%
2 Somewhat Agree		6	3	11	5	25
		22.2%	13.0%	40.7%	12.8%	21.6%
3 Somewhat Disagree		7	2	0	1	10
		25.9%	8.7%	0.0%	2.6%	8.6%
4 Strongly Disagree		1	0	0	0	1
		3.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%
5 Skipped		2	2	0	0	4
		7.4%	8.7%	0.0%	0.0%	3.4%
Total		27	23	27	39	116
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 4.3 Religious Leaders Have Positive Influence BY Gender Category of Respondent			
Responses	Male	Female	Total
1 Strongly Agree	48	25	73
	71.60%	55.60%	65.18%
2 Somewhat Agree	13	11	25
	19.40%	24.40%	22.32%
3 Somewhat Disagree	5	5	10
	7.50%	11.10%	8.93%
4 Strongly Disagree	0	1	1
	0.00%	2.20%	0.89%
5 Skipped	1	3	4
	1.50%	6.70%	3.57%
Total	67	45	112

Table 4.4 Religious Leaders Have Positive Influence BY Religion of Respondents			
Responses	Religion of Respondents		Total
	1 Christian	2 Muslim	
1 Strongly Agree	51	22	73
	64.60%	68.80%	65.76%
2 Somewhat Agree	20	4	24
	25.30%	12.50%	21.62%
3 Somewhat Disagree	6	4	10
	7.60%	12.50%	9.0%
4 Strongly Disagree	0	0	1
	0.00%	0.00%	0.89%
5 Skipped	2	2	4
	2.50%	6.20%	3.60%
Total	79	32	111

Table 4.5 Religious Leaders Have Positive Influence BY New Age Category of Respondents				
Responses		New Age Category of Respondents		Total
		1.00 Youth	2.00 Adult	
1 Strongly Agree		20	30	50
		71.4%	73.2%	72.5%
2 Somewhat Agree		4	5	9
		14.3%	12.2%	13.0%
3 Somewhat Disagree		3	5	8
		10.7%	12.2%	11.6%
5 Skipped		1	1	2
		3.6%	2.4%	2.9%
Total		28	41	69

Responses	Table 4.6 Religious Leaders Have Positive Influence BY Type of Participant										
	Type of Participant										Total
	1 Committee for Peace & Mediation	10 Not Indicated	2 Inter-Religious Platform	3 Peer Educator	4 Awareness workshop participant	5 Women's Group	6 Youth Leader	7 Journalists	8 Actor	9 Local Authority	
Strongly Agree	12 70.6%	6 40.0%	4 80.0%	9 90.0%	5 62.5%	15 65.2%	8 80.0%	3 75.0%	4 33.3%	10 83.3%	76 65.5%
Somewhat Agree	3 17.6%	5 33.3%	1 20.0%	1 10.0%	3 37.5%	6 26.1%	0 0.0%	1 25.0%	4 33.3%	1 8.3%	25 21.6%
Somewhat Disagree	2 11.8%	1 6.7%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	1 4.3%	2 20.0%	0 0.0%	3 25.0%	1 8.3%	10 8.6%
Strongly Disagree	0 0.0%	1 6.7%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	1 0.9%
Skipped	0 0.0%	2 13.3%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	1 4.3%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	1 8.3%	0 0.0%	4 3.4%
Total	17 100.0%	15 100.0%	5 100.0%	10 100.0%	8 100.0%	23 100.0%	10 100.0%	4 100.0%	12 100.0%	12 100.0%	116 100.0%

5. Most people in your religion are moral

Table 5.1 Moral Co-religionists are Moral People BY IP Implementing Partner					
			IP Implementing Partner		Total
			1 Mercy Corps	2 Search For Common Grounds	
	1 Strongly Agree		7	35	42
			17.9%	45.5%	36.2%
	2 Somewhat Agree		10	24	34
			25.6%	31.2%	29.3%
	3 Somewhat Disagree		10	13	23
			25.6%	16.9%	19.8%
	4 Strongly Disagree		7	3	10
			17.9%	3.9%	8.6%
	5 Skipped		5	2	7
			12.8%	2.6%	6.0%
Total			39	77	116
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 5.2 Moral Co-religionists are Moral People BY Locality Place of Interview							
			Locality Place of Interview				Total
			1 Bangui	2 Bangassou	3 Bossangoa	4 Bouar	
	1 Strongly Agree		9	11	15	7	42
			33.3%	47.8%	55.6%	17.9%	36.2%
	2 Somewhat Agree		10	7	7	10	34
			37.0%	30.4%	25.9%	25.6%	29.3%
	3 Somewhat Disagree		5	5	3	10	23
			18.5%	21.7%	11.1%	25.6%	19.8%
	4 Strongly Disagree		2	0	1	7	10
			7.4%	0.0%	3.7%	17.9%	8.6%
	5 Skipped		1	0	1	5	7
			3.7%	0.0%	3.7%	12.8%	6.0%
Total			27	23	27	39	116
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 5.3 Moral Co-religionists are Moral People BY Respondent Gender

Responses	Gender Category of Respondent		
	1 Male	2 Female	Total
1 Strongly Agree	27	13	40
	40.30%	28.90%	35.71%
2 Somewhat Agree	25	8	33
	37.30%	17.80%	29.46%
3 Somewhat Disagree	10	12	22
	14.90%	26.70%	19.64%
4 Strongly Disagree	3	7	10
	4.50%	15.60%	8.93%
5 Skipped	2	5	7
	3.00%	11.10%	6.25%
Total	67	45	112

Table 5.4 Moral Co-religionists are Moral People BY Religion of Respondents

Responses	Religion of Respondents		
	1 Christian	2 Muslim	Total
1 Strongly Agree	29	10	39
	36.70%	31.20%	35.14%
2 Somewhat Agree	27	6	33
	34.20%	18.80%	29.73%
3 Somewhat Disagree	17	5	22
	21.50%	15.60%	19.82%
4 Strongly Disagree	4	6	10
	5.10%	18.80%	9.01%
5 Skipped	2	5	7
	2.50%	15.60%	6.31%
Total	79	32	111

Table 5.5 Moral Co-religionists are Moral People BY Type of Participant

Responses	Type of Participant										Total
	1 Committee for Peace & Mediation	10 Not Indicated	2 Inter-Religious Platform	3 Peer Educator	4 Awareness workshop participant	5 Women's Group	6 Youth Leader	7 Journalists	8 Actor	9 Local Authority	
1 Strongly Agree	6 35.3%	7 46.7%	1 20.0%	3 30.0%	4 50.0%	3 13.0%	6 60.0%	1 25.0%	5 41.7%	6 50.0%	42 36.2%
2 Somewhat Agree	6 35.3%	6 40.0%	3 60.0%	3 30.0%	0 0.0%	4 17.4%	3 30.0%	1 25.0%	2 16.7%	6 50.0%	34 29.3%
3 Somewhat Disagree	4 23.5%	2 13.3%	1 20.0%	4 40.0%	4 50.0%	5 21.7%	1 10.0%	0 0.0%	2 16.7%	0 0.0%	23 19.8%
4 Strongly Disagree	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	7 30.4%	0 0.0%	1 25.0%	2 16.7%	0 0.0%	10 8.6%
5 Skipped	1 5.9%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	4 17.4%	0 0.0%	1 25.0%	1 8.3%	0 0.0%	7 6.0%
Total	17 100.0%	15 100.0%	5 100.0%	10 100.0%	8 100.0%	23 100.0%	10 100.0%	4 100.0%	12 100.0%	12 100.0%	116 100.0%

Table 5.6 Moral Co-religionists are Moral People BY Respondent New Age Category

Responses	New Age Category of Respondents		
	Youth ≤ 36 years	Adult > 36 years	Total
1 Strongly Agree	5	13	18
	17.90%	31.70%	26.10%
2 Somewhat Agree	6	12	18
	21.40%	29.30%	26.10%
3 Somewhat Disagree	9	9	18
	32.10%	22.00%	26.10%
4 Strongly Disagree	3	6	9
	10.70%	14.60%	13.00%
5 Skipped	5	1	6
	17.90%	2.40%	8.70%
Total	28	41	69

6. People who belong to another religion are probably just as moral as the people in your religion (MoralOther)

Table 6.1 People of other faiths are just as moral BY IP Implementing Partner			
Responses	IP Implementing Partner		Total
	1 Mercy Corps	2 Search For Common Grounds	
1 Strongly Agree	12	28	40
	30.8%	36.4%	34.5%
2 Somewhat Agree	11	27	38
	28.2%	35.1%	32.8%
3 Somewhat Disagree	8	18	26
	20.5%	23.4%	22.4%
4 Strongly Disagree	5	3	8
	12.8%	3.9%	6.9%
5 Skipped	3	1	4
	7.7%	1.3%	3.4%
Total	39	77	116

Table 6.2 People of other faiths are just as moral BY Locality Place of Interview					
Responses	Locality Place of Interview				Total
	1 Bangui	2 Bangassou	3 Bossangoa	4 Bouar	
1 Strongly Agree	3	12	13	12	40
	11.1%	52.2%	48.1%	30.8%	34.5%
2 Somewhat Agree	7	10	10	11	38
	25.9%	43.5%	37.0%	28.2%	32.8%
3 Somewhat Disagree	15	0	3	8	26
	55.6%	0.0%	11.1%	20.5%	22.4%
4 Strongly Disagree	2	0	1	5	8
	7.4%	0.0%	3.7%	12.8%	6.9%
5 Skipped	0	1	0	3	4
	0.0%	4.3%	0.0%	7.7%	3.4%
Total	27	23	27	39	116

Table 6.3 People of other faiths are just as moral BY Gender Category of Respondent

Responses	Gender Category of Respondent		
	Male	Female	Total
1 Strongly Agree	26	14	40
	38.80%	31.10%	35.71%
2 Somewhat Agree	21	16	37
	31.30%	35.60%	33.03%
3 Somewhat Disagree	15	8	23
	22.40%	17.80%	20.53%
4 Strongly Disagree	5	3	8
	7.50%	6.70%	7.14%
5 Skipped	0	4	4
	0.00%	8.90%	3.57%
Total	67	45	112

Table 6.4 People of other faiths are just as moral BY Religion of Respondents

Responses	Religion of Respondents		
	1 Christian	2 Muslim	Total
1 Strongly Agree	27	13	40
	34.20%	40.60%	36.03%
2 Somewhat Agree	29	7	36
	36.70%	21.90%	32.43%
3 Somewhat Disagree	17	6	23
	21.50%	18.80%	20.72%
4 Strongly Disagree	5	3	8
	6.30%	9.40%	7.20%
5 Skipped	1	3	4
	1.30%	9.40%	3.60%
Total	79	32	111

Table 6.5 MoralOther People of other faiths are just as moral BY Type of Participant											
	Type of Participant										Total
	1 Committ ee for Peace & Mediatio n	10 Not Indicat ed	2 Inter- Religio us Platfor m	3 Peer Educat or	4 Awaren ess worksh op participa nt	5 Wome n's Group	6 Yout h Lead er	7 Journali sts	8 Acto r	9 Local Author ity	
1 Strongly Agree	8 47.1%	2 13.3%	1 20.0%	2 20.0%	2 25.0%	8 34.8%	8 80.0%	1 25.0%	2 16.7%	6 50.0%	40 34.5%
2 Somew hat Agree	3 17.6%	6 40.0%	3 60.0%	4 40.0%	6 75.0%	7 30.4%	1 10.0%	2 50.0%	4 33.3%	2 16.7%	38 32.8%
3 Somew hat Disagre e	6 35.3%	7 46.7%	0 0.0%	2 20.0%	0 0.0%	3 13.0%	1 10.0%	0 0.0%	3 25.0%	4 33.3%	26 22.4%
4 Strongly Disagre e	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	1 20.0%	2 20.0%	0 0.0%	2 8.7%	0 0.0%	1 25.0%	2 16.7%	0 0.0%	8 6.9%
5 Skipped	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	3 13.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	1 8.3%	0 0.0%	4 3.4%
Total	17 100.0%	15 100.0%	5 100.0%	10 100.0%	8 100.0%	23 100.0%	10 100.0%	4 100.0%	12 100.0%	12 100.0%	116 100.0%

Table 6.6 People of other faiths are just as moral By Respondent New Age Category

Responses	New Age Category of Respondents		Total
	Youth ≤ 36 years	Adult > 36 years	
1 Strongly Agree	8 28.6%	16 39.0%	24 34.8%
2 Somewhat Agree	9 32.1%	13 31.7%	22 31.9%
3 Somewhat Disagree	3 10.7%	9 22.0%	12 17.4%
4 Strongly Disagree	5 17.9%	2 4.9%	7 10.1%
5 Skipped	3 10.7%	1 2.4%	4 5.8%
Total	28 40.6%	41 59.4%	69 100.0%

ANNEX I: EVALUATION RUBRIC APPLIED TO RECONCILIATION FUND PROJECTS

Key Issue	None	Marginal	Operational <i>supports project implementation</i>	Strategic <i>linked to achieving project objectives</i>	Strategic & Sufficient <i>efficacy determined at endline</i>
IMPLEMENTATION					
Centrality of religious actors in program	No role / non-engagement Implicit role non-distinguishable from other actors	Token representative Explicit role but non-distinguishable from other actors	Implementation role (e.g., logistical, advisory, consultative)	Principle change agent in project	Adequate number and project area coverage of change agents with high visibility, influence and/or responsibility to make lasting contributions to project objectives.
Implementation challenges, facilitators and opportunities related to religious dynamics	No documented consideration of religious dynamics for planning or implementation of project	Identifies challenges, facilitators or opportunities in context assessment but no link to project design or implementation	Links challenges, facilitators or opportunities to project design or implementation	Identifies challenges, facilitators or opportunities and develops appropriate responses that will support successful achievement of project objectives.	Accurate and comprehensive assessment with ongoing monitoring of evolving circumstances, flexibility in adaptation to change and effective responses in design.
Participants' perceptions of religion's relevancy to achieving project objectives (relevancy related to right issue, context, time)	No documented consideration of participants' perceptions of relevance	Participants do not understand or see how religion is relevant to achieving project implementation or objectives	Participants consider religion to be relevant for project's implementation	Participants consider religion to be relevant to achieving project goals.	Participants consider religion to be relevant to meeting project objectives as well as linked to project's contributions to Peace Writ Large.

EFFECTIVENESS					
Changes in attitudes, knowledge and behavior related to religious actors	No expected changes linked to religion or religious actors	Expected changes will affect religious actors only to extent that they are part of larger targeted beneficiary group	Expected changes related to religion or religious actors tracked through disaggregation of monitoring data or through implementation strategies to address religious identity in participant recruitment	Expected changes disaggregated by religion or religious actors with analysis on explanation of differences	Desired changes achieved. Modifications of project design to respond to religion-based differences in results, including addressing Do No Harm concerns and (when appropriate) specialization of approaches for religious actors different from secular actors.
Efficacy of religious actors in mitigating conflict/peacebuilding	No focus on religious actors for conflict mitigation/peacebuilding	No distinction between religious and secular actors for conflict mitigation/peacebuilding	Disaggregation of data in tracking participation of religious actors in conflict mitigation/peacebuilding capacity-building and mechanisms.	Project design & results tracking reflects religious actors' strategic advantage or specialized role in contributing to project's conflict mitigation/peacebuilding objectives.	Adequate capacity for religious actors to be effective in their conflict mitigation/peacebuilding contributions and external stakeholder recognition and appreciation for contribution.
Use of religious messaging	No use of religious messaging in project.	Messaging has only implicit religious content (e.g., posters features a women wearing headscarves but message has no religious content).	Messaging is intended to facilitate implementation of activities (e.g., religious value statements used in training materials).	Messages related to religious values, texts, practices, beliefs are intended to support a project objective.	Religious messages are targeted, timely, widely disseminated and repeated over time. There is evidence of public uptake and adoption of message.
Religious considerations related to project components (e.g., conflict assessment, project design, Do No Harm, participant selection, M&E, procurement, staffing) linked to intended results	Religion not taken into account for project components.	Religious consideration was taken into account for project components with little uptake (e.g., religion mentioned in conflict analysis but no link to project design).	Religious considerations of project components inform implementation plans.	Religious components of project components are linked to expected project results.	Religious considerations are appropriately integrated into each project component and are critical to achieving project results throughout the project area.

EFFECTIVENESS (continued)					
Theories of change related to intra- and/or inter-religious change	No reference to religion in TOC.	Religion is only an implicit aspect of TOC.	TOC includes religion in If statement (independent variable, planned activity).	TOC includes religion in Then statement (dependent variable, expected result).	TOC related to religion is validated and associated assumptions hold.
Intra-religious action	Project does not engage in intra-religious initiatives.	Project acknowledges intra-religious dynamics in context assessment but has no explicit intra-religious activities.	One or more intra-religious activities implemented but unrelated to project objectives (e.g., works with single-identity groups for logistical ease of implementation)	One or more intra-religious activities to advance project objectives (e.g., intra-religious sensitization in preparation for cross-identity efforts)	An integral part of project strategy with widespread intra-religious actions linked to PWL.
Inter-religious action	Project does not engage in inter-religious initiatives.	Project acknowledges inter-religious dynamics in context assessment but has no explicit inter-religious activities.	One or more intra-religious activities implemented but unrelated to project objectives (e.g., working with youth group with religious diversity of membership but with no direct relevancy or sensitivity to project activity)	One or more inter-religious activities to advance project objectives (e.g., inter-religious economic projects to improve understanding and build inter-group relationships)	An integral part of project strategy with widespread inter-religious actions linked to PWL.
Use of religion for positive mobilizing of participants	No mobilizations based on religion.	Religion recognized as a mobilizer but not integrated into project activities.	Religion used for outreach or to encourage participation in project activities.	Religion mobilizes key actors to participate in transformative action related to project objectives.	Religion mobilizes key actors of all faith groups for key interventions contributing to PWL.
Key Issue	None	Marginal	Operational supports project implementation	Strategic linked to achieving project objectives	Strategic & Sufficient efficacy determined at endline

SUSTAINABILITY

Capabilities, processes, institutions or relationships supportive of ongoing adaptability of achieved results	No planning regarding adaptability/ No mechanisms for identifying needs for adaptability related to religion.	Conceptual recognition that adaptation may be needed, but has no religious-based mechanism or plan for doing so.	Adaptation priorities related to religion identified and steps to support achieving these priorities incorporated into implementation plan but only related to continuation of project activities.	Adaptation priorities related to religion identified and steps to support achieving these priorities incorporated into implementation plan including use of monitoring data to support adaptability of project results.	Able to influence key people and institutions to support relevant adaptations in the project priorities, design, implementation and objectives.
Preparation for external conditions that are likely to support or undermine sustainability	No consideration of external conditions related to religion	Assessment of external conditions related to religion incomplete or limited to present conditions (e.g., no mention of potential shifts in current dynamics).	Assessment of external conditions related to religion focus only on those that impact ability to implement the project.	Assessment of external conditions related to religion focus on both threats/opportunities for implementation and also project's intended results.	Monitoring and review of external conditions related to religion with timely pre-emptive project modifications to improve sustainability prospects.

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